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Security incident update

blog.linode.com

1–10 of 282 posts

Re: Security incident update

#2
Good to see some discussion and acknowledgment from Linode, but their treatment of the credit card encryption is distressing. They don't address the claim that the private keys were on the servers' filesystems, and instead focus on them being password protected. If the password is brute-forced, then it's game over.

Re: Security incident update

#3
I really wish they would officially comment on the 'cover up' aspect. Security breaches happen, and are forgivable. But attempting to broker a 'silencing' deal with the intruders and hoping your customers will never be the wiser is not.

All this update does is restore my faith in their ability to store my information correctly. It does nothing to reassure me that they won't try to cover anything up again.

Re: Security incident update

#4
The hacker has claimed the public and private key were both stored on the same machine and both accessible. The only protection left is the passphrase then. Various people have reported fraudulent activity on their CCs.

Personally, I think Linode didn't mess this up as badly as many other companies. The statement took a while to appear but it's there.

As a Linode customer myself I can neither report anything unusual on my box, nor activity on my CC. Thus far I'm somehow inclined to believe Linode when they say no CC information has been compromised. Either way, they are offering a great service and I'll stick with them. Worst case, I'll have to get a new CC.

Re: Security incident update

#5
I know Linode has been getting hammered for not being trustable or that they don't respond well when contacted, but in my experience they have been extremely responsive to any issues I have raised. I don't just mean technical issues either, we had what looked like a security breach on our account and it kicked of a small frenzy in their support staff and supervisory team to track down the problem. They figured out what had happened after a thorough investigation, gave us a full post mortem and promised they were reviewing procedures to make sure it couldn't happen again.

Re: Security incident update

#7

I really wish they would officially comment on the 'cover up' aspect. Security breaches happen, and are forgivable. But attempting to broker a 'silencing' deal with the intruders and hoping your customers will never be the wiser is not. All this update does is restore my faith in their ability to store my information correctly. It does nothing to reassure me that they won't try to cover anything up again.

As these situations, especially on the internet, come out as "he said, she said", I think it's probably more important to keep focused on what directly affects you.

Re: Security incident update

#8
The update has quite a frank and an apologetic tone to it. Especially the concluding paragraph gives it a very empathetic touch. It must be truly tough for the ops folk at Linode to have suffered an attack due to a third party 0-Day exploit. It could happen to any of us really.

On a side note, I am not sure of the "some occurrences of plaintext Lish passwords". Seems like quite a goofup on Linode's part.

Re: Security incident update

#9
post #2

Good to see some discussion and acknowledgment from Linode, but their treatment of the credit card encryption is distressing. They don't address the claim that the private keys were on the servers' filesystems, and instead focus on them being password protected. If the password is brute-forced, then it's game over.

My thoughts exactly. Then again, I'd expect them to use a rather strong password for sensitive data. Considering 10^12 tries per second (which is probably very far fetched) and a 64 character alphanumeric password, my credit card -- probably the whole galaxy -- will have long expired until the password can be expected to be cracked.

At that point, it really depends on how strong their passphrase is. If it's a dictionary word, we're pretty much fucked.

Re: Security incident update

#10
post #2

Good to see some discussion and acknowledgment from Linode, but their treatment of the credit card encryption is distressing. They don't address the claim that the private keys were on the servers' filesystems, and instead focus on them being password protected. If the password is brute-forced, then it's game over.

I think a lot of people are failing to understand how credit card processing works. The private key needs to live on some machine, if you actually want to have any CC requests processed at some point. If the private key itself isn't on the frontend/user-facing server, then instead, when the frontend node is hacked, the hacker will find a shared secret or signing key to auth the frontend node against the backend node that does process the CC requests.

The hacker won't be able to take your CC number for themselves in this case, but they'll sure be able to put spurious/malicious charges on your account.

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