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NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

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Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

#291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is the spitting image of old pre-CRM thinking: If I try to force the captain to go around, (or follow procedures or whatever), then i am exceeding my authority and will probably be fired. Some cultures have this sort of mentality a lot stronger than others, and it has zero place in the modern cockpit. While a captain can pull rank, they really should only ever do it with respect to the first officer if: an inexp…

This seems like a no win situation for the subordinate pilot. Grabbing the wheel of an aircraft while landing must have its own set of risks. We also only hear about the times when the subordinate pilot didn’t prevent a crash. Never hear about the times they were mistaken and did nothing.

An overcautious go-around is a non-event though.

A big part of the monitoring pilot's job is noticing when things have gotten too far and taking over controls. This does very much include scenarios when the pilot flying has fallen to tunnel vision, subtle incapacitation, and the continuation/sunk cost fallacy.

Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

#292

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, the left main was not on the ground after touchdown for some time. The aircraft will not auto-deploy the spoilers nor autobrake until it senses weight on weels. It also locks out the thrust reversers. All for obvious reasons. The left wing was lifting because they came in way too fast. 30-40 knots above final approach speed. That's why they landed so flat - if they had assumed correct flare AoA the airplane would…

> The aircraft will not auto-deploy the spoilers nor autobrake until it senses weight on weels. It also locks out the thrust reversers. All for obvious reasons. While I agree the obvious course of action would be a go-around, a manual override for when you know doing the stupid thing is the least unsafe thing to do would be handy.

Spoilers have full support for manual deployment, as they are sometimes used to manage your energy during descent.

Deploying the spoilers manually would have brought the wheels down and that could have allowed thrust reverser deployment.

Note that it took them 7 seconds between first wheel touching down and first application of the brakes, which they were doing manually. If they had applied spoilers at the same time, they still only had 10 seconds of runway left. I think this still would have been a runway overrun even in that case.

Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

#293

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Did fly jets, although not transport-class ones. Just to hammer home that everything here is correct, and the common thread through all aircraft types is disciplined execution. You fly an approach on airspeed and/or angle of attack, and on glideslope. Period. You're either there or you're correcting to get there, and you're correcting at a point that you don't need huge oh-my-God corrections in close. If you can't do…

Do companies punish pilots for go arounds for costing them fuel and delays? If not outright punished, does it cost them in potential promotion/raises? Do they look into a go around enough to determine cause or are all go arounds assumed pilot error by the company?

"If you think safety is expensive, try an accident"

Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

#294
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

AIUI, they should never have gotten that far. They should have gone around at 1000 feet.

> They should have gone around at 1000 feet They hit the ground at 158 knots. 767-300ER rotates at 130 to 160 knots. Given it had burned through its fuel, at the moment they touched down they could have immediately taken back off and gone around. Given the pilots braked at 146 kts, released at 120 kts to throttle up for G-A, then four seconds later ditched the G-A and re-applied brakes, this sounds like they got stuc…

> Given the pilots braked at 146 kts, released at 120 kts to throttle up for G-A, then four seconds later ditched the G-A and re-applied brakes, this sounds like they got stuck between going around and committing to the landing and never quite did either.

Ah, literally the worst thing you can ever do, the in-between. Either go or stop, never do the indecisive middle route. If in doubt, default to stopping, though in this case of course the default is to go-around.

Although... it's probably going to end up the case, as is usual, that were they truly committed to landing and started braking hard right away, they would have ended up fine enough. Indecisiveness kills.

Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

#295

Looking at it from the glass-half-full perspective, I'm impressed that pilots declare go-around as often as they do. As someone who sometimes can't decide whether I should declare a production incident (even if it's not my change), I wonder if it's possible to learn that decisiveness.

It's a direct consequence of the stakes involved. It's literally a life-or-death decision and the rules pilots abide by are written in blood.

Production incidents are comparatively trivial, irrelevant issues.

Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

#296

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If there are factors that need to be met it seems like a red indicator light should trigger a go around.

There were quite literally multiple warning alarms that went off that should have automatically triggered this exact response.

Then it’s a real mystery how this could happen. Will the subordinate pilot be consider culpable?

Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami

#297

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There were quite literally multiple warning alarms that went off that should have automatically triggered this exact response.

Then it’s a real mystery how this could happen. Will the subordinate pilot be consider culpable?

It really is. That's why anyone with an aviation background is absolutely stunned that it happened. So, so, so, so, so many opportunities to avoid this accident were actively ignored and/or bypassed. I said it elsewhere but these guys single-handedly punched their way through the entire Swiss-cheese model of safety.

Given the level of negligence on display here I would not be remotely surprised if charges were filed against both pilots.

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