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Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

simonwillison.net

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Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#111
post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, thank you for engaging. The most naive versions of substrate independence have a hard time contending with Putnam’s thought experiment showing rocks are conscious (Chalmers has a webpage discussing this also); the idea is that a sequence of machine states can be made to correspond 1-1 to a sequence of rock states. There are stronger versions which start making assumptions about causal and organizational structure…

This rocks thing sounds like an argument I heard Searle make one time - that the vibrating molecules in a wall can be thought of as sentient because you can map them to intelligent output (where, of course, the intelligence is actually hidden in the mapping.) I don't know how to resolve these things - but my suspicion is these issues get resolved like the question of solipsism: we take a practical explanation because…

The explanation I have against solipsism is that I believe that physical things of similar kind have similar behavior, and brains are extremely similar to one another. This is compatible with my belief in substrate non-independence.

> it comes from a circular definition

Right my original post tried to preempt this common view. My view is that there cannot be a definition of consciousness that isn’t effectively like asking the other person to observe it.

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#112
post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This rocks thing sounds like an argument I heard Searle make one time - that the vibrating molecules in a wall can be thought of as sentient because you can map them to intelligent output (where, of course, the intelligence is actually hidden in the mapping.) I don't know how to resolve these things - but my suspicion is these issues get resolved like the question of solipsism: we take a practical explanation because…

The explanation I have against solipsism is that I believe that physical things of similar kind have similar behavior, and brains are extremely similar to one another. This is compatible with my belief in substrate non-independence. > it comes from a circular definition Right my original post tried to preempt this common view. My view is that there cannot be a definition of consciousness that isn’t effectively like a…

> brains are extremely similar to one another

But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right?

And for what it's worth - no - I do not believe neurons are so different than transistors. Sure, it could be possible - but really? That feels like a reach for a theory that wants to find a certain conclusion. They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right? They obey the same laws of chemistry and physics. You think consciousness is really in the carbon and not in the silicon? Do you have any justification for that belief? Is it the atomic weight? How could that possibly be?

> My view is that there cannot be a definition of consciousness that isn’t effectively like asking the other person to observe it.

Right. But that's circular, isn't it? Consciousness is what I feel like consciousness is.

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#113
post #112

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The explanation I have against solipsism is that I believe that physical things of similar kind have similar behavior, and brains are extremely similar to one another. This is compatible with my belief in substrate non-independence. > it comes from a circular definition Right my original post tried to preempt this common view. My view is that there cannot be a definition of consciousness that isn’t effectively like a…

> brains are extremely similar to one another But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right? And for what it's worth - no - I do not believe neurons are so different than transistors. Sure, it could be possible - but really? That feels like a reach for a theory that wants to find a certain conclusion. They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right? They obey the same…

> But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right?

Right but my belief is I live in a universe with regular processes depending on regular arrangements. It seems like a relatively weak axiom to hold and precludes the version of solipsism you mention.

> They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right?

They have different arrangements. A MOSFET is just a block of polysilicon sitting on top of another layer of silicon which has been doped to contain some arsenic or boron atoms (+ some other details). I can put some legos together which correspond conceptually to this, but they will have functional differences. The actual substrate is what causes the mosfet to have the function of a transistor. Of course the neurons in the brain are far more complex and have different physical properties.

To me trying to explain how protons and electrons put together results in consciousness feels the same as the pre-Newtonians trying to explain gravity with their mechanical philosophy. The only thing I know is my brain is conscious, and your brain is physically similar to mine. Substrate non-independence is actually the weaker of the two assumptions in a sense because it makes a positive statement about fewer systems.

> That feels like a reach for a theory that wants to find a certain conclusion.

The problem with this kind of thinking is one can impugn the beliefs of either side with underhanded motives. Maybe people self-identify as being moral and ethical and elevating the talking computer gives them status in their circle. Maybe the personhood for AI researcher has a big ego and wants their work to be extremely important today.

I honestly do not find it plausible that we cannot build a consciousness-free intelligent computer system. A computer system can be made out of marbles, or pulleys, or pen and paper. All of these are having an experience if you put the symbols or objects in the right order? It just seems absurd to me.

> Right. But that's circular, isn't it? Consciousness is what I feel like consciousness is.

A priori why must real concepts be reducible in the way you want? Gravity is the thing that makes stuff fall, actually it’s the curvature tensor of the spacetime metric? What is the spacetime metric actually? Maybe something in string theory? Eventually you get to irreducible primitives that simply correspond to something we observe. Why isn’t consciousness just this with fewer steps?

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#114
post #112

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> brains are extremely similar to one another But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right? And for what it's worth - no - I do not believe neurons are so different than transistors. Sure, it could be possible - but really? That feels like a reach for a theory that wants to find a certain conclusion. They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right? They obey the same…

> But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right? Right but my belief is I live in a universe with regular processes depending on regular arrangements. It seems like a relatively weak axiom to hold and precludes the version of solipsism you mention. > They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right? They have different arrangements. A MOSFET is just a block of polysilic…

> It just seems absurd to me.

But this is just the "consciousness is based on information, not substrate" position, right? It seems absurd?

I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation?

> A priori why must real concepts be reducible in the way you want?

Because everything we do in science is like this? Do you think consciousness is beyond the ability for science to study it?

> Gravity is the thing that makes stuff fall...

I agree that gravity is akin to an axiom handed down from on-high. But it's an extremely simple axiom. And it's possibly explained by yet undiscovered simpler axioms. I see no such axiom for the theory of conciousness, despite our extensive understanding of the physical mechanisms involved. Given its absence, it seems to me like the most reasonable explanation is the one we already have - rather than insisting it still must be undiscovered.

And... I'm sorry but your argument feels exactly like vitalism. Given the repeating pattern of man insisting he has a special place in God's universe and then fighting for it stubbornly but then being proved otherwise... I think it's likely this instance will fall the same way all the others have.

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#115
post #114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right? Right but my belief is I live in a universe with regular processes depending on regular arrangements. It seems like a relatively weak axiom to hold and precludes the version of solipsism you mention. > They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right? They have different arrangements. A MOSFET is just a block of polysilic…

> It just seems absurd to me. But this is just the "consciousness is based on information, not substrate" position, right? It seems absurd? I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation? > A priori why must real concepts…

> I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can.

I don’t understand what you’re saying here. It doesn’t trouble me at all. I’m actually quite confident I could design a simple computer from scratch in a substrate of marbles and an electric motor to bring them back up.

Maybe we should separate these threads otherwise it’ll be too hard to keep branching out.

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#116
post #114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It just seems absurd to me. But this is just the "consciousness is based on information, not substrate" position, right? It seems absurd? I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation? > A priori why must real concepts…

> I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. I don’t understand what you’re saying here. It doesn’t trouble me at all. I’m actually quite confident I could design a simple computer from scratch in a substrate of marbles and an electric motor to bring them back up. Maybe we should separate these threads otherwise it’ll be too hard to keep branching out.

I must have misunderstood where you were drawing the line of absurdity.

I'm comfortable going slower - although the site won't let me reply as quickly as it let's you.

So I take it that you disbelieve that consciousness/qualia can be created by computation. But you do believe, I suspect, that consciousness/qualia are a physical process. So I'm wondering, is this the only example of non-computable physical process you know of?

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#117
post #114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But according to solipsism you can't be sure my brain actually exists at all, right? Right but my belief is I live in a universe with regular processes depending on regular arrangements. It seems like a relatively weak axiom to hold and precludes the version of solipsism you mention. > They're both made of the same protons and electrons, right? They have different arrangements. A MOSFET is just a block of polysilic…

> It just seems absurd to me. But this is just the "consciousness is based on information, not substrate" position, right? It seems absurd? I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation? > A priori why must real concepts…

> So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation?

I think all physical processes are distinct from their descriptions, and have a real existence. We can describe some things about them but our descriptions are not equal to them.

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#118
post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. I don’t understand what you’re saying here. It doesn’t trouble me at all. I’m actually quite confident I could design a simple computer from scratch in a substrate of marbles and an electric motor to bring them back up. Maybe we should separate these threads otherwise it’ll be too hard to keep branching out.

I must have misunderstood where you were drawing the line of absurdity. I'm comfortable going slower - although the site won't let me reply as quickly as it let's you. So I take it that you disbelieve that consciousness/qualia can be created by computation. But you do believe, I suspect, that consciousness/qualia are a physical process. So I'm wondering, is this the only example of non-computable physical process you…

Let me apologize for having to discontinue now, or my girlfriend will dump me for being more interested in talking to you than her tonight. Another time!

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#119
post #114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It just seems absurd to me. But this is just the "consciousness is based on information, not substrate" position, right? It seems absurd? I understand that it troubles you that real computation can be done with marbles... but... it can. So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation? > A priori why must real concepts…

> So you must believe that consciousness is entirely uncomputable? Do you have any other examples of physical processes that are beyond computation? I think all physical processes are distinct from their descriptions, and have a real existence. We can describe some things about them but our descriptions are not equal to them.

I'm sorry - I missed this reply - which is why I asked it a second time below.

So - let me know if I have this right - if I created a simulation of you it would act like you and talk like you in all ways - but not actually feel like you?

And if I asked it if it felt like you (being a perfect simulation of you) it would answer as you do "Yes, I feel like me." But it would be what... lying about having feelings?

Do I have that right?

And if so - is it aware that it is lying to me? Does it believe what it's saying? I guess we could never tell, because our only recourse is to ask it, and it would just continue lying. Or, being a p-zombie, it wouldn't be capable of belief at all? Despite its claims?

And if I injured this simulation - it would cry out in pain and beg me to stop? All the while not actually feeling pain?

I'm curious - why does this scenario seem more likely to you than the more obvious explanation?

Why is it more likely that behavior which appears identical to a feeling creature is actually somehow faked?

And where does all this fakery occur?

Presumably my simulation is just simulating the interactions of atoms in the body. Does the body have systems for faking emotions that we are unaware of - that only come online while its being simulated? Or does my simulation have a secret fake emotion system I am not aware of?

I am very confused by this picture.

Re: Claude's new system prompt doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics

#120
post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I must have misunderstood where you were drawing the line of absurdity. I'm comfortable going slower - although the site won't let me reply as quickly as it let's you. So I take it that you disbelieve that consciousness/qualia can be created by computation. But you do believe, I suspect, that consciousness/qualia are a physical process. So I'm wondering, is this the only example of non-computable physical process you…

Let me apologize for having to discontinue now, or my girlfriend will dump me for being more interested in talking to you than her tonight. Another time!

OMG. Yes, of course. Send your girlfriend my regards.

I didn't see your second reply above - so I answered it now. I look forward to continuing... tomorrow?

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