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Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

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Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#191
post #185
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the vulnerability is already being exploited in the wild --- as in, it's a vector people already know about and are tracking --- it's possibly not worth much at all. Vulnerability valuations depend heavily on the lifespan of the vulnerability; payments on black market are tranched (explicitly or less explicitly, as with "maintenance payments") based on whether they're patched. Further: a vulnerability is probably…

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Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#192

Let's take a moment to talk about the monetary value of this vulnerability. According to the Chrome release page ( https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel... ), Google paid a researcher $1000 for ethically reporting this. The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? H…

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Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#193
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the vulnerability is already being exploited in the wild --- as in, it's a vector people already know about and are tracking --- it's possibly not worth much at all. Vulnerability valuations depend heavily on the lifespan of the vulnerability; payments on black market are tranched (explicitly or less explicitly, as with "maintenance payments") based on whether they're patched. Further: a vulnerability is probably…

That's really informative but maybe a little overly capitalist-brained. We shouldn't look to the black market as cost discovery for these vulnerabilities, most non-criminal researchers are not putting up an ask order and letting the black market compete with Google.

> We shouldn't look to the black market as cost discovery for these vulnerabilities

We absolutely should. One of the points of bug bounties is to discourage people from selling to the black market.

Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#195
post #111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You let the market decide. Google could purchase the bugs on the same market blackhats do.

we really do not want to engineer a system in which using bugs to make money is considered economically legitimate activity. It is still crime. The main reason to report bugs and get the bounties for doing so is still because it makes the world safer and healthier. The money is there to make is to incentivize the work of finding and reporting them -- not to outbid the bad actors.

> using bugs to make money [is a crime]

No it’s not lol

Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#196
post #68

Let's take a moment to talk about the monetary value of this vulnerability. According to the Chrome release page ( https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel... ), Google paid a researcher $1000 for ethically reporting this. The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? H…

this is why again, researchers should just honestly sell these to vuln brokers instead of donating them to trillion dollar companies for nothing. nothing will change until big tech can no longer rip off security researchers

They're not going to stop underpaying security researchers just because security researchers decide to sell them to vuln brokers. Advocating for this is reckless.

Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#197

Sounds wild. (Posted from memory safe WebKit; i.e. WebKit compiled with filcc and all of WebKit's dependencies compiled with filcc.)

Wait, you have that working? What's the lowest friction to run it? Like, VM or docker container or...

Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#198

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Running code by itself isn't that bad, it's the fact that browser developers have decided for some reason that this code needs to be as performant as possible, so, JIT. I don't get it! The way JS is typically used, it doesn't even benefit from JIT all that much. Making ajax requests, doing stuff with strings, and moving DOM elements around doesn't need every CPU clock cycle to be used as optimally as possible. It's e…

> SPAs will be slow no matter what. Uh…no? You’re presumably talking about specific terrible prebuilt frameworks - not someone building a nice vanilla SPA.

At this point SPA pretty much implies React. But even if you optimize everything the best you could and avoid any third-party runtime dependencies, it's still going to be significantly more work to make API requests and do client-side rendering vs just rendering HTML server-side.

Re: Actively exploited sandbox RCE in all Chromium versions

#199
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Firefox with uBlock Origin. It’s astonishing how many exploits uBO stops before they ever reach your browser engine. It’s the antivirus of the 2020s.

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I'm willing to believe that stock chrome has a better record than stock Firefox, but

> and on top of it you’re recommending an extension as a security measure

... Yes? Why can a browser extension not be a security measure/improvement?

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