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LLMs and self-referentiality

scottaaronson.blog

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Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#51
I think the missing idea for AI is in Iain McGilchrist's The Master and His Emissary. The book's thesis, very roughly, is that the hemispheres aren't redundant processors: the left specializes in focused, decontextualized representation (sound familiar?), while the right maintains broader, contextual engagement with the world (McGilchrist fuzzily reduces it to "what is out there?" which is fundamentally about ascertaining uncertainty as a mode of attention). And crucially, the corpus callosum connects the two processors and crucially helps preserve their functional separation through certain channels (as both sides are connected).

Transformers look suspiciously like very powerful left hemispheres. They are phenomenal at manipulating representations, but increasingly weird when the representation gets mistaken for the thing itself. Hallucination, sycophancy, context collapse, overconfident completion, etc. all look less mysterious when you compare it to the lists of pathologies that those with right hemisphere injury face (e.g. anosognosia, confabulation).

So what seems missing isn't a Gödelian strange loop but the other side of the brain and a mediator between the two sides.

The way I think about it is like Kriegsspiel, the ur-game for roleplaying and wargames. To truly "simulate" war (or a fantastic medieval adventure game), the simulation requires three sides: The Blue Team with a goal, the Red Team with its own goal (typically to stymie the Blue Team), and the Umpire, whose only job is to objectively simulate the effects of the orders of the two sides.

The Umpire has the true state of the world; Blue and Red only get observations through the Umpire. Neither can directly inspect the other's state. Each side must provide orders to the Umpire, who, ideally, being an SME, is able to process them both according to the rules of Kriegsspiel but also their real world experience in war. And that's the whole point of it in the first place: the Umpire maintains the fog of war between the players, with the ultimate purpose being improving the generalship (i.e. learning) of both the Blue and Red sides. And what is generalship really? It's being able to discern resources and operations in a world of Knightian uncertainty where one must evaluate whether there is an active intelligence attempting to thrwart your model of the world and your goals.

(An aside: I think this is why Dungeons & Dragons fails fundamentally as a rules/rulings-bound game. The dungeon master and referee are the same person, while each role has a fundamentally different goal. With split roles, the DM can actually try to kill the players using the Dungeon with the same level of asymmetric information as the players and the GM to actually referee the game neutrally with a view to what actually happens.)

Nobody actually gets the God's-eye view. The Umpire gets objective reality but lacks insight into the minds of either side, both of which are pursuing unique ends. This triad allows for genuine Knightian uncertainty in games where judgment (i.e. creating and using precedent) is fundamentally required. This triad is also shared by law, government (and from my perspective trinitarian theology). Intelligence becomes qualitatively more powerful when the architecture prevents any one component from possessing a complete, self-consistent description of the whole, while allowing the components to interact through constrained third parties.

I suspect this is also why human cognition seems to somehow avoid Godelian incompleteness by sidestepping the requirement that, as a formal system, it contains a complete model of itself. Just give the system multiple partially informed perspectives coupled through an epistemic boundary, and incompleteness becomes a source of entropy sifting and uncertainty rather than failure modes.

And if what I suspect is true, at some point the qualitative bottlenecks that pure transformer-style systems possess should begin to disappear when this approach is applied.

But I'm generally an idiot, so take all this with a huge grain of salt.

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#52
‘But the idea that you’d need explicit self-referentiality before you could get convincing and world-changing conversational intelligence?’ — has anyone ever formulated this actual idea or anything logically equivalent? This looks like a mighty straw man.

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#53

Their lack of self reference is a core problem that undergirds a lot of faults that do occur during inference, but their breadth + the agent harness successfully covers it well, so it requires a bit of poking to witness. The “hallucination” phenomenon is exactly this. They don’t know the scope of their own knowledge, and they just say stuff, so if you go out of band, it has a higher probability emitting claims that a…

From your comment, I noticed a sort of pattern that is often seen when discussing LLMs. That they are these amazing things that can run so fast they trip themselves in their attempts at achieving a task. So we resort to refining the models, creating guardrails, orchestrating harness, so as to alleviate the 'hallucination' problem.

In contrast to human intelligence, there is an underlying mechanism that propels intelligent behaviour. A person is no less intelligent just because they lose sight, sound or inner voice.

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ah yes, because you used the magical pixie dust that makes experiences "real" therefore you're actually seeing and hearing while a multimodal LLM doesn't really experience what it sees and hears "for real". We can be certain of this because, despite not being able to quantify or even rigorously define the phenomenon we intentionally deprive the LLMs of access to said magical pixie dust.

I agree. To further ask, why is your training data objectively real and qualifies you for consciousness? Is a deaf or blind person not conscious because they don't share your training data? If a deaf person reads about sounds, their experience of them is moot? If an alien with a greater array of senses then us exists, are we therefore not conscious?

People aren't just consciousness, they're conscious of things. Of course a deaf or blind person is conscious, even if they've been deaf or blind since birth. But they aren't conscious of hearing or seeing things, and if you ask them they'll tell you that.

I'm not conscious of magnetic fields, or ultraviolet light, but other animals are, and no amount of study will overcome that deficit.

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#55
post #37
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Scott Aaronson mentions Penrose's "The Emperor's New Mind", but I feel "Shadows of the Mind" is putting forward a much clearer view of Penrose's thesis. At the current stage of my life I'm quite comfortably in Camp C. "Intelligence" and "consciousness" are not algorithmic.[1] A lot of materialists are in Camp A. For some even today, LLM's are AGI. Unfortunately, the terminology is quite clearly not adequate. There's…

Do you treat LLM as algorithmic? I mean, the process of computing tokens is algorithmic, also the process of training, but does it mean that LLM itself follows an algorithm, in a practical sense? If yes, how is it different to a biological system constrained by physics?

A short disclaimer before answering. Right now I'm doing a Mathematics & Physics undergrad degree and have interest in philosophy. I'm not a specialist in any of those fields. I have plans to tackle the actual math around LLM's a bit further, but I'm not there yet.

To question 1 based on my current understanding (and let's say "beliefs") is that - yes, LLM's are following a probabilistic algorithm to give me the output. The same prompt won't yield the same result, but the same prompt will yield results that are quite adjacent to each other in meaning because of the training. There's randomness in the sense that you can't say which next token will be put with certainty, BUT you can be certain it will be a token that exists in the pool of tokens available. Hopefully that makes sense?

For question 2. Both us and LLMs are constrained by physics. The main difference for me is the fact that at every point of our existence we're constantly changing. Our internal state and bodies are changing based on all the sensory input we get from our environment and the processes that lie underneath. Another commenter in this thread talked about qualia. That's certainly part of it as well (but again we have a definition problem). That's not to say that I think that a hypothetical future machine cannot be devised to handle a lot of these, but the level of sophistication in the biological world is such that I don't think that's realistic. Let's say that even then, that happens, would that really prove that humans work the same way as the machine?

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#56

Their lack of self reference is a core problem that undergirds a lot of faults that do occur during inference, but their breadth + the agent harness successfully covers it well, so it requires a bit of poking to witness. The “hallucination” phenomenon is exactly this. They don’t know the scope of their own knowledge, and they just say stuff, so if you go out of band, it has a higher probability emitting claims that a…

Not sure self-reference solves the metacognition thing; an ant can pass the mirror test but probably lacks metacognition.

Though I haven't read GEB so I'm not sure how the strange loop thing ties in with either of those.

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ah yes, because you used the magical pixie dust that makes experiences "real" therefore you're actually seeing and hearing while a multimodal LLM doesn't really experience what it sees and hears "for real". We can be certain of this because, despite not being able to quantify or even rigorously define the phenomenon we intentionally deprive the LLMs of access to said magical pixie dust.

I just explained this. If someone looks at the contents of an image file without displaying it, they don't experience the colours either. So how can LLMs experience them?

Right. Because your eyes ... imbue the magical pixie dust ... no wait, is it your visual cortex that does it? Hmm ...

Less facetiously, I'm unclear where you believe this magic "qualia" thing to be happening and what you believe the (meta?)physical mechanism to be.

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#59
post #8

Was Hofstadter ever arguing that intelligence requires self-referentiality? I haven't read his stuff in a long time, but from what I recall he was saying more that something about consciousness and the sense of self is based on self-referentiality. Not that intelligence requires self-referentiality. I also remember having the sense that Hofstadter didn't really understand the "hard problem of consciousness". His disc…

Yes -- I can't remember the exact words, but there's a striking bit in GEB where he directly addresses the question of "will a machine ever create art?" His answer is yes, but only after it has really lived life, experienced heartbreak, and so on. The machine would have to have a self, which he argued arose from self-referentiality and "strange loops". Oh, I guess there's a question of whether you can separate intell…

> His answer is yes, but only after it has really lived life, experienced heartbreak, and so on.

The thing about this is that we're always encouraging people to read, because it gives them access to experiences and exposure to ideas far beyond what they could just speaking to the people around them. But there's no human alive who has read as widely or esoterically as the current crop of frontier models.

Re: LLMs and self-referentiality

#60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree. To further ask, why is your training data objectively real and qualifies you for consciousness? Is a deaf or blind person not conscious because they don't share your training data? If a deaf person reads about sounds, their experience of them is moot? If an alien with a greater array of senses then us exists, are we therefore not conscious?

People aren't just consciousness, they're conscious of things. Of course a deaf or blind person is conscious, even if they've been deaf or blind since birth. But they aren't conscious of hearing or seeing things, and if you ask them they'll tell you that. I'm not conscious of magnetic fields, or ultraviolet light, but other animals are, and no amount of study will overcome that deficit.

Okay, but there are multi-modal models. So do those experience qualia of sound and images? Do the text based ones experience the qualia of reading, or of finally comprehending a difficult concept after struggling with it?

For that matter, what exactly is the difference between "seeing" that a car is red versus an LLM reading an array of pixel data? Your eyes "just" translate photons into analog signals after all.

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