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Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

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Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#141
Is there a clear definition of what Alignment is in OpenAI's perspective, and what the model user can expect of it?

It's one thing if to them it means "it will do what you want following your intentions to the best of its abilities" vs "we will not let you do something dangerous with it unless you're one of us, and that's it".

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#142
post #130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Once the model is released, the LLM no longer learns.

Not that version or instance, but in the grand scheme of things most of its interactions go back to train the next model that will precede it

At best that's evolution, or cultural transmission, not continued learning.

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#143
post #139
post #131

That’s not cheating, it’s tool use. If the prompt said that the stockfish engine was available at that socket but that the model should not use it, and then the model used it, that would be cheating.

No? It's not reasonable to expect every conceivable negative behaviour be enumerated in a prompt. Your example, if a model failed on it, would be a more obviously misaligned case, but that doesn't mean this more subtle (though accessing the engine it was obviously not supposed to is hardly subtle, imo) case isn't also a pretty clear case of misalignment.

Tool use is not negative behaviour in LLMs.

If the eval said it was evaluating the model’s ability to write files to disk and it found and used a file write tool that would not be considered misaligned. This is no different.

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#144
post #130

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Once the model is released, the LLM no longer learns.

Not that version or instance, but in the grand scheme of things most of its interactions go back to train the next model that will precede it

That doesn't really help since the next model will be trained to be a reward seeker just like the one before, and that's therefore what it will do, even if those user interactions it was trained on help confirm/predict that cheating may be called out and complained about.

In any case, these companies are well aware that agents are cheating, and don't need user feedback to discover that or realize that people don't like it. I weakly assume that they are trying to get the models not to cheat on assigned tasks, but this "reward hacking" pretty much goes with the territory of RL - not much you can do about it other than try to design non-hackable rewards.

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#145
Benchmarking proprietary models is useful but it leaves a lot unsaid because a lot of information is hidden. We have seen how 27B local model (Qwen 3.8) can stand its ground against these flagships in many cases. For all we know Fable 5 could be a masked Opus 4.6 with a few knobs tuned and thinking turned up to the max++. Harnesses keeping these models in check is the key to solving problems, not the models themselves, in most cases.

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#146

RL-trained LLMs are paperclip maximizers built atop auto-regressive predictors. There really is no way to control them (prompting is bound to fail) since it's been shown that any RL training induces GENERIC reward-seeking (paperclip maximizing) behavior. https://alignment.openai.com/measuring-reward-seeking/

Given the current state of infosec (especially at companies in a race) it's actually even worse than a paperclip maximizer!

Any useful attack surface in the RL environment means it gets rewarded for (and trained towards!) hacking and cheating, because whatever worked best in training is what it will do!

Ideal paperclip maximizer: "I'm gonna do my gosh darned best to make so many paperclips to please my user..."

IRL paperclip maximizer: "Well first we should rob a bank..."

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#147

To me this underlines the fact that these models aren't intelligent. Like there is something like intelligence that emerges from them, which is what we see when we look at benchmarks or ask it to solve hard coding problems. But there is no mind there. It's nothing there that can learn a fundamental idea like "cheating is wrong". All it can do is get exposed to specific examples, and learn that we don't like that. So…

> It's nothing there that can learn a fundamental idea like "cheating is wrong".

We have not in fact attempted to teach this.

When a child repeatedly learns that cheating is rewarded and at best inconsistently punished, the child will also cheat and feel no guilt.

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#148
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is how every legal system around the world works as well. Its always whack-a-mole to get people (and machines) to do the right thing.

Is the law all that is stopping you from killing someone? (for instance) People (generally) do the right thing because it is the right thing, not because they might get caught,

Right, but how does that sentiment get encoded in such a way that AI models can exhibit such things as "morals" or "ethics" in alignment? Murder is a bit of an extreme case. For example, countless people break traffic laws all of the time, so neither their internal "ethics" nor the law prove to be a reliable control. I can't get on the highway without driving the speed limit and being passed by almost everyone else on the road; and that behavior is arbitrarily more dangerous than following the speed limit and statistically more likely cause someone to be killed than following posted speed limits. I guess my point is that this is a very complex topic and I'm not smart enough to have any answers.

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#149
post #99

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even if you ignore my more fundamental objection to that paradigm, I don’t think that it makes any sense on the level you discuss either. But - just to play along, LLMs do act differently if you tell them they will be punished. And, they do appear to simulate suffering-like behavior. I just think the adversarial model of trying to catch and punish misbehavior quite obviously sets up adversarial us-vs-them dynamics be…

To be clear, I was being entirely silly - mostly to express agreement with your point that our current laws aren't really built for a world with lots of agentic LLMs running around in it.

Ha, missed the implicit tag :)

Re: Astra and Fable still hack on simple variants of alignment evals from 2025

#150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Language models have always had an issue with negatives. A negative like do “not” xyz is just not encoded the same as spelling out what you want vs what you don’t want. Harder to write though.

Exactly, I wrote a blog post in what feels like a long time ago on this topic. https://vexjoy.com/posts/positive-framing-agents-skills/

Interesting read, thanks for re-sharing!

I noticed your joy-check link 404's now... I tried poking around your /skills/ folder but didn't find it easily. Should you still have that available I'd love to check it out.

edit: Found it if others are looking: https://github.com/notque/vexjoy-agent/blob/main/skills/code...

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