481–490 of 694 posts
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> It’s more economical at a compute level, but not at the developer level. Developers and compute are interchangeable now.
Who's proompting the machine to do it differently without a developer there to ask the right questions?
> because apparently what we have to offer is worth spending a ton of cycles to calculate the Anubis challenge. This statement holds the core misapprehension behind Anubis. It’s not a ton of cycles. There is no difficulty setting that would be inconvenient for bots but usable for humans on mobile devices. I noticed the other day that lists.ffmpeg.org had moved to Anubis difficulty level 6, which takes ~180sec for my…
Side note.. Fable just rejected this. GLM 5.3 did without questioning me. 5.6 sol did it beautifully.
All in the name of safety, of course.
> because apparently what we have to offer is worth spending a ton of cycles to calculate the Anubis challenge. This statement holds the core misapprehension behind Anubis. It’s not a ton of cycles. There is no difficulty setting that would be inconvenient for bots but usable for humans on mobile devices. I noticed the other day that lists.ffmpeg.org had moved to Anubis difficulty level 6, which takes ~180sec for my…
the only feasible CAPTCHA at this moment is probably hCaptcha. they began to offer animated challenges. it's probably the best you can do, using an LLM to solve them would be a bit expensive for now.
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I disagree. The kernel finds it effective - 66% of scrapers are turned away directly. The scraper problem now is fleets of residential proxy devices - often things like smart TVs, phones, and browsers with some “proxy SDK” installed as part of an app’s monetization scheme. They make a couple of requests to a site - just enough to fly under the radar - and move on to a different site. If each new site they hit forces…
It's weird to believe data center based, Internet-scale scraping operations will be less able to allocate compute to proof-of-work challenges than individual users. This is design problem with things like Anubis: proof-of-work depends on a cost asymmetry between attacker and defender. But in scraping, both legitimate users and scrapers get the same value out of a transaction.
I just checked, and these many months later after installing Anubis, I'm getting about 14K requests per day. It's unreasonably effective at cutting crawler abuse. It should not be able to reduce my traffic by 98%, and yet in practice that's exactly what it's doing.
I think that the most abusive scrapers are operated by people who absolutely suck at programming. If they didn't, they wouldn't be crawling every permutation of "show me the git blame for every file in this repo for every commit in its history". Were they actually competent, they'd be investing in smarts such that they weren't crawling a web frontend to get that information.
> Why is git.kernel.org “interesting” to crawlers I think the post underestimates just how little thought and effort is put into these bots. I also run a cgit instance with far less interesting projects, and am not spared from the deluge of HTTP requests. The explanation I could come up with is that they try to crawl all links regardless of how much sense it makes or how much load it causes. cgit being cgit, this mea…
Exactly my observation as well. They devour absolutely everything, no exceptions. No matter how stupid it might be to digest a source code repository via HTTP. They probably don't even recognize what's inside those pages and that there's an easier way to obtain the same result.
The horror.
I've handled every type of attack and malware that came their way but these past few years, ai scrapers are a large por or their traffic, eating into the budget and now interfering with sales.
and I don't know if anyone else is noticing or watching these ASNs but it sure looks like a few well know and big name AI companies are using *residential proxies* to so their scraping.
Tavis Ormandy called this, about Anubis, almost exactly a year ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44962529 It never really cohered as a solution. High-powered scrapers are better equipped to handle proof-of-work challenges than end users. Proof of work makes sense for a password hash, where any one guess at a password provides zero marginal utility. But every request from a scraper is productive to the scraper…
If you want to argue that there's excessive enthusiasm about anubis, which is neither a permanent solution nor a solution against all bots run for all purposes (some bot authors are cleverer than others, and you don't have to block everything, just enough to reduce resource use to tolerable levels)... fine. However, the refrain from naysayers isn't that there's too much enthusiasm. It's that anubis doesn't make sense…
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In this case, because there's a vastly more efficient economic path for the adversaries (cloning). They're not trying to engage in an arms race, they're trying to channel a racing river into its natural course.
It’s more economical at a compute level, but not at the developer level. The moment you start customizing your crawler to use protocol X for site Y your scale story collapses.
There's something missing from the picture. The bots are: - Using a terribly inefficient way to redownload the same commits as e.g. HTML diffs, possibly the most inefficient. - Putting in tons of CPU cycles to surpass the Anubis PoC. - Putting in other kinds of active effort like reworking access methods and buying "residential proxies" that are probably illegal in most jurisdictions. This sounds more like escalating…
Possible, but I doubt it. The sheer number of other free-to-read content sites dealing with the exact same problem the last few years (many of whom there's no plausible reason to DDoS) tells us that this is content harvesting, not an attack.
AI scraping might be bad, but if a particular case that's actually a DDoS becomes the cause celebre against AI scraping, it will weaken the argument, not strengthen it.