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LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

boydkane.com

11–20 of 116 posts

Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

#11
> LLMs’ responses to prompts are computed on a different computer with GPU access. Could a malicious LLM gain control of the host machine where its weights are loaded?

Needs to read up more on how LLMs work I think. Can't take the article seriously when the author seems to be making the claim that the weights of a provider model are loaded on the host machine, or implying something else just as incorrect.

Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

#13
post #3

This framing of security as something that belongs in the harness is completely wrong, and I hope no one is relying on a correct harness to keep their agents isolated. VM, or even just a container will do. The agent should be able to run as root in its environment and do whatever it wants. If you can't give it that, you aren't sandboxing correctly.

Also, operating systems should let us set filesystem permissions per app/process/executable instead of just user accounts. Similar to how macOS/iOS Sandboxing works but at a more lower and granular level

https://www.canyonroad.ai/ does some of this in a way tailored to agents.

Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

#15

> LLMs’ responses to prompts are computed on a different computer with GPU access. Could a malicious LLM gain control of the host machine where its weights are loaded? Needs to read up more on how LLMs work I think. Can't take the article seriously when the author seems to be making the claim that the weights of a provider model are loaded on the host machine, or implying something else just as incorrect.

>Like any program, inference engines like vLLM or SGLang may contain exploitable bugs. Because the LLM controls the tokens passed to the inference engine, a malicious LLM could therefore emit a sequence of tokens that a poorly written inference engine mistakes for code or instructions to execute rather than data to return to the user.

They aren't talking about model providers. These are the tools you use with model weights locally (but you could set up remote infrastructure a la data center if you have the fundage).

Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

#16
post #6

This framing of security as something that belongs in the harness is completely wrong, and I hope no one is relying on a correct harness to keep their agents isolated. VM, or even just a container will do. The agent should be able to run as root in its environment and do whatever it wants. If you can't give it that, you aren't sandboxing correctly.

I think if you are convinced you are sandboxing an LLM properly, you almost certainly are not. I think it is essentially impossible to have a frontier LLM with enough access to be useful without also giving it enough access to do damage if it's compromised or just goes off the rails.

Are you saying that LLM's will be able to exploit novel hypervisor bug with such ease that even a vm not running with any kind of network connection is a threat? I find this hard to believe. All the escape stuff I have seen has been around very poorly sandboxed agents.

Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

#18
This feels less like an actually plausible threat scenario and more like someone wanted to play the inception horn sound effect in people's minds.

Which isn't to say that it would be impossible, but you can also just hit people over the head with that $5 wrench.

Re: LLMs could control their host machines by exploiting inference engines

#19
The inference engine itself does not execute anything. The agent loop is what may execute a command. So I think this article is a kind of strange.

Or maybe the author means that a prompt could potentially mess up the inference. But I find it hard to see how that could take control over the host.

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