Earlier quoted context omitted.
They would have been in a much better position if they had actually turned on the revenue model before asking for money. Without that, the only metric they had to impress investors was user acquisition which was dropping.
Or he'd be in a much worse position, because his cost of customer acquisition was high and the money he'd earn from charging wouldn't come close to covering his operating expenses, and charging would slash his new user signups, which were probably the only realistic lead gen he had to work with. Which is, you know, the situation that gets most people to consider venture capital.
Protect Kids, Get F*cked
31–40 of 84 posts
Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#32Let me just quote one bit of that: Our service was free as we were working out the business model. We actually had a genius business model but hadn’t implemented it yet. We wanted more users so we spent money on marketing. Maybe the real problem wasn't the insurance?
I think it's not uncommon for companies get volume this way. I even saw on the recent PBS special "Silicon Valley" that Fairchild Semiconductor (then it was FCI) sold actual real-life transistors below cost, wagering that it would allow them to scale up their manufacturing. Ingenious, risky move. But, it worked.
Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#33Let me just quote one bit of that: Our service was free as we were working out the business model. We actually had a genius business model but hadn’t implemented it yet. We wanted more users so we spent money on marketing. Maybe the real problem wasn't the insurance?
If they had simply charged a reasonable fee, maybe they could have grown the business the old-fashioned way. It would have meant smaller sums of money all along, but maybe they wouldn't have experienced this explosion.
Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, the real problem wasn't insurance; it was that a firm-seeming commitment to fund the company fell through at the worst possible moment. A lawsuit wouldn't have fixed anything for them; it'd have taken years to resolve.
The real problem was they had no business model; spending money to get users when you don't even know what your return is? That's ludicrous. That's a core business issue from day one.
Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#35Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#36Let me just quote one bit of that: Our service was free as we were working out the business model. We actually had a genius business model but hadn’t implemented it yet. We wanted more users so we spent money on marketing. Maybe the real problem wasn't the insurance?
I think it's not uncommon for companies get volume this way. I even saw on the recent PBS special "Silicon Valley" that Fairchild Semiconductor (then it was FCI) sold actual real-life transistors below cost, wagering that it would allow them to scale up their manufacturing. Ingenious, risky move. But, it worked.
Good god, that was a bad idea. I got lots of users, ended up buying a bunch of hardware, and worse, signing contracts on more datacenter space. I got a whole lot of abuse complaints, and had to get a larger bandwidth commit, too. (my provider at the time had the very common business model of having very high overage charges, but you could get out of the overage charges by signing a long-term contract at the new 95th percentile.)
Of course, many left when they got the first bill, leaving me about where I started revenue-wise, and with much larger monthly bills.
several years later, vastly increasing the resources I gave per dollar, /then/ getting featured in a blog[1] many months later, brought me up to a reasonable scale. I do think that the lower prices were necessary (but not sufficient) to start that growth.
I suppose that might be more like the transistor situation than anything else; Yeah, the company was "Profitable" but only because my time was free. I was selling at a huge loss if you counted market-rate for my time.
[1]http://uggedal.com/journal/vps-comparison-between-slicehost-...
(I owe that one post so much; revenue more than tripled in just a few months, and I was able to go full-time. I should probably do something for that guy.)
Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#37What a shitty situation. But why, oh why, would you sell your house and move from Houston to California before the check cleared? We started Matasano when my kids were pre-K and a a full-day every-day handful, and I had to spend a couple months away from my family while we worked out the move (mine from Ann Arbor to Chicago). I know I'm not the only founder to deal with that situation. Was there some additional circu…
The clause that was impossible to make disappear suddenly disappeared overnight.
P.S. Congrats for Matasano, I am a fan of your company.
Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#38Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#39I suspect people who really want to "protect kids" find a way to do it that doesn't involve greed, lawyers, stupidity, and liberally cursing. Maybe there wouldn't be as much need to protect kids were there fewer people who talked about "getting f*cked" or screwed when talking about kids. Jerk.
As a parent of two middle schoolers, I am a lot less worried about adults using adult language to talk about business than I am about the people who can't tell the difference between that and actual threats to my children.
Re: Protect Kids, Get F*cked
#40I worked at the company that was bought by HP in Oregon and then later in Texas. It was called RLX technologies and created the first blade server. After it was purchased by HP I stayed on for a few months before moving on to a startup in Oregon. It seemed like a great idea as they moved me back to Oregon.
My best friend, who got me on at RLX after my first startup (NEI: high speed telecom startup) had crashed and burned, had taken a position at this startup in Oregon (we both were from there and had met after graduating from Oregon State). It seemed like a way to continue the work we had started at RLX and would get me back to Oregon. So win-win.
Long story short: the startup had issues and he moved on to found IMSafer. I would of liked to but needed to stay on for another 6 months, so I wouldn't have to pay back half of my moving expenses.
Once I finally moved on to IMSafer the company was still small with only 6 of us. It was a great time and we built something truly exciting and helpful. We had a wonderful time at the Techcrunch 40…, but that's a story for another time. :) I believe Paul knows this story too, as it was one of the big reasons we got into Ycombinator!
I will skip to the end as Jason supplied much of the interesting info and the color to that debacle. But, I will add, just as you don't count your chickens before they hatch you never, never invite your new 'partner' (board member, investors…whatever) to a board meeting until the money is in the bank.
Once the assets were sold only 2 of us stayed on with the new company that bought us. It was a trying time, but my best friend did get to move back to Oregon and it was just us, keeping a rather complicated site up and running while working on creating the 'new' product that was to make all the money.
While, at IMSafer we had realized that there could be big money in using this software in a more enterprise fashion. We realized that many virtual worlds for kids were popping up and they had use for software like this. He, I and another one of our friends from our old RLX days set out to create a real-time piece to the software that was much better at moderating less dangerous content like curse words, etc. It would quickly mark words they found objectionable and pass the text on to the more complicated software outside their enterprise to look for the truly dangerous things.
From the point that IMSafer crumbled to when he and I decided to leave or got fired…depends on who you are asking, we had grown the business to a million dollar run rate in 8-9 months. But, we had been bought by a startup and we had very different opinions on how to run it with the purchasing company…and we lost!
About that time we left/got fired we decided to do something new. Both of us had vary different experiences buying a new car and decided we wanted to fix that. After getting in a small fight with our former employees we got them to relinquish all rights to CarWoo! and proceeded to build it. At the time it seemed a bit crazy to fight for something that wasn't much more than a landing page and a bunch of crazy ideas, but in hind sight…seems like genius….I have decided to tell it as a stroke of genius!
After we got into Ycombinator we told Paul about this story and at the time he said it was the worst 'pulled funding' story he'd ever heard. It's possible he's heard worse since, but somehow I doubt it.
5 of the 6 of us were married at the time and 4 of us had children. As we were in the tussle over CarWoo!, which was almost nothing at the time my wife had our second child.
Tommy and I got our call that Ycombinator had accepted us while sitting in benchmark's parking lot in the spring of 2009. We had come full circle i guess you could say.
We moved down to Palo Alto, left our wife and kids behind for the time being and the rest is history.