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Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

qubes-os.org

41–50 of 104 posts

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#41
The founder Joanna Rutkowska left QubesOS in 2018. All the code involved in this bug was committed by her successor Marek Marczykowski-Górecki.

Joanna seems to be a genuine good guy, she once wrote a paper titled "Intel x86 considered harmful". That's why Huawei and the Chinese government aren't even trying any more to make western CPU architectures secure, it's a hopeless cause.

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#42
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

All I see is rudeness, insults, and arrogance sparkled with inklings of technical arguments. Worthless.

But, and this is the important part, is he wrong?

Being right is not the most important part. If you're right but don't convince anyone, you've made no difference.

Theo was right that virtualization is a comparatively shoddy security boundary. At the same time, it's flexible and capable in ways that now define the shape of modern IT.

Could we have replicated that by other means? If yes, then it's on Theo and other knee-jerk critics that they never proposed a better approach and settled for insulting people. If not, then maybe virtualization was a necessary evil. Or maybe everyone else is an irredeemable idiot, but again - if we reach that conclusion, is the world better off?

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#43
post #26
post #14

Reminds me of Theo DeRaadt again: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=119318909016582

I feel that, in fairness, one should at least read Adam’s response, though ideally all subsequent mails: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=119320496730314&w=2 Theos is a very opinionated and not necessarily wrong position, but I feel also a bit too reductive given we are eternally having to deal with compromises of some form. Also, lest we forget, it has been two decades in the interim and oh so much has changed. I…

I think it's pretty much spot on myself and applies to more than virtualization based on the last point. It really suggests that further complexity and abstraction is not a good security posture. And I agree with this from extensive experience (embedded, defence).

Regarding the two decades since and the numerous exploitable x86-64 and hypervisor bugs suggests he wasn't wrong and that the tone was appropriate for the severity of the problem.

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But, and this is the important part, is he wrong?

Being right is not the most important part. If you're right but don't convince anyone, you've made no difference. Theo was right that virtualization is a comparatively shoddy security boundary. At the same time, it's flexible and capable in ways that now define the shape of modern IT. Could we have replicated that by other means? If yes, then it's on Theo and other knee-jerk critics that they never proposed a better…

Maybe if we didn't virtualize everything at machine level we'd have portable software that runs on the original virtualization method: processes.

Stares at Go as about the only step in that direction...

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#46
post #7
post #6

I am still impressed by QubesOS track and I use it for my dedicated 'financials' laptop. IMHO the thing that is holding back QubesOS is the lack of hardware acceleration for graphics - maybe now when dual monitor setups are getting popular this could be a workaround for the security considerations?

I dropped QubesOS once exactly for that reason in the past but now I’m running it again on a separate computer. Even with all its drawbacks, there is something really nice about being able to run different applications over Tor, VPN or plain internet simultaneously, the ability to isolate non-safe binaries and being able to backup your VMs easily. I wish a similar distro would be made based on KVM so that the standar…

> being able to run different applications over Tor, VPN or plain internet simultaneously, the ability to isolate non-safe binaries and being able to backup your VMs easily.

These are all possible using light containers. For example, on FreeBSD I will spin up a jail which runs wireguard, and then I'll bridge that to another a jail. That 2nd jail is running entirely off wireguard without any other way to access the network. Since it is a jail, it is isolated. And backing up is as simple as a zfs snapshot and zfs send. I assume the same is possible on Linux.

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#47
post #26
post #14

Reminds me of Theo DeRaadt again: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=119318909016582

I feel that, in fairness, one should at least read Adam’s response, though ideally all subsequent mails: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=119320496730314&w=2 Theos is a very opinionated and not necessarily wrong position, but I feel also a bit too reductive given we are eternally having to deal with compromises of some form. Also, lest we forget, it has been two decades in the interim and oh so much has changed. I…

In all fairness also read this: https://taviso.decsystem.org/virtsec.pdf

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#48
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

All I see is rudeness, insults, and arrogance sparkled with inklings of technical arguments. Worthless.

But, and this is the important part, is he wrong?

This community lives on not understanding that...form over function always...

Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel

#49
post #24
post #14

Reminds me of Theo DeRaadt again: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-misc&m=119318909016582

The bug here is not related to virtualization, but a footgun as old as C stdlib: system() that doesn't take arguments separately, and instead relies on shell escaping by the application.

The only point of system(3) is to invoke the OS shell, if you do not want that use exec(3).
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