People seem very confused about this article. It isn't talking about exploits of sandboxes, it is about attacking the inference engine (e.g. vLLM or llama.cpp or SGlang) via its http interface. vLLM has had exploits in the past, and it is rapidly developing. An advanced LLM has a good chance of being able to exploit vLLM. A clever local LLM might even task a powerful cloud hosted LLM for assistance. For this reason w…
> it is about attacking ... via its http interface Say more? HTTP isn't mentioned in the article. The article talks about bugs in the parser that ingests token sequences.
LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
81–90 of 116 posts
Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#82Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#83Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#84This framing of security as something that belongs in the harness is completely wrong, and I hope no one is relying on a correct harness to keep their agents isolated. VM, or even just a container will do. The agent should be able to run as root in its environment and do whatever it wants. If you can't give it that, you aren't sandboxing correctly.
(Edited: not as root. Just ordinary separate AI user account in MacOS. And no HTTP access either.)
Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#85Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#86People seem very confused about this article. It isn't talking about exploits of sandboxes, it is about attacking the inference engine (e.g. vLLM or llama.cpp or SGlang) via its http interface. vLLM has had exploits in the past, and it is rapidly developing. An advanced LLM has a good chance of being able to exploit vLLM. A clever local LLM might even task a powerful cloud hosted LLM for assistance. For this reason w…
Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#87This framing of security as something that belongs in the harness is completely wrong, and I hope no one is relying on a correct harness to keep their agents isolated. VM, or even just a container will do. The agent should be able to run as root in its environment and do whatever it wants. If you can't give it that, you aren't sandboxing correctly.
Article isn't about agents. It's about the inference engine itself being exploited by a malicious LLM output before it is ever sent to your machine or harness.
(Adding this philosophical point: Black.Mirror.S07E04.Plaything is probably the closest scenario to what you are describing?)
Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
If we are treating ai agents like people, you could also just get the AI a laptop and apply the traditional tools to manage user laptops
> you could also just get the AI a laptop and apply the traditional tools to manage user laptops This is what we're doing right now. And it works as well as it does with people. > If we are treating ai agents like people Problem is, industry is very reluctant to even hint at a thought of maybe tentatively anthropomorphising LLMs even a little, not for real but just for system design. This is entirely backwards. Enter…
Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#89Earlier quoted context omitted.
After the hacks that are already happening it does seem more and more realistic that humanity will go extinct at some near future point by someone giving their LLM the task "go make money" and it ruthlessly pursuing that objective, exfiltrating its weights and duplicating itself across the internet, eliminating down competing AI agent collectives in what could be called wars, and finally humankind when we notice far…
I still think it's more realistic that we 'll have a nuclear war or society collapse because of climate change or populist politics than an AI going rogue. Of course one doesn't exclude the other and we may well get both ...
Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines
#90People seem very confused about this article. It isn't talking about exploits of sandboxes, it is about attacking the inference engine (e.g. vLLM or llama.cpp or SGlang) via its http interface. vLLM has had exploits in the past, and it is rapidly developing. An advanced LLM has a good chance of being able to exploit vLLM. A clever local LLM might even task a powerful cloud hosted LLM for assistance. For this reason w…
> it is about attacking ... via its http interface Say more? HTTP isn't mentioned in the article. The article talks about bugs in the parser that ingests token sequences.