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Our position on open-weights models

anthropic.com

361–370 of 1001 posts

Re: Our position on open-weights models

#362

> Anthropic has never advocated for a ban on open-weights models. > All sufficiently capable models, open and closed, should go through mandatory safety testing. Yeah, this is anthropic advocating for a ban on open weight models. Who runs this test? What happens if this test is too costly or the administrator refuses to allow certain people to participate. This is exactly how the US has banned goods in the past, by r…

> Yeah, this is anthropic advocating for a ban on open weight models.

This is an ungenerous take, and I think it's important to to recognize it's reasonable to support models that are both open and safe. How this would actually be achieved is unclear though. Dario is at least proposing a solution a solution, which is the model needs to pass safety testing. This is reasonable and I wouldn't conflate this with wanting to ban open weights.

I think the deeper problem might be though that once you have safe open-weight models, it will be much easier to make them unsafe. And to be specific, unsafe means proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons knowledge and similar information.

Re: Our position on open-weights models

#364

I don't really see the link between use of AI and military superiority. My current understanding is a lot of current US military problems are due to rare earths supply chains. I don't see how AI would either help or hurt with that.

This framing also builds a case for AI being a Second Amendment issue in the US, which seems to work against Anthropic here.

Re: Our position on open-weights models

#365
post #172

To everyone here pushing for total proliferation of open models -- what should be done about open weight bioweapon and cyber-offense capabilities? Is it simply the cost of freedom that we should allow attackers to access these tools? The OpenAI / Hugging Face incident shows what a GPT 5.6 level model can do off the leash; within ~6 months, open weight models will match this and every bad actor under the sun will be a…

[deleted]

Re: Our position on open-weights models

#367
post #172

To everyone here pushing for total proliferation of open models -- what should be done about open weight bioweapon and cyber-offense capabilities? Is it simply the cost of freedom that we should allow attackers to access these tools? The OpenAI / Hugging Face incident shows what a GPT 5.6 level model can do off the leash; within ~6 months, open weight models will match this and every bad actor under the sun will be a…

If this is really the risk, then we should approach LLMs like atomic bombs: the US should reach out to other nations so they all agree on no one developing any more AI models. That's the only way you could possibly convince another party to stop. The US should set the example, not conveniently keep all the spoils.

Re: Our position on open-weights models

#368

It's absolutely reasonable to have safeguards on sufficiently dangerous models being released - if you disagree, can you explain your perspective? I think it's wildly irresponsible to release models that are extremely capable at things like bio-weapons. Do you really think information anarchy is the answer? The problem with open models compared to closed models is not about protecting profit - it's about protecting c…

The biggest problem is the infectious nature of restrictions that start narrowly. Fable is too touchy about helping people with biology and chemistry problems. It was initially released with an even more insidious safety mandate:

https://simonwillison.net/2026/Jun/10/if-claude-fable-stops-...

In light of the ability of recent models to accelerate their own development, we’ve implemented new interventions that limit Claude’s effectiveness for requests targeting frontier LLM development (for example, on building pretraining pipelines, distributed training infrastructure, or ML accelerator design).

...

Unlike our interventions for cybersecurity, biology and chemistry, and distillation attempts, these safeguards will not be visible to the user. Fable 5 will not fall back to a different model. Instead, the safeguards will limit effectiveness through methods such as prompt modification, steering vectors, or parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT).

(And although the "silent" downgrade part was quickly dropped, Fable still won't help you here.)

Anthropic won't teach you how to build bioweapons, or enable you to make your own software infrastructure so that you can train your own biology model. That's where lawmakers may arrive too if they buy Anthropic-style safety arguments. It's too dangerous to publish models that understand biology. It's too dangerous to publish training software. It's too dangerous to publish tools that allow you to build training software.

If you keep following the implications of their safety argument, it's as broad an assault on the distribution of software and computing as has ever been proposed. Worse than the Clipper Chip proposal of the 1990s era Crypto Wars. I have seen how "children must be protected online" has in practice turned into an attack on adult privacy affecting a wide swath of services and devices. I'm taking a maximalist position on openness now because I think that I can anticipate the next steps on the safety side, and I reject those steps.

Re: Our position on open-weights models

#369

In the first paragraph, > Anyone who has read my past writing should know that I don’t regard such bans as a useful measure, Later (on banning chip sales to china) > we should crack down on the rampant smuggling and workarounds used to obtain access to such chips. If you truly believe that bans don't work, the same applies to hardware too. Furthermore, Dario says later "To address these concerns, I do support the fol…

TL;DR: We like money, and Anthropic should stay in a position to make loads of it despite any competition.

> We like money, and Anthropic should stay in a position to make loads of it despite any competition.

In a position to lose loads of money, maybe.

Even without China eating their lunch, there's zero reason to believe Anthropic will ever be profitable.

Re: Our position on open-weights models

#370
I know it's unpopular, or unfashionable, but I agree with this letter.

LLMs are becoming so powerful that they are dangerous. We've seen last week with the OpenAI hacking (by mistake) Hugging Face debacle.

It is absolutely ok to have open weight models at the level of GPT-OSS-100B. That one was released one year ago, and I think it's still a strong one. GLM 5.2 is a whole new level, but it appears to still be safe. Maybe Kimi K3 will be ok too. But beyond that, things will start being dicey.

It's easy to dismiss this and claim that Dario Amodei is just looking to fatten his pockets. And, sure, if Anthropic manages to put the brakes on open weight models, that reduces the competitive pressure it feels. But that does not make what Amodei's argument incorrect.

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