Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I just wish that they used bcrypt instead of a salted SHA256 but at least it's salted (and anyway in my case I never reuse passwords so no big deal). If they fall under PCI:DSS, they might not be able to use bcrypt since it isn't an official recommended standard. (I am of course assuming that they mean PBKDF2 when they say salted SHA256.)
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_glossary_v... seems to list Blowfish as an approved standard as far as the PCI standards group is concerned.
From http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/4781/do-any-secu..., I gather this: bcrypt is neither a NIST or FIPs standard, but PBKDF2 is.
> For any business required to comply with U.S. NIST or FIPS standards, bcrypt is not a valid option. Check every nation's laws and regulations separately if you do business there, of course.
However, from a comment on this other answer: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11552/would-it-m..., someone mentions this:
> As far as I know, PCI doesn't specify actual technology, especially Encryption specifications. The legal cases I've seen support what's technically feasible, not technically ideal or perfect. I'm sure either one [bcrypt or PBKDF2] meets PCI requirements
An opinion shared by many people that deal with PCI, is that you follow PCI not to secure your systems, but to limit your exposure to PCI fines and remedies. It seems like it is a rock-solid defense for PCI compliance to choose the algorithm that is certified by NIST.