431–440 of 528 posts
How many Heartbleeds[1] must software users and our national security interests endure before the industry treats memory safety as a best practice for systems with exposure to the Internet? The V8 vulnerability being exploited today, CVE-2026-85046, is listed in NVD under CWE-843, "Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')."[2] On this class of vulnerabilities, MITRE explains: > When a memory buff…
There's more to it than just using a memory safe language.
How many Heartbleeds[1] must software users and our national security interests endure before the industry treats memory safety as a best practice for systems with exposure to the Internet? The V8 vulnerability being exploited today, CVE-2026-85046, is listed in NVD under CWE-843, "Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')."[2] On this class of vulnerabilities, MITRE explains: > When a memory buff…
How do you write a performant memory-safe JS JIT?
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I think the problem is that we've let JS engines become absurdly complex so there's no way to avoid them having really gross bugs. That said, I think that the V8 team has done a fantastic job of securing their engine. Their heap sandbox feature is really inspiring! It's really wild that (as far as I can understand this issue) someone is able to bypass it. (Posted from a memory safe browser - WebKit MiniBrowser compil…
In Chromium you can turn off V8's JIT compiler for this reason. You can even opt in again for sites you trust that need the additional performance.
That’s even the case for C#, which is why the dotnet runtime only conditionally JIT compiles code. Only hot path code is eligible for JIT compilation.
Isn't this exactly why there is a sandbox? What can the RCE actually do or obtain within the sandbox?
Yes, it says right in the CVE > allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code *inside the sandbox*
Google has the means and ability to rewrite Chromium ; bug for bug in Rust from C++ using Astra & Fable. Same for the Linux kernel. Considering the Fermat's Last Theorem lean proof was 13MLoC and cost $300,000 it would cost $2M to rewrite Chromium & Linux in Rust going purely of combined LoC.
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I wouldn't consider that an SPA at all, it's just a page with an interactive element. An SPA is something that renders everything client-side and uses a generic client API to talk to the backend. A telltale sign of an SPA is that the first thing you see when you open it is some sort of loading indicator instead of the actual page you're visiting.
No, the telltale sign of a SPA is that it’s an app that’s a single fucking page, lol Please stop changing the definitions of explicit words and phrases - to anyone reading this!
For example, a search function. For a MPA, each search query would be a new page. For a SPA, each query is a new logical page, served on the same real page.
Technically yes, a SPA may have minimal client side rendering. But then it’s not doing much of anything at all - it’s just a site. When people say SPA, they typically mean an application with client side rendering.
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> We shouldn't look to the black market as cost discovery for these vulnerabilities We absolutely should. One of the points of bug bounties is to discourage people from selling to the black market.
The black market also prices in a risk premium for ‘this is illegal and you could go to jail for selling me this’. Google is only paying for the vulnerability; the exploit market is also paying for your mortal soul.
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Because extensions especially MV2 ones only increase attack surface.
No, they don't only increase attack surface. In particular, uBo reduces attack surface a lot more than it increases it.
uBO MV2 and MV3 in any of the higher two modes objectively add more attack surface when the alternative is basic uBoL + DNS level filtering which is the most secure combination second to just DNS-only filtering.
And ultimately ad blocking is only badness enumeration which is a poor security measure to rely on, especially when the main application (Firefox) lacks proper security measures versus Chromium. It’s like the NVIDIA owners coming up with 3,000 different cable solutions to the burning connectors when its a problem with the card itself.
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The black market also prices in a risk premium for ‘this is illegal and you could go to jail for selling me this’. Google is only paying for the vulnerability; the exploit market is also paying for your mortal soul.
I'm surprised that selling knowledge is illegal? Is it really? Maybe it shouldn't be
‘Officer, you can’t arrest me for carrying a gold bar!’
‘I can if you are carrying it out of the Federal Reserve vault without permission’
Similarly:
‘Surely selling someone the knowledge that a piece of software can be hacked isn’t illegal?’
‘It is if you know or suspect that that person’s intention is to use that knowledge to commit crimes’
This would make you a ‘coconspirator’ or possibly an ‘accessory before the fact’ in any crimes they committed.
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> I chained this bug with an n-day sandbox escape and flagged the v8CTF. https://serotav.github.io/Writeups/v8/when-sorting-leads-to-...
Then what it was chained to is the real issue, not this one. The entire point of having webpages run in their own process is to prevent bugs like this one from doing worse. If you're claiming this bug is the bug that matters, you're effectively claiming they shouldn't need to run pages in their own process and just trust that there are zero bugs. No major browser does that. Not Firefox, not Safari, and not Chromium.…