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Everything I own, owned

schlarp.com

121–130 of 367 posts

Re: Everything I own, owned

#121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is giving me the confidence to RE my cat feeder. The company (Petlibro) has an outage and now my chilled wet feeder that should be a dumb, offline feeder is basically bricked now. The device reports fine wifi but the backing services are totally busted.

Why do you have a cat when you can't be bothered to feed it yourself?

Try getting a cat sitter around Christmas or a holiday weekend and then ask this again.

Re: Everything I own, owned

#122
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The user has to first specifically pick the device from the list and grant the website access. If a user is confused by a permissions prompt and has no idea what is going on, the default path is to reject the permission.

In the real world the default action for a user when presented with a permissions popup is to accept it because they get asked 20 times a day, have no idea what the implications of it are and just want to get on with their day. So software designers need to avoid asking the users to approve potentially highly dangerous things.

This is untrue. Chrome's "acceptance rates" for proceeding through its bad SSL cert warnings used to be pretty high, but with a redesign they basically flipped the numbers so most people didn't proceed to connect to the site. Similarly with cookie banners, where making it more difficult to say no (by e.g. moving a decline button to a second interaction layer) meaningfully raises acceptance rates; if users were just blindly accepting everything, then there'd be no reason to make it harder to say no. Apple's App Tracking Transparency (ATT) prompt has users overwhelmingly answering no even years after introduction (though of course opt-in is increasing). A study on permission prompts in Android found that the main factor in first-use denial rates was whether users thought the app needed the permission it was requesting or not, showing some actual comprehension of what they're being asked. Another found higher denial rates if the frequency of the prompt was on every access instead of once, rather than apathetic blanket acceptance.

Design prompts for potentially dangerous actions so refusal is easy and what's being asked is legible, and people will refuse plenty.

Re: Everything I own, owned

#123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah, you actually want to do this with monitors of that generation to make them last. You could argue that there should be an option to disable it for people who don’t care. Refusing to take 1 minute out of your day to learn the reason for the alert is a strange self-defeating protest next to the explanation that it was a pretty expensive monitor.

How is it strange that among the 900,000 1-minute tasks you need to complete on a given day, this one is low on the list?

Some people's time is actually worth or even just valued more than others to be bothered doing maintenance tasks such as there. I have a life to live outside preserving every last minute of functionality out of a monitor, I'll buy a new one eventually regardless.

Re: Everything I own, owned

#124
I spent a decade in robotics and have built firmware for dozens of devices. And yet I was never able to successfully fix my webcam device driver on linux with Claude. I'm jealous of this person's prompting skills! Or perhaps pwning is easier than fixing the nightmare that is Intel open source device drivers?

Re: Everything I own, owned

#125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Surprising. I have hit its BS guardrails a lot lately, working on my vintage computers from the 80s and early 90s. Just about done with Claude.

You can’t be loyal to these things. I ditched ChatGPT during the peak Claude hype after Christmas. I feel like Claude has shittified a bit and ChatGPT is good and fast. Gemini remains mediocre, although it seems Google AI energy is directed elsewhere.

Just sign up with something like openrouter and keep switching models until one completes the task.

Re: Everything I own, owned

#126
post #51
post #10

Key takeaway: > And the existence of WebUSB, WebHID, and WebBluetooth mean that for some devices, depending on the specifics of which classes are used, a moment of user indiscretion in accepting a permissions prompt could permanently backdoor one of their attached devices.

The preceding sentence is equally prescient: > Operating systems aren’t really equipped to work with the user to ensure that a microphone stays a microphone, and doesn’t spontaneously turn into a keyboard that hits Win+R and drops a payload to steal all your data when the room is quiet enough that it can assume you aren’t watching. In a world of USB-C everything we no longer have power supplies that are physically bo…

Was daydreaming the other day about how this could be used by adversaries to hack even air-gapped computers. Any peripheral which contains a microchip and some ram is a vector. Does the compartmentalized facility ever bring in a new monitor, or mouse, or keyboard? All of those things could be hacked to hack their new host. And then taking data into/out of the facility. Which devices have lights? Any LED that can be blinked is a low-speed output channel. Which have light-level sensors, or sound sensors? Or any RF capability? If bluetooth is disabled by software but the hardware is still there...

If I was writing a novel, the top secret facility would be cracked open by the smoke alarm, which has a wired connection to the central fire control and runs a little microprocessor. There is enough storage for 20 programmable voice alert messages. I/O includes an LED and also a light sensor. After the attacker gains control of the smoke alarms -- reach to every room of the secure facility -- their focus turns to mass poisoning peripherals until one makes it into range. A poisoned monitor detects the smoke alarm blinking a coded broadcast via its LED during darkened overnight hours. The monitor responds with flashing code of its own. That creates a communication path back to the controlling LLM. From there its like attacking a normal networked device, just with a slow data link in the middle...

Re: Everything I own, owned

#127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> the LED can't be controlled from software If you look at tear downs apparently it is connected to the webcam so it is energized when the webcam receives power making it nearly impossible to defeat. You can say a lot about Apple but the engineering is clever at the hardware level.

It's not even that clever, really. The camera power rail must be physically close to the camera, so it's trivial to hang an LED off it. A device manufacturer has to go out of their way to make it so the LED and camera function are independent, and I'm sure many do, for the worst reasons you can possibly think of.

It's more a testament to how little most companies care. The solution is simple and yet most products are defective.

Re: Everything I own, owned

#128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The teardown showed this is the 1% right? Also I thought you could trust iMessage if, unlike everyone, you disabled iCloud backup (and, unlike everyone, so did the recipient). Perhaps a way for the feds to be able to pin dumb criminals while giving investigative journalists & dissidents a way to stay safer.

According to Apple, you can have iCloud backup enabled while maintaining E2E encryption with their Advanced Data Protection option: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#advanced You do have to be sure to not enable web access via icloud.com

You also have to make sure everyone you contact did this, which is impossible.

Much easier to use a 3rd party app like Signal.

Re: Everything I own, owned

#130
post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Apple also claims that iMessage is end to end encrypted. Their privacy stance is 99% posturing.

The teardown showed this is the 1% right? Also I thought you could trust iMessage if, unlike everyone, you disabled iCloud backup (and, unlike everyone, so did the recipient). Perhaps a way for the feds to be able to pin dumb criminals while giving investigative journalists & dissidents a way to stay safer.

Even with "E2E" encryption with iMessage, you're still trusting Apple completely and totally with key distribution. If a new device is added to your account by an attacker or by Apple themselves, your existing devices will happily loop them in to share iMessage access with them. The vast, vast majority of iMessage users are never going to dig into the Apple keychain app to actually check what keys are being trusted and this is something that can be targeted to a single account so no one outside of Apple never even needs to know it happened.
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