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Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

security.apple.com

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Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#231

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You worry that a technology that you have never used nor evaluated might not work in practice... Therefore because of your worry (which is based on remarkably little information), it's a bad technology? Come the fuck on. That's beyond luddite bullshit.

Is this you? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49685271

Being right twice isn’t a crime

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#232

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> No, because images will be confirmed to have been taken on "this iPhone". Actually the description of Apple makes explicit statements AGAINST that: Quote: Privacy preservation: an outside observer cannot determine whether any pair of reference images were taken by the same device

> an outside observer An inside observer can tho, and if they know or have it, cant they be subpoenaed and forced to disclose the identity? This sounds pretty bad for journalists/sources. Why is this needed now of all times?

Your guess is as good as mine...

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#233

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". You have it all wrong. Apple Reference Image is not an id system; it's primarily a way to attest that the pixels recorded by…

> There's no way to link a reference image to a person; it's also not possible to determine if a pair of images came from the same device. Apple knows the iphone the reference image was uploaded from, so, yes, there is.

It doesn't, as it is run through an Oblivious HTTP relay run by a third party before getting to Apple's servers. So it has no IP information, and the requests use anonymous access tokens.

It is probably possible for an entity to break it, but it would require live access to both Apple and the third party (Likely Cloudflare) servers. And that is assuming there is only one third party routing OHTTP requests, otherwise you would need to monitor all of them, in real time, since the requests are transient.

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#234

This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". There are already plenty of insurances that require you to submit claims through a smartphone app that tries to essentially do…

> This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". You have it all wrong. Apple Reference Image is not an id system; it's primarily a way to attest that the pixels recorded by…

Nation states almost certainly have the ability to extract the private keys out of an image sensor and SEP. Outside of superpowers even if you're willing to do it destructively.

They can then sign their own fraudulent images.

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#235
post #198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it's also not possible to determine if a pair of images came from the same device. It’s possible for Apple, as stated in the blog post (e.g. “which lets the device later produce signatures that Apple can attribute to that specific phone”).

[flagged]

[flagged]

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#236
post #219

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not the OP, but yes, other vendors will be able to support that as well. But a camera sensor that has 1. a public/private key exchanged during device-production (production-cost), 2. the capability to reboot in a cryptographic mode (R&D / component cost) and 3. a cloud-service which then processes the raw data to create a JPG (operational cost) comes at a premium. Why should this premium be applied on a 99 USD Smartp…

Well, that's kind of like DRM and Widevine, which exists on every consumer device.

Well, that happened because in ~2011 the entire media industry announced that they will stop media playback on devices which didn't secure the DRM-keys. As media consumption was fundamental to the Smartphone ecosystem, Google made secure-boot and widevine mandatory.

Sure, the same could happen here, but I don't know which industry (or other body) would demand that and have sufficient justification for it.

After all, the feature doesn't really change that much for a consumer, the trust-chain is largely unchanged: If I send you a picture and tell you that's my dog, you still have to take my word for it, regardless whether Apple signed the picture or not.

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#237

This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". There are already plenty of insurances that require you to submit claims through a smartphone app that tries to essentially do…

> This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". You have it all wrong. Apple Reference Image is not an id system; it's primarily a way to attest that the pixels recorded by…

> Apple Reference Image is not an id system; it's primarily a way to attest that the pixels recorded by the camera sensor have not been altered in any way

You think that this won't be used as additional data by the various competing companies who have implemented "take a live still or video selfie of yourself with your phone and show us your ID cards" for identity verification purposes?

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#238

This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". There are already plenty of insurances that require you to submit claims through a smartphone app that tries to essentially do…

> This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". You have it all wrong. Apple Reference Image is not an id system; it's primarily a way to attest that the pixels recorded by…

> Apple Reference Image is not an id system; it's primarily a way to attest that the pixels recorded by the camera sensor have not been altered in any way; the pixels, metadata and timestamp are all cryptographically signed.

> There's no way to link a reference image to a person; it's also not possible to determine if a pair of images came from the same device.

Some banking apps nowadays ask you to upload a photo of your ID and then use the webcam/selfie camera to confirm that's it's really you (sometimes asking you to move your head in a particular way). But how trustworthy is that process really? Apple Reference Image could be (part of) a solution, by certifying that both images were taken by the same device around the same time.

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#239

This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". There are already plenty of insurances that require you to submit claims through a smartphone app that tries to essentially do…

> This is really clever from Apple. The journalist use case is just the PR story. This will be really useful for identity verification and insurance apps, and has the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". You have it all wrong. Apple Reference Image is not an id system; it's primarily a way to attest that the pixels recorded by…

I can tell its 'shopped because of the pixels

Re: Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

#240
My comment on this idea from 9 years ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16291641

First reply was exactly the same as most of the top-level comments here today: "That doesn’t prove anything. Make your fake video, point your phone camera at it, record."

Of course, I'm sure someone else had thought of something along these lines in the 90s, I just didn't have a citation to hand.

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