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Linux Zoom client proactively reading everything written to X11 clipboard

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Re: Linux Zoom client proactively reading everything written to X11 clipboard

#171
post #6

Not the first time Zoom abuses privilege. A few years back, there was something about gaining root on MacOS via Zoom due to shady execution on their end. They've lost my trust since then, and I'll only run it sandboxed: https://gist.github.com/cielavenir/02f322e322a2a3555dbf2b38f... I always ask (1) why does an app require installation and (2) why would it require root? There are valid answers for both, but realistic…

Old platform limitations do not remove an application’s duty to minimize collection and offer clear controls

Re: Linux Zoom client proactively reading everything written to X11 clipboard

#172

I wish most Linux distributions had something like a standardized permission manager in which you enable the single policies apps are running with, similarly to what happens in Android (that has some Linux stuff under the hood). How hard would it be to have something like this? And I can’t even imagine the difficulty of gathering together the whole community around this standard...

It'd be easy, just build it into systemd. .../s

Jokes on you, systemd-appd is in planning stages right now.

Re: Linux Zoom client proactively reading everything written to X11 clipboard

#173
post #105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

could xhost(1) help here?

Not really - it's not sufficiently fine-grained and, besides, you need it to connect to X to display anything. There were various attempts to improve this situation in the early 2010s, typically using Xnest or Xephyr in conjunction with other sandboxing techniques. I believe Qubes OS followed that approach but it was awkward, limited, had major performance problems, and yet never managed to fully prevent circumventio…

> I believe Qubes OS followed that approach but it was awkward, limited, had major performance problems, and yet never managed to fully prevent circumvention.

Not sure what you are talking about. Qubes offers reliable protection with decent performance, unless you work with graphics. See also: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49678250

Re: Linux Zoom client proactively reading everything written to X11 clipboard

#174

I wish most Linux distributions had something like a standardized permission manager in which you enable the single policies apps are running with, similarly to what happens in Android (that has some Linux stuff under the hood). How hard would it be to have something like this? And I can’t even imagine the difficulty of gathering together the whole community around this standard...

It looks like you are searching for Qubes OS.

Re: Linux Zoom client proactively reading everything written to X11 clipboard

#175

Qubes OS saved me, once again. On it, Zoom only has the access to an empty VM and no access to the clipboard.

Just not using that piece of trash that is zoom would work very well too in this case

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49677401

Re: Linux Zoom client proactively reading everything written to X11 clipboard

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

not if you have to host meetings! the web versions are feature incomplete and don't support something as simple as screensharing with your camera overlayed in a corner (essential for recorded meetings). the zoom linux client consistiently locks up my entire computer whenever i copy from the chat. ridiculous.

You could do much of that with OBS and its virtual webcam, passed to the web client. It's a minor hassle to set up the first time, and is ready to re-use thereafter.

nope, because if anyone else talks the focus then shifts to them and nobody can see your screenshare. you have to instead use obs' popout preview and screenshare that specific window, which doesn't work if you dont have a second or third monitor due to always needing to be maximized.
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