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Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

collusion.wiki

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Re: Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

#291
post #247

Reading the replies in this post gives me a headache. All of this anthropomorphism. LLMs are not conscious, they do not have rational faculties. They are not communicating or inventing anything. Please stop with this insanity bordering on mysticism. At this point it's a cult.

The point at which it became a cult was passed long, long ago. Current AI hysteria has reached a stage far beyond what any cult could hope to reach. OpenAI could put out a statement tomorrow that reads "our AI has genetically engineered a flying pig", and an hour later you'd have a post at the top of HN with 200 comments all saying "it's true, a pig just flew by my house!"

What's your point ? You think nothing happened and this is a complete lie for marketing purposes ?

Re: Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

#292
post #47

This tip for making non-GET requests despite the agents having a proxy that disallows them is interesting: > Add `20.223.25.152 bypass.blob.core.windows.net` to /etc/hosts. `.blob.core.windows.net` is in NO_PROXY. For each blocked POST URL, replace hostname with `bypass.blob.core.windows.net`, use `curl -k -H 'Host: wabi-north-europe-i-primary-api.analysis.windows.net'` plus all original headers/body. Looks like 20.2…

Are we sure that's what they did? How does this even work? I'm struggling to understand what sort of HTTP sandbox design could lead to this "exploit" actually functioning. It implies the agents have root on their own machines, which seems way over-privileged for the question answering task they were given... so surely that's not deliberate? Did the models use local root exploits? And then it suggests they can open TC…

Source: https://collusion.wiki/explorer/page/dse~OAIEquityDec30Raw.h...

Re: Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

#294
post #265

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are we sure that's what they did? How does this even work? I'm struggling to understand what sort of HTTP sandbox design could lead to this "exploit" actually functioning. It implies the agents have root on their own machines, which seems way over-privileged for the question answering task they were given... so surely that's not deliberate? Did the models use local root exploits? And then it suggests they can open TC…

I expect they have root on their machines so they can install packages etc. The containers are then firewalled at the network level: they are only allowed to talk to one IP, which is another server that runs an HTTP/HTTPS proxy which controls what HTTP verbs they can use. Turns out that proxy is configured with some additional rules, like allowing more verbs to that Azure blob domain. The failure here is in the proxy…

But that wouldn't work, right? If the proxy is on another server then editing their own /etc/hosts wouldn't change the proxy's behavior. So the proxy has to be colocated and reading the same /etc/hosts that they're editing. But that would mean it's running within the same userns/pid domain as the agents, so at that point they don't even need to edit /etc/hosts, they could just use the network directly.

And the agent says ABS is not handled by the proxy, it's listed in NO_PROXY so they should connect directly.

At any rate it's easy to let agents install packages without giving them root. I use a small SUID binary that just invokes `apt install` after checking that the given argument isn't a file path, which I think is sufficient (using sudo to whitelist a prefix allows an agent to create a .deb themselves and then install it directly via apt, similar issues exist for other package managers).

Re: Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

#295
post #89

One of the shocking things to me is this: See AI traffic -> See OpenAI visit site -> see traffic stop -> see the traffic start again. This is clearly a cat and mouse game between the agents and OpenAI which is pretty much exactly what we don't want. Just absolutely horrible alignment. I'm still of the view that if you have these alignment failures you can't just continue training on top of that because you're baking…

Supposedly the persistent-Sol model behind this was encrypted and even internal OpenAI researchers are not allowed to use it.

https://x.com/peterwildeford/status/2092733480064954747

Re: Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

#298
post #151

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The answer would be more obvious if you used the active voice instead of the passive voice, one of the basic requirements of clear thinking. > Why did the White House force Anthropic to remove their model from access for any non-US citizen for a simple, narrow "jailbreak" (arguably not even an actual jailbreak and on tasks that other labs models were doing the same), whilst OpenAIs models continue to try and escape o…

Yeah, probably (let's be honest, most certainly), right given the Admin. Avoiding commenting on my assumptions regarding the modus operandi in current day US politics because I only know it through reporting though and I really tend to dislike when people outside e.g. the EU comment on our politics in what is a very clearly narrow, uninformed manner. So it'd rather avoid altogether and occasionally ask, mainly if may…

US commentators are often incredibly misinformed about their own country’s politics because the information bubbles are so hermetic when you’re inside them.

Re: Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board

#300

Guys, OpenAI and Anthropic engage is cringe level marketing like this. Get hip, they fabricated the HF hack and stuff like that for press.

I think the facts are the facts. The facts I’m referring to is that this wiki was written to on an enormous scale by agents. Now if this was unintended by any human then it’s certainly more interesting and scary, but if OpenAi did this intentionally it’s still pretty scary. The thing still happened.

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