A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
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A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
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Re: A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
#2Re: A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
#3Re: A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
#4the coolest bit by far is RDS was decoded from intermodulation distortion in the radio's Line Out audio caused by the stereo demuxer circuitry. :o)
I wonder if this is a fairly common side channel attack? The most common in the domain of digital crypto is time (e.g. all password inputs must take equal time to check vs a given password, otherwise you leak info about the password) but distortion seems an obvious attack vector against analog crypto. Though I don't know if it's merely obvious in hindsight, as are most things.
Re: A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
#5the coolest bit by far is RDS was decoded from intermodulation distortion in the radio's Line Out audio caused by the stereo demuxer circuitry. :o)
decoded from intermodulation distortion in the radio's Line Out audio I wonder if this is a fairly common side channel attack? The most common in the domain of digital crypto is time (e.g. all password inputs must take equal time to check vs a given password, otherwise you leak info about the password) but distortion seems an obvious attack vector against analog crypto. Though I don't know if it's merely obvious in h…
The decryption is performed in a second step. The reason she had to do it this way is because most radios do not provide a convenient way to get at the subcarrier data.
Re: A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
#6Earlier quoted context omitted.
decoded from intermodulation distortion in the radio's Line Out audio I wonder if this is a fairly common side channel attack? The most common in the domain of digital crypto is time (e.g. all password inputs must take equal time to check vs a given password, otherwise you leak info about the password) but distortion seems an obvious attack vector against analog crypto. Though I don't know if it's merely obvious in h…
No, she used the distortion to decode the specific subcarrier that holds the RDS information. This had nothing to do with the decryption, as the data decoded at this step would include regular RDS/RDBS data along with the _encrypted_ TMS data. The decryption is performed in a second step. The reason she had to do it this way is because most radios do not provide a convenient way to get at the subcarrier data.
Re: A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
#7the coolest bit by far is RDS was decoded from intermodulation distortion in the radio's Line Out audio caused by the stereo demuxer circuitry. :o)
decoded from intermodulation distortion in the radio's Line Out audio I wonder if this is a fairly common side channel attack? The most common in the domain of digital crypto is time (e.g. all password inputs must take equal time to check vs a given password, otherwise you leak info about the password) but distortion seems an obvious attack vector against analog crypto. Though I don't know if it's merely obvious in h…
Re: A determined 'hacker' decrypts RDS-TMC
#8Earlier quoted context omitted.
decoded from intermodulation distortion in the radio's Line Out audio I wonder if this is a fairly common side channel attack? The most common in the domain of digital crypto is time (e.g. all password inputs must take equal time to check vs a given password, otherwise you leak info about the password) but distortion seems an obvious attack vector against analog crypto. Though I don't know if it's merely obvious in h…
This isn't an attack, it's just using the cheap FM radio and a sound card like a software-defined radio.