Of course. Who else would be their CA? Some USA state-run CA? That's far too much political risk. I hope we see a different CA for each ccTLD in the future.
>I hope we see a different CA for each ccTLD in the future.
Completely agree with this and IMO it's how the system should've operated from the very start. Unfortunately, I highly doubt that the CA cartel will let go of the power (and associated cash flow) voluntarily.
> Surely this will improve user security and trust in the existing Web PKI system in non-Western countries. /s I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying, but this particular sarcasm seems incorrect. Given Verisign's willingness to bend the knee to Texas courts, one could reasonably lose faith in US PKI issuers such as Digicert. I certainly hope the EU is studying the problem US-controlled EU-trust…
>I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus. >So I empathize with the sarcasm, but best not to offer MitM proponents (whether in Russia or the U.S. or elsewhere!) an argument that could be used against your viewpoint. If browsers truly cared about u…
I’d be totally onboard with TLD-locking them to legal jurisdictions they’re comfortable being bound to, except that this would underserve a great deal of the Internet. Don’t really have a great solution yet, either. Perhaps as each TLD operates DNSSEC they could sign authorized issuers by publishing TLD CAA records, which would create some legal zone accountability that’s lacking today (and give the EU a lever by which to cut off U.S. registrars from their zones). But I have no idea how to effect any of that change, and Let’s Encrypt is truly screwed in this model as a worldwide entity. The endgame might actually be “to operate a domain registrar you must be a PKI”, which would ravage the segment and probably permanently kill off Namecheap (one can dream). So, yeah, I agree: I think instead we absolutely will see fragmentation, at both software (PKI) and, eventually, hardline levels, rather than see domain registrars and PKI issuers be forcibly merged by policy.
Of course. Who else would be their CA? Some USA state-run CA? That's far too much political risk. I hope we see a different CA for each ccTLD in the future.
>I hope we see a different CA for each ccTLD in the future. Completely agree with this and IMO it's how the system should've operated from the very start. Unfortunately, I highly doubt that the CA cartel will let go of the power (and associated cash flow) voluntarily.
>I hope we see a different CA for each ccTLD in the future. Completely agree with this and IMO it's how the system should've operated from the very start. Unfortunately, I highly doubt that the CA cartel will let go of the power (and associated cash flow) voluntarily.
> Surely this will improve user security and trust in the existing Web PKI system in non-Western countries. /s I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying, but this particular sarcasm seems incorrect. Given Verisign's willingness to bend the knee to Texas courts, one could reasonably lose faith in US PKI issuers such as Digicert. I certainly hope the EU is studying the problem US-controlled EU-trust…
>I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus. >So I empathize with the sarcasm, but best not to offer MitM proponents (whether in Russia or the U.S. or elsewhere!) an argument that could be used against your viewpoint. If browsers truly cared about u…
>Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus.
So the West essentially helps Kremlin to control Russian citizens. Why is that? Incompetence or something else?
This is probably the future. Who is better able to verify an identity than a state? State run registrars regulate companies. States issue individuals ID documents. If you have trusted central parries issue encryption certificates it will gravitate to fewer and more centralised issuers. Decentralised systems such as ssh are different, but I find it hard to imagine trusted central authorities ending up as anything othe…
Downvotes but no counter arguments? DO people think I am wrong but cannot be bothered to explain why, or are people shooting the messenger, or have poor reading skills and interpret prediction as advocacy? Genuinely curious.
Might as well merge them all and call FSBank, for they will be sure as hell MITMing all the communication between clients and backends.
I have very little reason to believe that NSA is not doing, and had been doing that, more or less for as long as there had been CA.
And on a global scale.
If you don't find this plausible, it is because usually americans believe their predator state to be some kind of a "lion king" (aka superman, spiderman. etc), while it is more of a laughing hyena.
Might as well merge them all and call FSBank, for they will be sure as hell MITMing all the communication between clients and backends.
I have very little reason to believe that NSA is not doing, and had been doing that, more or less for as long as there had been CA. And on a global scale. If you don't find this plausible, it is because usually americans believe their predator state to be some kind of a "lion king" (aka superman, spiderman. etc), while it is more of a laughing hyena.
You can verify this for your own domains by using certificate transparency.