Earlier quoted context omitted.
In fairness, in the early 2000s they were probably right. Early browser security model was a bit of a mess. The fact that this article is even talked about is a sign of how much better things are.
Plus add in Flash and Java applets.
Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
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Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#392Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#393Earlier quoted context omitted.
[flagged]
The idea here is that uBlock filters the domains that may serve the malware in the first place. It basically works the same as a DNS filter.
Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#394Earlier quoted context omitted.
The idea here is that uBlock filters the domains that may serve the malware in the first place. It basically works the same as a DNS filter.
Which you can also easily do with uBlock Origin Lite in Chrome/Chromium.
Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#395Earlier quoted context omitted.
[flagged]
I'm willing to believe that stock chrome has a better record than stock Firefox, but > and on top of it you’re recommending an extension as a security measure ... Yes? Why can a browser extension not be a security measure/improvement?
Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#396So basically, Edge, Brave and any other browser built on Chromium. Nice.
Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#397How many Heartbleeds[1] must software users and our national security interests endure before the industry treats memory safety as a best practice for systems with exposure to the Internet? The V8 vulnerability being exploited today, CVE-2026-85046, is listed in NVD under CWE-843, "Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')."[2] On this class of vulnerabilities, MITRE explains: > When a memory buff…
Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#398Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#399Same for the Linux kernel. Considering the Fermat's Last Theorem lean proof was 13MLoC and cost $300,000 it would cost $2M to rewrite Chromium & Linux in Rust going purely of combined LoC.
Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions
#400How many Heartbleeds[1] must software users and our national security interests endure before the industry treats memory safety as a best practice for systems with exposure to the Internet? The V8 vulnerability being exploited today, CVE-2026-85046, is listed in NVD under CWE-843, "Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')."[2] On this class of vulnerabilities, MITRE explains: > When a memory buff…