Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you have the reference for this, I remember seeing it recently but can't dig it up
I think GP is referring to "Prompt Injection as Role Confusion" ( https://role-confusion.github.io/ ). It was discussed on HN several weeks ago ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48631888 )
Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
261–270 of 317 posts
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#262Earlier quoted context omitted.
Some physical constraints do not allow for the best security, and those physical constraints will always win out in the real world. When presented with the pick two of three options of fast, cheap, secure/done right, fast and cheap will always win out.
Also more commonly, security is at direct odds with utility . Not in the least here.
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#263Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#264> "At the time of publication, no robust mitigation for the broader vulnerability class is available" Isn't it obvious by now that it's never going to be possible to fix this kind of thing, at least until we stop mixing up instructions with data.
This is probably a dumb question but why can't we use message signing to segregate the streams or at least add repudiation? The message telling you to look at the doc is signed but the doc is not signed and thus not treated like chat input.
There aren't two different inputs to an LLM, just one. You can put any text you want in the input (the "context window"), but fundamentally the current architecture of LLMs is a function taking one argument. So signing doesn't help because the portion that's signed is commingled with the portion that's not signed, and sometimes the LLM will "do things" based on the unsigned portions' contents.
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#265Earlier quoted context omitted.
There are so many better alternatives but it seems many people really like Word for some weird reason. The last time I cared I had to look up how to make a document starting the page numbering on the 2nd page. It turns out there are totally different ways between different versions of Word. shrug.jpg
Such as? Word hits the sweet spot of having support for all the complexity the average person may encounter/want to create. Libre, Apple Pages, and Google Docs all seem like clearly worse tools in most aspects in my experience. LaTeX is extremely powerful, but also way too complicated for the average non-HN person/person who doesn't live in complicated documents.
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#266Earlier quoted context omitted.
He probably means JSX mixing HTML with Javascript... function Greeting({ name }) { return Hello, {name} ; }
You just did that in a HN comment, yet nothing happened :). Could it be that the whole idea is silly misunderstanding of fundamental tenets of reality in the first place?
You can also post a random AI malware prompt, and I can assure you nothing will happen.
What's your point?
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#267> "At the time of publication, no robust mitigation for the broader vulnerability class is available" Isn't it obvious by now that it's never going to be possible to fix this kind of thing, at least until we stop mixing up instructions with data.
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#268> "At the time of publication, no robust mitigation for the broader vulnerability class is available" Isn't it obvious by now that it's never going to be possible to fix this kind of thing, at least until we stop mixing up instructions with data.
Probably not, because that is the same reason phishing works on us. That email could be really from the CEO, containing instructions, or it could be spam, containing data that should be ignored.
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#269> "At the time of publication, no robust mitigation for the broader vulnerability class is available" Isn't it obvious by now that it's never going to be possible to fix this kind of thing, at least until we stop mixing up instructions with data.
Instructions are data
Re: Document-borne AI worms can self-propagate through Copilot for Word
#270> "At the time of publication, no robust mitigation for the broader vulnerability class is available" Isn't it obvious by now that it's never going to be possible to fix this kind of thing, at least until we stop mixing up instructions with data.
This has been a security vulnerability since day 1 with these models, yet collectively the people who use them just simply don't seem to care about the security implications. Its especially problematic given that people let AI agents have full unrestricted access to their system Its going to take even more data breaches for the AI crowd to finally care, but to a large degree I have absolutely no sympathy. You know wh…