Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why is this so, so common? They're subdomains. They're free. It's not hitting anybody's budget to publish a new DNS entry. If someone has permission to publish anything in your name, they probably should be able to go make themselves a subdomain.
Counter-argument is: do you really want some team of 90% marketers and PMs throwing up a MVP/WIP codebase for some ancillary product not related to your core business on your core domain? At a minimum you'd want a thorough security review and risk assessment, and that goes against the ethos of "ship fast and pivot as needed".
Web Security is Too Hard
51–60 of 127 posts
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#52What a ride of a read. I was 100% it was phishing and I got really surprised to find out it wasn't.
All the bots including Google’s say it’s a phishing scam site probably, since they don’t know Cloudflare has a wallet product.
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why is this so, so common? They're subdomains. They're free. It's not hitting anybody's budget to publish a new DNS entry. If someone has permission to publish anything in your name, they probably should be able to go make themselves a subdomain.
Because they point foo.example.com to AWS. They then let whatever the CNAME is pointing to lapse. Then an attacker registers the lapsed AWS and can now put their content on your trusted domain. https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/threat-tactic-spotligh... (AWS have since fixed this problem, but it exists on other services.)
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#54Ironically, this might be at least partially because the internal security controls at Cloudflare for using or provisioning new domains/subdomains is so difficult and arduous that the team decided the fastest way to go to market is to get an entirely new domain. Possible bonus that the official bug bounty program won't apply either, since it's on a new domain so any vulnerabilities found won't have to be paid out (as…
Your organizational management is the problem not the technology
If you can’t coordinate internally to roll out a proper domain then I question how well your teams are managed
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#55In the movie Sneakers, a whole scene is taken up sending some guy on a date with Mary McDonnell so she could record clips of his voice. Today she'd just need a phone call or his Instagram. It's getting harder to keep up with who _people_ are online, much less organizations and domain names. Identity is hard y'all.
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you have no training or knowledge-base to search, sure. But then you'd be an awful support-team employer.
I mean, yes? That sounds pretty accurate for most companies before chatbots became the new hot thing
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
Counter-argument is: do you really want some team of 90% marketers and PMs throwing up a MVP/WIP codebase for some ancillary product not related to your core business on your core domain? At a minimum you'd want a thorough security review and risk assessment, and that goes against the ethos of "ship fast and pivot as needed".
Why does the TLD matter in this case? How does your security/risk posture change if you launch on myexperiment.mycompany.com vs. www.mycompanyexperiment.website that you had to go out and newly purchase? Asking because I legit don't know.
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
You really would think that at least in theory a company like Cloudflare would make it very easy for internal teams to automatically request new subdomains
Running marketing off a separate domain is often a conscious decision because if they start getting blocked for spam, then critical service/operational emails from your actual domain might also get blocked.
Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#59Re: Web Security is Too Hard
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why is this so, so common? They're subdomains. They're free. It's not hitting anybody's budget to publish a new DNS entry. If someone has permission to publish anything in your name, they probably should be able to go make themselves a subdomain.
Because they point foo.example.com to AWS. They then let whatever the CNAME is pointing to lapse. Then an attacker registers the lapsed AWS and can now put their content on your trusted domain. https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/threat-tactic-spotligh... (AWS have since fixed this problem, but it exists on other services.)