101–110 of 456 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
turns out reading comprehension skills have still not gotten better in the future
In the future, some companies begin to store their data on-premises away from big centralized datacenters. But many companies do not, due to costs and the general friction of changing how things are done. If OP tells me the name of his company I can hop in my time machine and tell him how it plays out.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
As far as I know, the attacks happened at different times. If Amazon knew that they had lost some data redundancy, shouldn’t they have been quickly mirroring that out of the region?
That would be a legal nightmare. They don't necessarily know what customers' data residency requirements are.
This interview with an AWS leader isn’t aging well, from CBS Sunday morning: Pogue asked, "I don't mean to give anyone ideas, but let's say I figured out that one of these unmarked buildings was an AWS data center, and I blew it up. Are you saying that it's so backed up and redundant that you probably wouldn't notice?" Wood replied, "Yeah, you wouldn't notice. I mean, we might be a bit upset, but you wouldn't notice!…
He forgot to add "if it's Multi-AZ" ;)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Offsite to.. where? Sea? Data residency in Gulf states is very strict and basically nothing is leaving the countries
Typically 300 miles geographically but could be hard in some Gulf States
Strictly speaking from a missile defense perspective there's an argument 2 sites are a waste of valuable interceptors.
Uh-oh.
It's not clear from their messaging if multiple availability zones were severely damaged, or if the damage to one availability zone was simply more than they planned for. If it's the latter, that's a big uh-oh.
The wording certainly seems very careful:
"The damage to our infrastructure spanned multiple availability zones and exceeded what our regional and multi-AZ services are designed to withstand"
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The SLA excludes force majeure.
Making a probabilistic claim while excluding a factor that dominates those statistics is... is quite creative accounting.
No disaster recovery plan? No offsite backups? Someone failed to applied the most basic principles that have existed for decades.
This interview with an AWS leader isn’t aging well, from CBS Sunday morning: Pogue asked, "I don't mean to give anyone ideas, but let's say I figured out that one of these unmarked buildings was an AWS data center, and I blew it up. Are you saying that it's so backed up and redundant that you probably wouldn't notice?" Wood replied, "Yeah, you wouldn't notice. I mean, we might be a bit upset, but you wouldn't notice!…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> to-do list becomes securing weapons, vehicles and fuel. I toured a datacenter once back in the early 2000s and they showed me 30 days of generator fuel storage. When i asked them why 30 days and not 35 they replied "we're such a major customer of both electricity and fuel that if we don't get electricity or fuel for 30 days there's way bigger problems than your website not being online" hah.
That's probably already true for 7 days or less
Look at data center responses from Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. This guy [1] was onsite for Katrina. Lost utility power on August 29. They did have some access to fuel on Sep 1, but pretty spotty until maybe the 3rd. Looks like power started coming back in some places Sep 8, and maybe widely restored on Sep 14th.
I would say, by 7 days in you'll probably have a good idea of if 30 days might not be enough.
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20061206181753/http://interdicto...