Earlier quoted context omitted.
Since neither smith.name nor the wildcard *.name appear in the Public Suffix List ( https://publicsuffix.org/ ), browsers would likely allow any page on a *.smith.name domain to set cookies for .smith.name. There was an effort to properly handle the .name 2LDs, but it was never resolved because there’s no easy way to tell a reserved 2LD (open for 3LD registrations only) apart from a normal 2LD on .name: https://githu…
I think this says more about how the cookies security model is stupid. They should always have been scoped to the single, exact name they were set from and nothing else. Websites would have had to be designed a bit more thoughtfully.
Maybe it could be opt-in or opt-out via some markers at the DNS level, though? The public suffix list having to exist at all is bizarre.