A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
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A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
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Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#2This stuff happens more than anyone in infosec wants to admit; it's (ironically) what got me into professional software security to begin with, after being upset by what a commercial network monitoring tool would have allowed us to do to our customers at an ISP I helped run.
It's especially funny to see a government sponsored telecom reaching out to Moxie Marlinspike. Also: this isn't like that time a random Microsoft recruiter accidentally hit ESR and he wrote the "Your Worst Nightmare" post about it. Like Moxie says, money buys technology, and they will eventually find someone to rig up a workable solution for what they're trying to do.
Moxie: one thing that would be hugely helpful is a quick list of the things you did that make you confident in Twitter's TLS code (which: thanks for doing).
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#3There needs to be an RFC for Postcard Key Encryption - send each other public keys on hand-written postcards to single-use P.O. boxes to avoid mitm of the initial key exchange. I don't understand why anyone trusts CAs any more.
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#4There needs to be an RFC for Postcard Key Encryption - send each other public keys on hand-written postcards to single-use P.O. boxes to avoid mitm of the initial key exchange. I don't understand why anyone trusts CAs any more.
Nobody trusts CAs. There is a lot of work being done on layering more trustworthy authentication features on top of the TLS CA system, one good one being TACK:
The problem with simply abandoning CAs is that it creates a situation in which it's even easier for government sponsored agencies to mass-intercept traffic, at least for a window of time (probably several years), and all that window buys us is the ability for sites that don't really care about security to save $10-$100 dollars on cert costs.
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#5The reality is that they will eventually find a company or five that will do exactly what they asked. Thanks to their checkbook.
Moxie: Do not go to Saudi Arabia, you are probably persona non-grata by now.
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#6There needs to be an RFC for Postcard Key Encryption - send each other public keys on hand-written postcards to single-use P.O. boxes to avoid mitm of the initial key exchange. I don't understand why anyone trusts CAs any more.
Nobody trusts CAs. There is a lot of work being done on layering more trustworthy authentication features on top of the TLS CA system, one good one being TACK: http://tack.io/draft.html The problem with simply abandoning CAs is that it creates a situation in which it's even easier for government sponsored agencies to mass-intercept traffic, at least for a window of time (probably several years), and all that window b…
> Nobody trusts CAs.
No. The problem is that pretty much everyone trusts them, at this point in time. That was Peter's point.
Sure, there are researchers and engineers who rightfully don't trust CAs. But we don't really matter. The users, the consumers, the parents, the grandparents, the activists do.
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#7> TextSecure and RedPhone could serve as appropriate secure replacements
sadly those are only available for Android.
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#8There needs to be an RFC for Postcard Key Encryption - send each other public keys on hand-written postcards to single-use P.O. boxes to avoid mitm of the initial key exchange. I don't understand why anyone trusts CAs any more.
Nobody trusts CAs. There is a lot of work being done on layering more trustworthy authentication features on top of the TLS CA system, one good one being TACK: http://tack.io/draft.html The problem with simply abandoning CAs is that it creates a situation in which it's even easier for government sponsored agencies to mass-intercept traffic, at least for a window of time (probably several years), and all that window b…
CAs solve a very specific threat model, governments or corporations are not included. It is purely designed to protect against Computer criminals with very limited resources. PKI is designed to be about as strong as the lock on your front door, experts and police could pick it or get a key from the manufacturer but many thieves will just break a window and run a small risk of being detected in the process.
If we want real security we have to build it separate from the CA model, but as you point out CAs do provide some security against government inception, just as a locked door does provide some security against police wondering into your house, and we should not abandon it wholesale.
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#9Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nobody trusts CAs. There is a lot of work being done on layering more trustworthy authentication features on top of the TLS CA system, one good one being TACK: http://tack.io/draft.html The problem with simply abandoning CAs is that it creates a situation in which it's even easier for government sponsored agencies to mass-intercept traffic, at least for a window of time (probably several years), and all that window b…
> Nobody trusts CAs. No. The problem is that pretty much everyone trusts them, at this point in time. That was Peter's point. Sure, there are researchers and engineers who rightfully don't trust CAs. But we don't really matter. The users, the consumers, the parents, the grandparents, the activists do.
The users, the consumers, the parents, the grandparents, the activists, ... don't even know what CAs are. To the degree that people trust computers at all they trust what their browser tells them is safer.
Generally almost everyone has experience with malware, bugs and broken software. No one who has used a computer for more than 10 minutes absolutely trusts computers in any capacity including security.
Re: A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch
#10Unfortunately, this is the world we live in now. Its only going to get worse, and sooner or later will self-destruct.
Bliss.