Earlier quoted context omitted.
It makes sense to have them connected for a lot of reasons.
which reasons?
You could absolutely make the case that it isn't worth the risk, but that isn't the same as not having benefits.
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Earlier quoted context omitted.
It makes sense to have them connected for a lot of reasons.
which reasons?
You could absolutely make the case that it isn't worth the risk, but that isn't the same as not having benefits.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think the argument is more the IMEI side of things, one might naively expect that they could could simply change SIM and that would change ones identity and that anything like an IMEI could be easily configurable like how a MAC is on a NIC is.
IMEI is needed to allow them to identify the device's capabilities, and know if it's been reported stolen.
This seems largely to be about security by obscurity. I was hoping it was gonna be about how our modern practices are making things less secure. For instance, we claim we need to be able to rapidly update clients so that we can patch security vulnerabilities as they are discovered (often without involving the user at all). And there are a lot of companies that have an incentive to push this narrative because they hav…
About your second comment- newer systems CAN be less secure, but not always. But even if they are, falling back on things like eLoran are important.
Sadly, the real lesson we need to learn from Battlestar Galactica is not this. They weren't saved by old software, they were saved by not having critical systems on the network unnecessarily. Our water and power utilities need to re-watch the pilot.
> the real lesson we need to learn from Battlestar Galactica It's the same lesson that we can learn from Star Trek, Star Wars, and all the other self-aggrandising lore that humanity concocts when gazing lovingly in the mirror. There is no greater enemy than greedy, barbaric humanity itself.
MS-DOS: Over 45 years, and STILL NO remote holes in the default install!
Well, there is no protection against compromised floppy disk sent by snail mail. I have also seen virus source code published in books and magazines. We don't have such threats anymore.
MS-DOS: Over 45 years, and STILL NO remote holes in the default install!
I understand BBC may not have the technical background to critically assess this approach, but whoever using Eudora (I loved it in 2001 btw) for security should get their credentials removed via King's order. Security through "obsolescence" is no different from security through obscurity - therefore, it doesn't work. Somebody not bothering to look for holes in your software doesn't mean they don't exist - in the age…
Yes but you'd need to a) know that they use that particular software and b) have a reason to bother destroying it in the first place.
That is really the crux of the idea.
The client the guy in the article uses isn't secure because it has no security vulnerabilities - it is secure because nobody bothers to target Eudora users in general.
Of course as others mentioned, if the target switches from "Eudora users in general" to "that guy in particular" then the situation changes (though the attackers would still need to realize he uses Eudora - assuming this article didn't exist to reveal it anyway :-P).
But aside from that, even "in the age of Claude", i doubt anyone is wasting time and/or tokens scanning the open Internet for all sorts of old vulnerabilities in antique software that (relatively) nobody uses in hopes they catch some random passer-by as there is barely any ROI by doing that compared to taking advantage of vulnerabilities on software that people actually use.
Back when my friend Jim (retired Pilot) and I visited Chicago's Approach Control facility, I asked one question "What would happen if GPS went away?", they didn't like the question one bit.
It's really not good the way we're getting rid of ground based navigation aids in the US.
Sadly, the real lesson we need to learn from Battlestar Galactica is not this. They weren't saved by old software, they were saved by not having critical systems on the network unnecessarily. Our water and power utilities need to re-watch the pilot.
Why are our water and power utilities connected to the internet? Is it so that the employees controlling them can work from home? If so they are accepting too much risk relative to the benefit.
The water and power utilities are themselves large distributed systems. They need communications between elements just to function properly. They don't exist in a single location where people can go locally manage them in some air-gapped, offline fashion.
There is no option of not having a communication network to monitor and manage these geographically distributed elements. The question is which communication network you would use, and how you would secure it. Whether it is telephones, radio links, or people running around as messengers, it is still a communications network.
Will some "dedicated" network be any safer? If anything, I imagine the fantasy of a private network will lead to even less security. You cannot physically secure the entire signal path. You really need to treat it as untrusted and build your security on top with encryption, authentication, authorization, etc.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
think about a grid responding to demand. The old model (like the titanic) had a remote manager phoning the site lead who phoned the control room who phoned the engineering room. Remote management has clear benefits, don’t be obtuse. I totally agree on the security risks, but the benefits are obvious.
I'm not seeing why it has to be connected to the internet. Make it a private, air-gapped intranet for all (or most) of the benefits of being "connected", but with no entry point for someone sitting on another continent to turn off the water.