A couple years ago I worked on a service that had to communicate with a Siemens S7-1500 PLC. Based on my experience with that project, none of what I’ve read recently about unsecured industrial PLCs is surprising. I opened Siemens TIA Portal and PLCSIM for the first time and thought “wow, I didn’t think the Windows 95 GUI library was still supported.” None of the PLC contractors we had hired knew how to enable TLS on…
> In all fairness, the people who are experts in the field of Siemens PLC programming are usually mechanical-ish engineers and security is not in their skill set or on their mind. Stuxnet was over a decade ago. There should be a simple rule that everyone with the ability to understand things like PLCs should be able to grasp: your equipment does not touch the internet or external storage, period. Those who can't gras…
The worm was designed to jump across network air gaps via USB flash drives, and spread across isolated networks to other hosts. Finally, it targeted what was likely going to be a service technician laptop, which had to connect to the PLC via a data cable to update and adjust its configuration.
An attack like this can only be avoided if you never transfer any data from the outside to the inside. But that means you won't ever be able to install any form of software update or upload new config files without manually typing them in - or even reinstall the OS on any machine...