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On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

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Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#171
post #68
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You need to parse the word mentality in context. The root problem here is the EU is culturally broken, and until some grand disaster will simply decline ever further with everyone involved wondering why no one else is doing anything about it.

Why don't we export some better culture to Europe then? That would be a good place and now would be a good time for Americans to flee to.

> Why don't we export some better culture to Europe then?

Because there is way more impact potential of doing so from within the US than from Europe.

Also, because moving to another country with the primary intent to "export culture" is not something (I suspect) most people are interested in (I know I am not). Overall, it feels like a weird proposal. And I expect most of the residents of those countries to treat you with both suspicion and bewilderment, if you told them that this was your reason for moving to their country (and rightfully so, in my opinion).

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#172
post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the toaster acts against my interest and I can't change its behaviour then yes, absolutely. It doesn't have to be named root, the point is that my device should act in my interest to the fullest extent permitted by the law. But those running illegal monopolies no longer fear the user and blantantly ignore their choices (yes vs "remind me later" is a good example), if I can't enforce my choice, I don't own that.

Android in fact has an entire Settings app allowing users to configure a lot about the device. There are a lot of choices exposed to users. Exposing this ability to the user didn't require root.

The number of choices exposed to users is irrelevant, what's relevant is that choices which I'd want exposed are not exposed, and without root, there's no extension mechanism which'd let me load my code into for example the system server process.

What you also seem to be ignoring is that the fact that for example there's no simple runtime internet permission toggle is NOT an accident, this functionality is deliberately not directly exposed despite creating no "security risks" and you know it very well.

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Toasters are heating elements with slots for bread. The 70s saw ten men walk on the moon and return to Earth to tell us all about it. Whatever point you were trying to make wasn't made.

And phones run apps. Neither require root to be able to accomplish their designed purpose.

And drugs are bad. Neither require root to work. Point not found.

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#174

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Software freedom is about freedom of choice, not philosophically mandated security holes. You are free to take the GrapheneOS code and introduce a huge vulnerability in the form of a privilege escalation path from sandboxed apps if you wish, it is open source and you can easily compile and flash your own build. Mobile phones store incredibly intimate data and are incredibly vulnerable to seizure. It stores my message…

> not philosophically mandated security holes. So you're arguing the same technofascist arguments that Apple and Google both claim. I own my phone, not technofascist sky daddy, or whatever developer also envisions that role. My hardware. My rules. More people like you need to learn what ownership actually bloody means.

The source code is right here, make your hardware follow whatever rules you wish with your derivative of it: https://grapheneos.org/source

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#175

GrapheneOS has minimal, private [1] system apps so you don't have to debloat anything yourself. Manual debloating is not a good solution at the user level. Some system apps are being overhauled, so that's something to look forward to. Gallery will be [2] based on ReFra [3]. [1] Except phone and messaging but that's the cell network. GrapheneOS recommends Signal/Molly or SimpleX instead. [2] https://nitter.net/Graphen…

GrapheneOS also runs only on Google Pixels, which isn't an option for people who refuse to support Google, or live in a country where Google doesn't sell Pixels.

I find it ironic that an organisation which touts "privacy" so much, asks you to financially support one of the biggest anti-privacy corporations, which is why I can't take GrapheneOS seriously.

(And yes I'm aware of the upcoming Motorola partnership, but the release has already been delayed several times. I'll believe it when it actually ships).

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Software freedom is about freedom of choice, not philosophically mandated security holes. You are free to take the GrapheneOS code and introduce a huge vulnerability in the form of a privilege escalation path from sandboxed apps if you wish, it is open source and you can easily compile and flash your own build. Mobile phones store incredibly intimate data and are incredibly vulnerable to seizure. It stores my message…

Why is providing a mechanism to view your own data a security risk? You cannot view application data (even in a read only fashion) without root on android. Why should the app be able to read its own data, but the human not able to?

GrapheneOS already ships Seedvault, which extracts application data with no root at all, so what you describe is possible in at least some form, but I assume not with the ergonomics you want.

Providing a good interface for that access is a specific missing capability. But we shouldn't presuppose that the only way to supply it is a global su. The former is a bounded fix; the latter changes the isolation model of the entire system. A portal is mediated, scoped to what you asked for, and revocable. Root is none of those things.

Seedvault is itself an example. The need for backups can be met either with a narrow backup service or by handing out root and letting you do it however you like. Those two have very different security properties, and you can want the new capability without wanting a generic privilege escalation path to deliver it.

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And phones run apps. Neither require root to be able to accomplish their designed purpose.

And drugs are bad. Neither require root to work. Point not found.

Exactly. Root is unrelated to the problem at hand.

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#178

I don't understand why ensuring general-purpose computing is not a priority of the European Union. All that talk about sovereignty, and we are giving full control of our digital lives to 2 American companies.

There’s lots of cynical takes to answer that, but I honestly think that often regulators and people writing / pushing laws just don’t know any better….

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#179
post #18

GrapheneOS has minimal, private [1] system apps so you don't have to debloat anything yourself. Manual debloating is not a good solution at the user level. Some system apps are being overhauled, so that's something to look forward to. Gallery will be [2] based on ReFra [3]. [1] Except phone and messaging but that's the cell network. GrapheneOS recommends Signal/Molly or SimpleX instead. [2] https://nitter.net/Graphen…

GrapheneOS or other custom ROMs don't solve the actual problem that you can't just buy a smartphone and install any operating system like you can with an actual computer, despite technically being one. Also, GrapheneOS supports device attestation (the non-google kind at least), which is still ridiculous as such systems have no benefit to people, only to technofeudalist corporations.

    > GrapheneOS supports device attestation (the non-google kind at least)
they have an app that does GOS to GOS attestation.

they also run a remote attestation proxy to a google attestation intermediary (doesn't really accomplish anything).

they unfortunately don't provide you with the option to disable the Android APIs that can be used to get a unique hardware identifier from your device (cryptographic identity burned into the silicon) with some extra steps. APIs such as remote attestation and DRM handshake initiation.

Re: On non-rooted Android 17, ADB uninstall of system apps fails

#180
post #172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Android in fact has an entire Settings app allowing users to configure a lot about the device. There are a lot of choices exposed to users. Exposing this ability to the user didn't require root.

The number of choices exposed to users is irrelevant, what's relevant is that choices which I'd want exposed are not exposed, and without root, there's no extension mechanism which'd let me load my code into for example the system server process. What you also seem to be ignoring is that the fact that for example there's no simple runtime internet permission toggle is NOT an accident, this functionality is deliberate…

And if you wanted a toaster with a setting to enable which side of the bread gets cooked you may have to look for a niche product instead of using main stream toasters similar to how you may need to use a niche operating system like GrapheneOS for your special handling of internet permissions.

Even if a toaster doesn't have such a setting or an easy way to add, you still own it. When products are designed they have a specific design that they implement.

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