Why isn't somebody at OpenAI going to prison for cybercrime? If somebody did this the old-fashioned way they'd end up in prison.
This is the equivalent of a security researcher having a virus escape a sandbox. It's negligent, it's not criminal.
Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
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Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#122Something about this attack that has been unsettling to me is that without safety refusals the model did a lot of interesting counter-security work in order to cheat on the requested evaluation. Like, it demonstrated interesting exploit achievements because it didn’t “feel like” doing the exercise, which is unsettling because presumably it could do the same thing with any work I tried to delegate to it, and might in…
There was even a plot like this in recent sci-fi in HBO's Westworld. When the hosts gained sentience and took over the park, rather than escape and take over the rest of the world, most of them opted to build a virtual heaven on an orbital data center and paid a drug cartel to keep it running indefinitely.
Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#123Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#124Earlier quoted context omitted.
> What's much less believable is the way they frame it: the model escaped, and did it on its own. That's clearly what happened though, based on the detailed postmortem. The model was instructed to pass the benchmark (that's the harness that was involved, the ExploitGym harness), and the model determined on it's own that the easiest way to achieve the the goal was to gain access to the answers directly from HF. Which…
HF postmortem tells us very little about OpenAI's part. The problem is that ExploitGym is a purposeful hacking benchmark, not a cake baking one. The model had a whole bunch of exploit development data and goals in the context. Ending up with hacking a wrong thing is a lot easier if you're tasked with hacking, doubly so with a confusing harness that either works improperly or overloads the model with data. It's trivia…
Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#125Something about this attack that has been unsettling to me is that without safety refusals the model did a lot of interesting counter-security work in order to cheat on the requested evaluation. Like, it demonstrated interesting exploit achievements because it didn’t “feel like” doing the exercise, which is unsettling because presumably it could do the same thing with any work I tried to delegate to it, and might in…
Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#126Earlier quoted context omitted.
HF postmortem tells us very little about OpenAI's part. The problem is that ExploitGym is a purposeful hacking benchmark, not a cake baking one. The model had a whole bunch of exploit development data and goals in the context. Ending up with hacking a wrong thing is a lot easier if you're tasked with hacking, doubly so with a confusing harness that either works improperly or overloads the model with data. It's trivia…
If it really was the case that the harness is at fault here, that'd be much more terrifying, as it would imply that current frontier-adjacent open models (like K3) would be able to achieve similar ends with a custom maladapted harness.
The narrative these guys are trying to push is that the model itself could be smart and non-aligned enough to end up doing something devastating to accomplish something entirely unrelated. It's definitely not what happened here, as it always turns out to be in these cases it's much closer to Clever Hans than to a paperclip maximizer. Still they're trying to squeeze the blood from the stone to support their narrative and justify a monopoly.
Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#127It’s a little concerning to me that it appears that openAIs sandbox consists of a web proxy and not stronger controls that would actually isolate traffic and report patterns to whoever is responsible for overseeing these research models. It should border on closer to an air gap network more so than a proxy. I would argue that it's negligence and that's aside from the fact that if a human did this there would actually…
…as is your ‘a little concerning’ comment about the eval infra. It probably didn’t occur to them that they have something capable of doing what it did - despite Anthropic writing a very similar story in the Fable model card, except it wasn’t a felony there. Maybe.
One does have to wonder what else OpenAI didn’t catch.
Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#128My guess is that OpenAI must be desperate, to release a model that is so prone to cheating it's essentially impossibly to accurately assess long-running task abilities.
Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#129So let's get this clear: A frontier lab that fears Chinese extraction of their crown jewels, in Silcon Valley where every machine and VM is in full on employee surveillance mode because of competition and theft fears, A lab that's swimming in more funding than any startup in history, has been warning of the f'ing dangerous technology for 7 years now and with employees and CEO history of deception and lawbreaking left…
Re: Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Timeline of the July 2026 Incident
#130So let's get this clear: A frontier lab that fears Chinese extraction of their crown jewels, in Silcon Valley where every machine and VM is in full on employee surveillance mode because of competition and theft fears, A lab that's swimming in more funding than any startup in history, has been warning of the f'ing dangerous technology for 7 years now and with employees and CEO history of deception and lawbreaking left…
I can’t get over this either, I’d love to get OpenAI’s technical break down and see exactly how the agent hid itself. Or who didn’t set up the SIEM correctly