This has all the hallmarks of a "gethomeitis" disaster, where the urge to push on overrides better judgment about going around and doing things properly.
A bad driver never misses an exit.
NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
181–190 of 297 posts
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#182Captain Steeeve’s latest video on this tragedy is shocking, complete disregard for the aviation rules. I think he cited 11 separate instances of __mandatory__ go around, the first of which was before they were anywhere near the runway at 1000ft elevation.
He may or may not be right here, but captain steeeve has a bad track record of baseless claims and/or bad speculation and is not a good reference due to his past failings. I would not be referencing him as a good source.
I don't know the specific items that were called out here but I can tell you, as a flight instructor, that the failure to capture the glideslope was already enough to require a go-around. The late flap settings were too. So was the high airspeed. At no point did they have a stabilized approach. There were multiple unequivocal mandatory go-around conditions before they got to the runway.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#183Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is par for the course for HN; smart people failing to interpret a comment in a charitable light, preferring instead to author a condescending reply in an apparent effort to score imaginary points at the expense of intellectually stimulating conversation.
Turbofans being slow to spool up is jets 101.
So presumably OP never took jets 101. Neither have I. So what? The condescension remains unjustified and contrary to fruitful interaction. (See also the "lucky 10000" xkcd.)
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#184The details of course matter; but the overarching principle put on stark display here is that if you don’t meet stabilized approach criteria (on-speed, on-glidepath, minimal necessary flight control deflections) at the 1000 ft AGL gate, go around. Yes grey areas exist but this approach never became stabilized. The whole approach was a missed opportunity to go around.
I am a pilot; and although I don’t fly large transport category aircraft, this sort of procedural discipline makes all the difference no matter what you fly.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is one thing an airline never wants to have happen and it is a fatal accident. Everything else is secondary. Having one caused by corporate policy would lead to mass exodus of passengers.
21Air isn't a passenger airline though, it's cargo. It's conceivable that they have lower standards, hire less experienced pilots, and just don't emphasize safety culture in the same way that passenger airlines do.
> It's conceivable that they have lower standards, hire less experienced pilots, and just don't emphasize safety culture in the same way that passenger airlines do.
In German railways there is a saying "Fracht motzt nicht, Fracht kotzt nicht" - freight neither complains nor vomits.
I would not be surprised at all to find this kind of attitude in air freight transportation too.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#186Earlier quoted context omitted.
I wonder: would PM have taken control if they had more experience on the 767?
Having pilots fighting over the controls is not a situation anyone wants. The pilot monitoring saying go around should have caused an immediate reaction, the human factors behind why it didn't will probably feature prominently in the post-accident actions.
If any of the two pilots feel uncomfortable about the approach, they are actually drilled to just order a go-around, not politely ask and hint that they would prefer to do it like this FO did (wastes time). Ideally the pilot flying should then do it, but if they don't, the pilot monitoring can also take control (while clearly stating "my controls, going around") and do it. One major issue that I bet the NTSB will note in the final report is that both pilots were relatively new to the aircraft and to the airline, usually it's preferable to pair an inexperienced FO with more experienced captains.
(not an aviation expert, just summarizing various bits and pieces I gathered from various YouTubers over the last days)
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#187Earlier quoted context omitted.
Isn’t there a regulation for idle to full go-around thrust in a maximum of 8 seconds? If so, it’s tight… but i feel like they should have made it if they had stuck to that plan. They commanded full power 15 seconds before the crash, and were pretty close to (if not slightly above) their stall speed (depends on load). I suspect they just needed another 10-20 knots and enough energy to climb.
> They commanded full power 15 seconds before the crash Not 15 seconds before the crash, 15 seconds before the end of the recording. Then overran the runway 10 seconds before the end of the recording, then started crashing into objects 7 seconds before the end of the recording. Thrust was reduced back to idle 11 seconds before the end of the recording, so just before departing the runway.
Ah, those timings make a lot more sense.
They aborted the go-around attempt because they were literally at the end of the runway; Probably because they thought it would be "safer" to run off the end without the engines rapidly reaching full thrust.
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#188Looking at it from the glass-half-full perspective, I'm impressed that pilots declare go-around as often as they do. As someone who sometimes can't decide whether I should declare a production incident (even if it's not my change), I wonder if it's possible to learn that decisiveness.
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Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#189A few observations to add context (partially stolen from PPRuNe): - Pilot Flying (PF) was the Captain, 55 yo (presumably) more experienced pilot, who only got certified to fly that type (B767) in May - Pilot Monitoring (PM) was a 38 yo first officer, also not very experienced on B767 - PF made a number of mistakes, going too high, too fast (partially because he was descending too fast), not catching the glidescope on…
This is the spitting image of old pre-CRM thinking: If I try to force the captain to go around, (or follow procedures or whatever), then i am exceeding my authority and will probably be fired. Some cultures have this sort of mentality a lot stronger than others, and it has zero place in the modern cockpit. While a captain can pull rank, they really should only ever do it with respect to the first officer if: an inexp…
Is this legislated, required policy, or is this something that you believe should be the case?
The reason I ask is, case in point, do you think the PM is going to be penalized in some way?
Re: NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
#190A few observations to add context (partially stolen from PPRuNe): - Pilot Flying (PF) was the Captain, 55 yo (presumably) more experienced pilot, who only got certified to fly that type (B767) in May - Pilot Monitoring (PM) was a 38 yo first officer, also not very experienced on B767 - PF made a number of mistakes, going too high, too fast (partially because he was descending too fast), not catching the glidescope on…
One more thing worth noting is that they flew through bad weather on the approach, which led to the deviation from the glideslope. But the actual issue IMHO is not going around when they noticed that the approach was wildly unstable, or at the latest when they noticed that they were going to touch down with very little runway left.