This was my first thought after they disallowed LLM contributions. They may not use AI to check for vulnerabilities but attackers are going to which puts themselves at the disadvantage.
https://codeberg.org/Codeberg/org/commit/71149c7fc95ccfeae36...
21–30 of 87 posts
This was my first thought after they disallowed LLM contributions. They may not use AI to check for vulnerabilities but attackers are going to which puts themselves at the disadvantage.
https://codeberg.org/Codeberg/org/commit/71149c7fc95ccfeae36...
This was my first thought after they disallowed LLM contributions. They may not use AI to check for vulnerabilities but attackers are going to which puts themselves at the disadvantage.
Why can't you use an LLM to find vulnerabilities and then hand-code the fix? You don't even have to clean-room implement it; let the LLM write the code, and then reimplement, doing what you can to de-LLM-ify it.
Quick note that this is not an RCE in the typical sense that I can rock up to a Forgejo installation and execute code on the server. The attack vector here is via a template repo specified when initializing a new repo. The template repo could contain malicious code that then executes on the host server. So if you don't create new repos from mystery meat template repos, you should be ok.
Only posting here because I've been asked about it. Gitea is protected against both of these issues. (bias note: part of project leadership of Gitea) Edit: As a note, security incidents happen to everyone and we shouldn't shame anyone for reporting them, especially as that'd otherwise cause less issues to be reported overall.
Quick note that this is not an RCE in the typical sense that I can rock up to a Forgejo installation and execute code on the server. The attack vector here is via a template repo specified when initializing a new repo. The template repo could contain malicious code that then executes on the host server. So if you don't create new repos from mystery meat template repos, you should be ok.
Are you sure? The change says "A malicious template repository could be used to read arbitrary data from the Forgejo host " (emphasis added). Couldn't an attacker create a template repo and then immediately create a new repo from their own template, causing the Forgejo process to execute their template code on the server?
It can't be done without authenticating first, but there's nothing about RCE that says that it must be sent from unauthenticated connection.