41–50 of 66 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hmm, isn't the Korean subnet allocation fixed? If an IP falls in that range, doesn't it belong to the Korean ISP? How can someone be assigned that IP by someone other than the ISP who owns it?
BGP has almost no security. Anyone can hijack any IP address, especially if you can find an unused /24 so that the owner isn't inconvenienced.
Not quite.
One thing a lot of people don't realize is that a good deal of how the internet routes traffic is simply determined by trust. Yes there are complicated legal agreements between AS's but when ti comes down to it any AS can advertise any route they want. Most edge routes are configured to simply trust routes as they come in. If they didn't we wouldn't have such a redundant infrastructure.
http://tech.slashdot.org/story/12/11/06/2040226/why-google-w...
Syria being taken offline was also via BGP
It's fake but his analysis is wrong. TPB is still somewhere in Europe. Otherwise you couldn't have 50ms RTT to thepiratebay.se TCP port 80 from within Europe. I explained here how they do it http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5319720
From the discussion there it looks like the real host is rrbone UG (haftungsbeschraenkt) Leibnizstr. 8a 44147 Dortmund GERMANY https://www.rrbone.net/
https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-f...
> Do not play with BGP. Well, okay. Don't touch it. It ain't broken. I don't think there's anything wrong with showing people who are not network experts how easy it is to (believably) route things into nirvana. I guess the effects of fake routes being propagated could have been a lot worse than this. Why not promote some discussion and thought around BGP and friends? Maybe we can come up with something more resistan…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
From the discussion there it looks like the real host is rrbone UG (haftungsbeschraenkt) Leibnizstr. 8a 44147 Dortmund GERMANY https://www.rrbone.net/
Yes, he added a second part https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-f...
Dude, this was a (really well executed) joke! It should be our responsibility to help keep this shit going.
Yes, let's make internet freedom a joke. But we already have anonymous for that. Edit: The real tragedy is the people excusing NK so they can have their way. I'm not saying they are dumb, just unlucky at thinking. Edit2: No defense of hackivists making a mockery of themselves? How much does TPB make?
I've read this sentence a few times, left, come back, and re-read it a few times, and I still can't really make heads or tails of it.
Are you saying that people doing this (pretending their website is hosted in North Korea) makes light of the suffering of people who live in North Korea? I don't understand how you can conclude that: The whole point is that, as bad as North Korea is, it still doesn't go after torrent sites. It wouldn't work if North Korea were replaced with a country that actually has a lot of freedoms.
Are you implying that people should be working to end what's going on in North Korea? Well, what can anyone do? Any serious attempt to force change would simply lead to a massive, destructive war, killing most of the people that the outside world wants to help.
One thing a lot of people don't realize is that a good deal of how the internet routes traffic is simply determined by trust. Yes there are complicated legal agreements between AS's but when ti comes down to it any AS can advertise any route they want. Most edge routes are configured to simply trust routes as they come in. If they didn't we wouldn't have such a redundant infrastructure.
> when ti comes down to it any AS can advertise any route they want If the provider isn't filtering, sure. > Most edge routes are configured to simply trust routes as they come in Actually, edge routers are where your prefix filtering takes place. It's much more difficult to filter at the "core".
This is why my comment posted in the recent CloudFlare post mortem talks about good network engineers and the misunderstanding of many 'technical savvy' folks that know enough to do some really dumb things architecturally.
This lends credence to the fact that, this is well understood if you've spun up peering sessions more than once. I find it slightly embarrassing most people don't realize how fragile a framework BGP really is. But it definitely comes to light reading through forums like HN that lean towards the developer side of readership.
It's fake but his analysis is wrong. TPB is still somewhere in Europe. Otherwise you couldn't have 50ms RTT to thepiratebay.se TCP port 80 from within Europe. I explained here how they do it http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5319720
The easiest thing to do is to put up caching reverse proxies on big providers that respond immediately and only slow down on "dynamic" content, which we all assume to be slower anyway.
A more non-conventional approach would be to break the embedded OS of an intermediate router or network device (can you count how many transparent filtering network devices there are between you and a random website?) and have it return false data or provide static NAT to establish connections before they actually reach the destination.
The spoofed packets seems the most likely explanation. It's just not the only possibility :-)
One thing a lot of people don't realize is that a good deal of how the internet routes traffic is simply determined by trust. Yes there are complicated legal agreements between AS's but when ti comes down to it any AS can advertise any route they want. Most edge routes are configured to simply trust routes as they come in. If they didn't we wouldn't have such a redundant infrastructure.