Earlier quoted context omitted.
No it can't. The the thing, it's obfuscated.
I'm gonna trust the grapheneos HN account on this one.
GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
251–260 of 284 posts
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#252Earlier quoted context omitted.
"I'm here for business and my employer requires it" is an acceptable excuse. "I don't like government surveillance" is not.
"I'm self-employed and my SOC 2 compliance consultant requires it."
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#253Earlier quoted context omitted.
This may feel like a good idea as a “gotcha” justification but it just doesn’t matter. It’s still extremely abnormal and you will stick out. The only way to protect yourself is by blending in, not sticking out.
i am familiar with a number of the security team personnel, so i can give you the inside perspective. the reaction you provoke at a border crossing, or an LEO encounter is almost entirely based on what profile you fit. the vehicle, the state/contents of the vehicle, what you say, even how you move, are being evaluated for consistency with a profile.
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#254Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#255Earlier quoted context omitted.
A replacement for SeedVault is planned: https://grapheneos.org/features#encrypted-backups https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/4687#i...
Neat, I didn't realize it was still included. I thought it had been abandonned. So basically one needs a webdav server somewhere or an usb flash drive.
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#256Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The iPhone Probably the latest models. Cop told me they have problems cracking those. Older models not so much, that's pretty common knowledge.
Is this because of vulnerabilities baked in the HW (or bootROM or any other unpatchable area)? What’s the situation on older Pixels? Are they generally safer than an iPhone for HW issues? It’s expected that given a few years some vulnerabilities will crop up for most hardware. So then the best chance for security is to stay up to date with everything, including the latest HW model. At least this gives an attacker a w…
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#257Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#258There was some comment here somewhere arguing that 16 characters for a password is too little, but that he used the pattern lock. Looks like it was deleted. Anyway. The pattern lock in Android provides Log2(389112) =~ 18.57 bits of entropy. This is less than 3 random characters, or 4 lowercase letters, or a decimal PIN digit password of 6 characters. Granted, you could use mnemonics for long passwords, but how conven…
GrapheneOS supports up to 128 character passwords to support using diceware passphrases. Using a strong passphrase avoids depending on the secure element. A random 6 digit PIN is secure due to the secure element rate limiting. Only a total of 20 attempts are permitted so even a random 4 digit PIN would be fine. GrapheneOS adds the option to set a 2nd factor PIN for fingerprint unlock to make using a strong passphrase…
- After an incorrect key, require two (or more) consecutive valid key entries.
- After an incorrect key, no longer accept that nominal key until a secondary key is supplied.
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#259Earlier quoted context omitted.
No one is stopped from backing up important data. It is, in fact, kind of boneheaded to keep all "valuables" on a single device. I don't understand the scenario of not trusting a device to safely access the Internet or the telephony grid while also insisting that they need a PHONE to keep all their stuff on where they're going, and at the same time somehow trust that both themselves and their possessions are perfectl…
Personally I just got grapheneos to replace my normal phone. It's nice, it works for the user instead of the advertiser, and its security features help block antiuser features in apps
Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices
#260Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm gonna trust the grapheneos HN account on this one.
An unmounted, hidden veracrypt volume is pretty much undetectable with the typical forensics, if the OS hasn't leaked anything that would expose it. I don't know what their official account was alluding to with that wildcard statement.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=Cider9986#49058421