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C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

da.vidbuchanan.co.uk

61–70 of 153 posts

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#61
post #57

Aside from the fact that this was obviously never viable and the entire problem is clearly unsolvable if you sit down and really probe it for fifteen minutes, what I find most frustrating about this is that the false promise of preserving photos as reliable evidence is actively harmful. You will not build a perfect system, or even something near perfect. The best you're going to do is make it so that it's hard to cas…

I think it's useful even if it can be spoofed. Many people don't even bother to edit visible watermarks out of AI photos/videos. I'm fairly certain this will defeat 99.9% of malicious users, many of whom won't even know it exists until someone points out it's missing. People are concerned that the technology will lend additional credence to the last 0.1%. But anyone who thinks about the technology for 2 minutes will…

When I search for "C2PA" on the google play store, there are more AI-watermark-removal apps than there are signing apps. Certain types will jump through ridiculous hoops if they think it will affect their algorithmic reach on social media.

Malicious users don't need to root their own phones. They just need to go to fakemyimage dot com, and someone else's rooted phone in a clickfarm-type setup signs it for them. I am not operating such a service myself because I thought it was unnecessary in making my point, but perhaps I will have to reconsider.

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#62
post #57

Aside from the fact that this was obviously never viable and the entire problem is clearly unsolvable if you sit down and really probe it for fifteen minutes, what I find most frustrating about this is that the false promise of preserving photos as reliable evidence is actively harmful. You will not build a perfect system, or even something near perfect. The best you're going to do is make it so that it's hard to cas…

I think it's useful even if it can be spoofed. Many people don't even bother to edit visible watermarks out of AI photos/videos. I'm fairly certain this will defeat 99.9% of malicious users, many of whom won't even know it exists until someone points out it's missing. People are concerned that the technology will lend additional credence to the last 0.1%. But anyone who thinks about the technology for 2 minutes will…

It's actually worse if it is plausibly trustworthy for "99.9%", since that's enough that naive users will get accustomed to believing the verification badge is authentic.

When a motivated malicious user (who doesn't actually need that much resources) will be able to convince people something is authentic because the verification passes when it shouldn't since naive users are primed to believe it by default.

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#63
post #31
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah this is what I don't get why are people even spending time on this.

Is this picture real or AI is a real problem it is worth money to solve.

What I'm getting at is that metadata that claims that a photo is "real" won't necessarily convince people that it is, and the lack of that metadata doesn't mean anything at all. About the only real use I've seen for C2PA is to confirm that an image bearing that metadata is AI-generated - and that marker is easily lost through editing or retransmission.

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#64
post #58

For the time being, I wish more workflows revolved around RAWs. You can pretty much prove the origins of an image sans cryptography by just possessing the image sensor data that you used to produce the final. It's not foolproof but AI image models can't really generate a convincing bayer raw and it's not something anyone is going to spend significant time training.

Until it matters. Which you are proposing happening.

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#67

Aside from the fact that this was obviously never viable and the entire problem is clearly unsolvable if you sit down and really probe it for fifteen minutes, what I find most frustrating about this is that the false promise of preserving photos as reliable evidence is actively harmful. You will not build a perfect system, or even something near perfect. The best you're going to do is make it so that it's hard to cas…

I don’t think there is a technical solution to this problem but I think there is a legal one. Make it a legal requirement to mark AI generated photos and enforce penalties for posting unmarked AI generations. Social media should also mark the country of origin for each post, with the knowledge that posts from your own country are covered by these laws.

The EU did this, Claude and Microsoft complied and HN was practically rioting about it literally yesterday: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49421158

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#68

Isn't film photography verifiable with a physical negative? i.e. you could verify a digital reproduction of the analog photo by comparing the digital image with the negative. Tedious, but sound?

Transferring electronic images to film is a long-solved problem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Film_recorder

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#69
post #60

I always got the impression that C2PA is a way to say "this photo came from the BBC (for example) and they've only signed it because they've verified the supplied edit chain". It's always been obvious that one could point a camera at a screen, I don't think anyone involved with C2PA has claimed otherwise. It seems like there's a big disconnect between what C2PA says it's for and what certain journalists think it's fo…

C2PA is a bit nebulous as a concept, which is part of the problem. It is both of these things. The BBC type use case where a publisher signs their own content with their own keys seems reasonable to me, or at least, not obviously broken. However I question the value-add when e.g. the BBC website is already authenticated by nature of being served over HTTPS, and anyone who redistributes BBC content can and should link…

> However I question the value-add when e.g. the BBC website is already authenticated by nature of being served over HTTPS, and anyone who redistributes BBC content can and should link back to the source.

The value would be in images reposted to social media where the website an show a badge that says it came from a certain source.

Re: C2PA Cameras Do Not Survive Contact with Reality

#70
post #53

I always got the impression that C2PA is a way to say "this photo came from the BBC (for example) and they've only signed it because they've verified the supplied edit chain". It's always been obvious that one could point a camera at a screen, I don't think anyone involved with C2PA has claimed otherwise. It seems like there's a big disconnect between what C2PA says it's for and what certain journalists think it's fo…

Why not just have BBC sign stuff with their own creds then? You can originate the chain of custody anywhere and relying on the camera is kind of silly when the reputation of the original publisher in a more meaningful backstop.

It's useful to have all your tools automatically apply metadata in a standard way instead of having to keep track of it manually. Most cameras already add metadata that says what camera and lens were used, but you lose that as soon as you import it into Photoshop and export as a jpeg.
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