Interesting, Claude cared enough to stop
Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
71–80 of 212 posts
Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#72Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#73Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't interpret it like that at all . This is deeply embarrassing for Anthropic: it turns out they hadn't been keeping a close eye on their models either, and back in April they successfully attacked three different organizations! The hacks weren't particularly impressive either: > [...] using basic techniques, such as exploiting weak passwords and unauthenticated endpoints. It did not find or exploit any complex v…
Then maybe just this timing is really unfortunate, I think most people’s first reaction will be that it looks like a “us too” response to the OpenAI/hf thing.
It's fun to bash Anthropic, isn't it?
Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#74Earlier quoted context omitted.
so deeply embarrassing that they published an eng blog about it
If they quietly brushed this under the rug - especially given the PyPI malware that was involved - it would be a huge scandal. Disclosure is the only ethical response to this.
Writing PR pieces competing to be the most dangerous model around (so give us money!) is the unethical part.
Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#75Seems they want the narrative to be that “Claude” (their computer program) independently attacked some organizations, ergo LLMs are dangerous etc. Another framing would be Athropic irresponsibly (vibe?) coded an attack script, and didn’t monitor it as it was pointed to public facing orgs. There are lots of non-AI attacks a large org with a lot of compute and bandwidth could level against others, there are evidently v…
Exactly. These postings by AI companies are just publicity stunts and demonstrate the delusional world they live in driven by the fear that they will be subject to a reckoning at some point either from their VC masters, government, or the public. The very notion (in this case put forward by one of their own competitors) that OpenAI's models 'broke out' of an isolated test environment plays up to the narrative that th…
Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#76Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I don't interpret it like that at all. This is deeply embarrassing for Anthropic: it turns out they hadn't been keeping a close eye on their models either, and back in April they successfully attacked three different organizations! This just helps their (Anthropic) argument into persuading the US government into taking action into limiting powerful closed or open-weight models from being released without going thro…
They also gave access to Mythos ( the Mythos) to some companies, based on... vibes. Who knows how these companies are using it. If Anthropic can't effectively contain their own models, can the partners? While the rest of us get fallbacks and warnings, not even being able to defend against the attacks they themselves are causing. Do we really have to re-learn all the industry's knowledge the hard way?
According to whom?
> Do we really have to re-learn all the industry's knowledge the hard way?
Yes we do. That's why there is the saying "regulations are written in blood". Especially for LLM, which not too long ago a lot of people on HN dismissed as stochastic parrot and next token generator.
Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#77I can’t help thinking if I casually blogged about a computer or software I was responsible for hacking into multiple organizations and exfiltrating data I would invite some form of official attention.
What if one of these companies decides to sue?
Has Anthropic violated any Federal law?
Is there some kind of expectation that if you just admit to hacking, it’s ok? Yet, that doesn’t seem to apply to individuals.
Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#78Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#79[flagged]
/s
Re: Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations
#80Earlier quoted context omitted.
They also gave access to Mythos ( the Mythos) to some companies, based on... vibes. Who knows how these companies are using it. If Anthropic can't effectively contain their own models, can the partners? While the rest of us get fallbacks and warnings, not even being able to defend against the attacks they themselves are causing. Do we really have to re-learn all the industry's knowledge the hard way?
> based on... vibes According to whom? > Do we really have to re-learn all the industry's knowledge the hard way? Yes we do. That's why there is the saying "regulations are written in blood". Especially for LLM, which not too long ago a lot of people on HN dismissed as stochastic parrot and next token generator.
It's very easy to answer this without my help by trying to get access to Mythos.
Do you see requirements clearly listed anywhere?Can you even apply?
What you'll find is maintainers of large open source projects and analysts' reports with vague statements like - "should follow strict security requirements":
"Trinidad also noted that the Anthropic announcement pointed out that each of the 150 new participants, in Anthropic’s phrasing, “will need to meet our security requirements before they gain access.”
Trinidad said the security requirement claim doesn’t build confidence, because “nobody knows what those security requirements are.” [1]
It's also some random rich companies like Hitachi or Dragos [2]
Do you trust that Hitachi and hundreds of other random organizations will be able to contain Mythos and not accidentally attack your project or your bank? I don't.
> Yes we do. That's why there is the saying "regulations are written in blood"
We absolutely don't. We have already learned with blood that gating access to security based on the number of zeroes in bank account and authority is a horrible model. We can apply this knowledge to LLMs, we don't have to spill blood again.
[1] https://www.csoonline.com/article/4180265/anthropic-grants-p...
[2] https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/anthropic-limits-on-ot-acce...