581–590 of 1001 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Probably, but it will be more valuable for society for him to be tried and found not guilty, setting a legal precedent.
… that dude probably would have preferred not having that in their life
The decoy passcode feature should boot into a separate partition that looks like a normal phone setup, and during that time quietly erase the user's actual data. They would never have known if it worked like this.
Not physically possible[1] to be deniable and a bad[2] idea. [1] https://veracrypt.io/en/Wear-Leveling.html https://veracrypt.io/en/Trim%20Operation.html [2] https://nitter.net/GrapheneOS/status/2082153517234676150#m
(That of course only takes down the "physically impossible" part.)
The decoy passcode feature should boot into a separate partition that looks like a normal phone setup, and during that time quietly erase the user's actual data. They would never have known if it worked like this.
Probably, but it will be more valuable for society for him to be tried and found not guilty, setting a legal precedent.
I used to play around on projects adjacent to Tor and TailsOS, and had an idea for a setup I was researching. It's a little intense and probably has annoying failure modes, but sharing in case anyone else finds it helpful: - Tasker is an automation app for setting up rules for triggers and actions. It allows extension apps to be created to add new triggers and actions. - someone at one point made an extension to add…
I like the idea of a phone that automatically wipes itself if I don’t act to stop it. I wonder about the legality of that if the duress code is considered “destroying evidence.”
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I think it's enough to shut down you phone. Then it needs a pin, and you're entitled to not give that over, I believe. So you should be safe, apart from some kind of rubber-hose cryptanalysis.
If you don't give a pin, they can seize your devices (Andrew Tate on his 1st visit to Florida said that he refused to give pin and they seized phone and laptop)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not physically possible[1] to be deniable and a bad[2] idea. [1] https://veracrypt.io/en/Wear-Leveling.html https://veracrypt.io/en/Trim%20Operation.html [2] https://nitter.net/GrapheneOS/status/2082153517234676150#m
Question on a detail: It's not necessary to have deniability on the fact that you did wipe your device, just on the fact that you did it after you entered the border? Or said differently, if he'd wiped the device before entering the border, it'd be all fine? (That of course only takes down the "physically impossible" part.)
The decoy passcode feature should boot into a separate partition that looks like a normal phone setup, and during that time quietly erase the user's actual data. They would never have known if it worked like this.
For exactly the border search scenario, I wish smartphones could be imaged and restored as easily as PCs. Imagine booting the phone from a flash drive, making an encrypted image of the phone on said drive, and writing a fresh OS before reaching the border. There's no deception required to protect sensitive data or avoid the seizure of an expensive phone. Consent to unlocking the phone, refuse to unlock the drive. The…
"I have an opinion on the legal matter. But I think it's worth noting that destroying the data was a categoric strategic blunder by the defendant. If you don't destroy the data, but just don't provide the password, they might never be able to recover the data, perhaps with the exception of a multi million dollar cryptographic attack.
Destroying the data is a strategic mistake even if there's a mildly strong case that deleting the data is a crime, as it provides no benefit at the cost of increasing the risk of being sentenced for evidence tampering. I personally am not appealed by the grapheneOS thing, but I can't see any case were that feature would be beneficial, it sounds like a shitty technology."
To me this is evidence tampering, and again to me, it's a great law to have that evidence cannot be destroyed. But even if you argue that it's a bad law, and even if you argue that this was not evidence tampering, you have to concede that it IS the law and that it IS highly likely that courts will find it to be evidence tampering, finally that there is little value to destroying encrypted evidence. It's a categoric legally strategic mistake.
And GrapheneOS is a dumb product by consequence for this matter, unless you are like some high level spy whose security model is being tortured or dissapeared instead of being put to jail.
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Not how the law works. If I put a bomb in a box. It will explode if a certain pin is put in. And you ask ”can I open the box? What is the pin?” And I say ”here is the pin to open it” and the bomb explodes. Do you think I can claim they blew up themselves ?
It's already a crime to build a bomb, so it's a moot point.