That is actually a pretty good idea.
Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
251–260 of 359 posts
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#252That's a lot of words to say "we re-invented C2PA but made worse by getting our servers involved somehow". Like with C2PA, the entire thing hinges on nobody being able to dump keys or trick the TPM into signing arbitrary image data. The timestamping server is a nice idea (though I don't see why they can't just use a normal timestamping server, I guess to keep control over the protocol) but it doesn't solve the fundam…
Doing that on modern iOS is unlikely. They’ve really locked it down in the past half decade.
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#253I'm super excited for all the people saying "lol just point it at a genai photo" to make a blog post later about how they successfully subverted this approach and fooled people into believing their image was verified without detection as a fraudulent image. because that'll be a lot more interesting than a reflexive snarkpost about the first idea that came to mind to hypothetically defeat it.
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#254I would also like the reference image from the sensor instead of the blown out HDR monstrosity Apple removed the ability to turn off after the iPhone 12.
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#255This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". There are already plenty of insurances that require you to submit claims through a smartphone app that tries to essentially do…
> This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps
This is definitely not an Apple thing, though the use profile is more ubiquitous. Canon had, more than twenty years ago, when they first started making DSLRs, the question of "If we want law enforcement to use these, how do we handle the inevitable questions?" and as a result built out the option to digitally sign the raw sensor data in-camera so the raw file could be pointed to in court with an attestation of image integrity.
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#256Thinking aloud about failure modes / edge cases:
If i create a high quality deepfake image, project it on a large screen and take a photo of that image with an iPhone (+apple verified image secure tag) ... would that resulting image be considered "authentic" by default?
Would digital forensics accessible to lay people still be able to fact-check and call out misuse / fakery of the new secure tag.
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#257Thinking aloud about failure modes / edge cases: If i create a high quality deepfake image, project it on a large screen and take a photo of that image with an iPhone (+apple verified image secure tag) ... would that resulting image be considered "authentic" by default? Would digital forensics accessible to lay people still be able to fact-check and call out misuse / fakery of the new secure tag.
It is authentic, in a way. It’s exactly what you took a picture of.
I do wonder how easy that would be to detect, but I can’t help but think some sort of artefacting or something would show up.
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#258Earlier quoted context omitted.
It looks like the reason for the custom timestamp setup is to assert and upper and lower bound on time. A normal timestamp server can asset it saw the image at a certain time but not that the image wasn’t created much earlier. This setup, the image processing pipeline can immediately attach the last seen timestamp to the photo as a lower bound, and then connect to the network to get the upper bound time. If there is…
The lower bound is specified by the device, you don't need support from the timestamping server for that. Determining if this timestamp is or isn't suspicious can be done at verification time. The timestamping feature itself makes sense from a verification perspective (though the privacy implications are questionable, of course), but I don't think it necessitates an Apple-specific setup. This approach does have one b…
this already happened -> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49421158 -> My passing comment mentioning Apple Reference Image in the same thread was moderated down into oblivion for some reason!
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#259This is something I always had in my mind: sign at photo taken, at least you know it comes from a phone and it's not AI generated
Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography
#260Thinking aloud about failure modes / edge cases: If i create a high quality deepfake image, project it on a large screen and take a photo of that image with an iPhone (+apple verified image secure tag) ... would that resulting image be considered "authentic" by default? Would digital forensics accessible to lay people still be able to fact-check and call out misuse / fakery of the new secure tag.
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