Pilot here but not ATP or Jet rated. When you try to land with too much energy the airplane refuses. When you get within a wingspan or two of the ground then ground effect starts giving you more and more lift. That plus excess speed means the airplane simply will not come down. To force it down you lower the nose but that can end up castering on the nose wheel, starting a PIO event (pilot-induced oscillation), or as…
Did fly jets, although not transport-class ones. Just to hammer home that everything here is correct, and the common thread through all aircraft types is disciplined execution. You fly an approach on airspeed and/or angle of attack, and on glideslope. Period. You're either there or you're correcting to get there, and you're correcting at a point that you don't need huge oh-my-God corrections in close. If you can't do…
NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
261–270 of 297 posts
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#262Earlier quoted context omitted.
If any of the two pilots feel uncomfortable about the approach, they are actually drilled to just order a go-around, not politely ask and hint that they would prefer to do it like this FO did (wastes time). Ideally the pilot flying should then do it, but if they don't, the pilot monitoring can also take control (while clearly stating "my controls, going around") and do it. One major issue that I bet the NTSB will not…
Also not an expert, I wonder if there's some rule where a "Go around!" order has precedence over any other activity anyone in the cockpit wishes to perform. As a passenger I had my first go around a few days ago, but we were 5km away from the runway.
When either pilot calls for a go-around, both are supposed to drop literally everything else, execute the go-around without delay or hesitation, and then pause to analyze the situation once ATC gives them a heading and altitude or holding pattern to regroup.
The only thing lost in a go-around is fuel and time. Any sane airline will never punish a call to go-around if done so in good faith.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#263Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is the spitting image of old pre-CRM thinking: If I try to force the captain to go around, (or follow procedures or whatever), then i am exceeding my authority and will probably be fired. Some cultures have this sort of mentality a lot stronger than others, and it has zero place in the modern cockpit. While a captain can pull rank, they really should only ever do it with respect to the first officer if: an inexp…
This seems like a no win situation for the subordinate pilot. Grabbing the wheel of an aircraft while landing must have its own set of risks. We also only hear about the times when the subordinate pilot didn’t prevent a crash. Never hear about the times they were mistaken and did nothing.
Four words said by the pilot monitoring that any pilot flying will understand and react automatically to.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#264Earlier quoted context omitted.
I wonder: would PM have taken control if they had more experience on the 767?
Having pilots fighting over the controls is not a situation anyone wants. The pilot monitoring saying go around should have caused an immediate reaction, the human factors behind why it didn't will probably feature prominently in the post-accident actions.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#265Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do companies punish pilots for go arounds for costing them fuel and delays? If not outright punished, does it cost them in potential promotion/raises? Do they look into a go around enough to determine cause or are all go arounds assumed pilot error by the company?
No, a go around is not a pilot error and it's not punished. It's almost the opposite. There is automatic monitoring for stable approach criteria (simplified: you must be at speed X with flaps selected etc by altitude Y). So this example would cause an automatic report from the aircraft to the airline, because they were too fast (not within stable approach criteria) and still continued the approach instead of going ar…
But the cause of a need to go around can be pilot error. There could be non-pilot error needs for a go around like when there is a runway incursion so the pilot is waved off. If a pilot makes a bad approach, would that not be pilot error? Not being a pilot, I'm not sure of the procedure. I'm assuming a 767 uses autopilot for the majority of the flight. I just have no insight on whether the pilot or the autopilot is responsible for the approach.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#266Earlier quoted context omitted.
Isn't it? Pretty sure its actually the drilled and trained commandment. If you doubt, speak up, and if that fails, take control. [0] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management
There are a lot of things which are drilled and trained which have gone wrong in this incident.
If this had happened and the captain had fought over the controls and still caused an accident, we’d be having a very different conversation. The FO would be lauded as a hero who fought to save the lives of those on the ground.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#267Earlier quoted context omitted.
The key mistakes were that they had 11 mandatory go-around situations between 1000ft before touchdown and overshooting the runway and they didn't go around.
Does the 767 have automated voice callouts for those?
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#268Earlier quoted context omitted.
Having pilots fighting over the controls is not a situation anyone wants. The pilot monitoring saying go around should have caused an immediate reaction, the human factors behind why it didn't will probably feature prominently in the post-accident actions.
“My controls” is something every single pilot has heard since day 1 of training and has a learned, immediate response to.
Making the assumption the PM could have taken control cleanly if the power dynamic was so poor that they weren't able to demand a go-around seems iffy, typical stabilised approach gates are 500ft in VMC, with an aircraft travelling 3nm a minute, 40 seconds before touchdown.
But as I said, the human factors involved will be a huge focus of the accident investigation.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#269Earlier quoted context omitted.
You’re imagining a last minute perfectly executed response after what appears to be a series of gross errors of judgement. Rarely works that way.
> Rarely works that way. How sure are you? Could it actually happen that way 95% of the time, which means they don’t crash and we never hear about it? Likely a pilot gets disciplined for the other errors and nobody else cares? This exact thing could happen 20 times with everything turning up relatively ok and we only heard about it because they didn’t make that final call correctly either. To be clear I’m not an avia…
This concept is called normalization of deviance and is the cause of a lot of accidents in aviation and other fields.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#270Earlier quoted context omitted.
If any of the two pilots feel uncomfortable about the approach, they are actually drilled to just order a go-around, not politely ask and hint that they would prefer to do it like this FO did (wastes time). Ideally the pilot flying should then do it, but if they don't, the pilot monitoring can also take control (while clearly stating "my controls, going around") and do it. One major issue that I bet the NTSB will not…
Also not an expert, I wonder if there's some rule where a "Go around!" order has precedence over any other activity anyone in the cockpit wishes to perform. As a passenger I had my first go around a few days ago, but we were 5km away from the runway.
The clouds had been very thick for awhile. The plane was making those weird low-and-slow vibes that it makes on final approach.
We popped out of the clouds and there was a highway with cars! A huge parking lot! (An airport, too? Certainly, but I didn't really see a runway or any runway-adjacent stuff.) To my inexpert eyes, we just looked to be impossibly low for our location.
The folks in the cockpit apparently didn't like what they saw with their eyes, either. In an instant, the engines roared as they simultaneously pointed the thing upwards. My little pea brain was very impressed by the immediacy of the forces on my body as we disappeared back into the clouds after what was at most just several seconds of visibility.
Anyway, it was very clear that there was no hesitation to the go-around. However that decision was reached, it was then simply executed.
The next attempt went very smoothly about ten minutes later.
(The go-around can be seen here, if anyone wants to have a look at some pretty lines and maps from ADS-B: https://planefinder.net/data/flight/NK630/history/5-48596475 )