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Packets of Death

blog.krisk.org

81–90 of 119 posts

Re: Packets of Death

#81
I've been unable to reproduce this on systems equipped with the controller in question. I'd love to see "ethtool -e ethX" output for a NIC confirmed to be vulnerable.

/edit Ah, I spoke to soon; the author has updated his page here with diffs between affected and unaffected EEPROMs:

http://www.kriskinc.com/intel-pod

Re: Packets of Death

#82
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's worse than that. It's not BIOS-- it's a freestanding computer. You'll enjoy this (or be horrified by it): http://fish2.com/ipmi/itrain.html

But it's a freestanding computer that means that I don't need to go to the data center at two in the morning to bring up a box that's kernel panicked. Yeah, be careful with it. Firewall it silly. But recognize that it's a tool that can be very useful.

They're definitely useful tools-- don't get me wrong about that. The fear is that they're controlled, essentially, by an in-band signaling mechanism.

Being grafted onto the same NICs on the server computer that you might potentially expose to the Internet makes firewalling them a more difficult proposition. I get a lot of piece of mind from having management interfaces on an an out-of-band control network whenever possible.

Re: Packets of Death

#83

I've always had mixed emotions about NICs that have hardware assisted offload features. I welcome the decrease in CPU utilization and increased throughput, but the NIC ends up being a complex system that very subtle bugs can lurk inside versus being a simple I/O device that a kernel driver controls. If there's denial of service hiding in there I wonder about what other security bugs might be lurking. It's scary stuff…

Makes me wonder if someday a bug (or "administrative function") in the firmware of a hardware device used at a major virtualization farm (EC2, Linode, VPS.NET, etc.) will be used to r00t the hardware nodes and then go wild all over everything there. Be afraid.

Re: Packets of Death

#84
Before actually testing this with the real payload, is there a better way of determining if you have a potentially vulnerable driver than something like this?

  # awk '/eth/ { print $1 }' 

Re: Packets of Death

#85
post #15

That is great HN content! Debugging deep down the rabbit hole, until you find a bug in the NIC EEPROM - and the disbelief many show when hearing a software message can bring down a NIC. I for one would enjoy reading more content like this on HN that what qualifies as best as a friday-night hack

You may then enjoy these:

* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euMHlV6MNqs

* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Q8EFwKVKdA

Re: Packets of Death

#86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It would be interesting to see what the actual error in the NIC firmware source was. This invalidates my assumption that a shop like Intel probably uses formal verification in firmware development. Its also scary to consider how many very important (nuclear/damn control, etc) systems while themselves might be formally verified are dependent on services of lower level software (OS, drivers) and hardware (firmware) tha…

Dam control, or damn control? I teach a control systems course, so I know about both kinds. PS You should be very frightened. The industrial control systems industry are slow to adopt new tech/new best practices/anything else new; and even more reticent to touch anything that "works." Tons of vulnerable equipment controlling dangerous things with default passwords (if any at all). I could go on for days.

Absolutely utterly true. (I work at a SCADA-ish vendor).

Re: Packets of Death

#87
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But it's a freestanding computer that means that I don't need to go to the data center at two in the morning to bring up a box that's kernel panicked. Yeah, be careful with it. Firewall it silly. But recognize that it's a tool that can be very useful.

They're definitely useful tools-- don't get me wrong about that. The fear is that they're controlled, essentially, by an in-band signaling mechanism. Being grafted onto the same NICs on the server computer that you might potentially expose to the Internet makes firewalling them a more difficult proposition. I get a lot of piece of mind from having management interfaces on an an out-of-band control network whenever po…

If you use your BMC's "pass-through" capability to push its traffic through your regular NICs, you're Doing It Wrong. In fact, if you're not running a separate physical network (not merely separate VLANs) that is, to the extent possible, air-gapped from the rest of the world for your IPMI traffic, you're probably still Doing It Wrong.

Re: Packets of Death

#88
post #73

So is it only the byte at 0x47f that matters? Could you just send a packet filled with 0x32 0x32 0x32 0x32 0x32 to trigger this? (Like, download a file full of 0x32s?) Or does it have to look like a SIP packet? You'd think the odds of getting a packet with 0x32 in position 0x47f is almost 1/256 per packet? So why aren't these network cards falling over everywhere every few seconds?

Probably because there is a 2/256 chance of getting sent the inoculation value. But it's a good question.

Re: Packets of Death

#89
post #73

So is it only the byte at 0x47f that matters? Could you just send a packet filled with 0x32 0x32 0x32 0x32 0x32 to trigger this? (Like, download a file full of 0x32s?) Or does it have to look like a SIP packet? You'd think the odds of getting a packet with 0x32 in position 0x47f is almost 1/256 per packet? So why aren't these network cards falling over everywhere every few seconds?

[deleted]

Re: Packets of Death

#90
post #15

That is great HN content! Debugging deep down the rabbit hole, until you find a bug in the NIC EEPROM - and the disbelief many show when hearing a software message can bring down a NIC. I for one would enjoy reading more content like this on HN that what qualifies as best as a friday-night hack

You may then enjoy these: * http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euMHlV6MNqs * http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Q8EFwKVKdA

(watched this and submitted it immediately to HN)

HIGHLY recommended to anyone who enjoyed the article.

It's a remote PHY injection at the hardware level - basically hacking the chip directly thanks to "special" content, i.e. putting a packet header within the packet.

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