> because apparently what we have to offer is worth spending a ton of cycles to calculate the Anubis challenge. This statement holds the core misapprehension behind Anubis. It’s not a ton of cycles. There is no difficulty setting that would be inconvenient for bots but usable for humans on mobile devices. I noticed the other day that lists.ffmpeg.org had moved to Anubis difficulty level 6, which takes ~180sec for my…
Memory-hard hash functions maybe? Like, you must dedicate 4gb of ram to compute the function. Not a problem for a one-off, but is a problem when reading lots of pages at once. Or… the site will serve a random seed and the device must compute 4gb of pseudo-random data, then supply a value at a random server-demanded offset.
Creepy Crawlies
321–330 of 691 posts
Re: Creepy Crawlies
#322Re: Creepy Crawlies
#323I love to see the 'leet kernel hackers and maintainers' struggling with basic volume. Each page load should cost you near nil. Us lowly PHP developers have been caching shit for close to twenty years. Learn how to cache your application and your cpu usage should be almost zero. In fact basically any read should cost nothing in comparison to writes.
The amount of memory required to cache all possible diffs (defined as an ordered pair of commits) would likely be in the exobytes. At current ram prices that's easily a trillion dollars of ram to run that cache lol. Git focuses on making diff calculations efficient largely because the space of possible diffs is very expensive to enumerate. The following from Claude: """ A diff between two randomly chosen commits usua…
Re: Creepy Crawlies
#324Earlier quoted context omitted.
Seeing the exact same thing on (somewhat high profile) open data sites I run. The crawlers get stuck in a loop requesting the dataset listing page with every. single. combination. of. facets. At essentially as fast as it can be pumped out or blocked. Had one bot super interested in a single organization to the tune of 1000 r/min for 24+ hours. Realistic rotating user agents, realistic sec-* headers, no ip address see…
Once detected, don't block them because they'll just change strategies automatically, but you can toy with them, like returning a page full of random numbers instead of real data.
Re: Creepy Crawlies
#325> because apparently what we have to offer is worth spending a ton of cycles to calculate the Anubis challenge. This statement holds the core misapprehension behind Anubis. It’s not a ton of cycles. There is no difficulty setting that would be inconvenient for bots but usable for humans on mobile devices. I noticed the other day that lists.ffmpeg.org had moved to Anubis difficulty level 6, which takes ~180sec for my…
Re: Creepy Crawlies
#326this is an increasingly common situation. it goes something like: - i have a free, niche resource - it becomes too popular - i make it more efficient - now it's really popular, and people are "abusing" it - let's make them proof-of-work - ... and proof-of-work harder - but now "legitimate" users can't use it - ??? the core problem is that the average person uses a mobile device where work is expensive, and the "attac…
What's actually stopping them isn't the PoW, it's the customisation effort. If one site has Anubis nothing scrapes it. If many sites have Anubis they write counter scrapers. Today if you make a slight change to the Anubis algorithm on your site, they'll burn CPU endlessly computing hashes with the original algorithm and submitting wrong ones. The author of Anubis hates this fact and will ban you if you mention it, so…
Re: Creepy Crawlies
#327Earlier quoted context omitted.
It feels like this progression of increasingly drastic measures to circumvent the protections of a computer system ought to be enough to establish criminal intent and get some of the people running those crawlers into prison.
It does. It's literally a felony but for some reason not a single person has pressed charges.
Re: Creepy Crawlies
#328Re: Creepy Crawlies
#329Except the majority of LLM training content nowadays is synthetically generated by LLMs. I wish people would stop making this statement, I don't know why this claim persists to this day. It wasn't true two years ago and it sure isn't true now
Re: Creepy Crawlies
#330> It was immediately extremely effective — the bots just gave up. For a few months, it was bliss: bots were blocked at the perimeter and gave up, moving on to easier targets; the users were mildly annoyed but tolerated it, and the Anubis stack was easy enough to deploy everywhere. As a tech person who works with tech people, I have become extremely sensitive to this kind of bias. Is this solution actually better? Is…
> What is the cost of 20% and is that cost worth “mildly annoying” everyone?
from the articled:
> With a bunch of generous assumptions, legitimate requests are only about 2% of git.kernel.org traffic — everything else are scrapers.
this is not some "CPU use is 20% higher than baseline" situation. it seems that people still do not understand the scale of these bad actors.