171–180 of 284 posts
It's fairly easy to open up a phone and probe inner circuitry. I suspect that'll be the next step for malicious actors. I doubt very much the phone is fully resistant to having malicious data injected onto various busses.
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Neat, I didn't realize it was still included. I thought it had been abandonned. So basically one needs a webdav server somewhere or an usb flash drive.
The problem is that most apps opt out of backup, so it's effectively useless.
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The problem is that most apps opt out of backup, so it's effectively useless.
Yeah I don't even understand why this is even a thing. It should be user's choice, not app vendor/developer's choice.
What GrapheneOS is missing is a complete backup and restore solution so that people can preventively wipe their smartphone before crossing the border. It would be nice to have the possibility to backup/restore every app and their data from an ssh/sftp server the way google/apple users do with google cloud / icloud. I'd rather wipe my smartphone, only add a couple of direct contacts, a copy of my passport and the pdf…
We plan to entirely overhaul the backup system but it already works fine. It could be a lot simpler and cleaner both in terms of implementation and user experience. We're in the process of overhauling the other apps first but we'll get to it.
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> you need to get the guy across from you to not find you suspicious. What? No, who cares about that? Let him find you suspicious, what matters is that he doesn’t access your data. And it is not suspicious to cross borders (esp. US borders) with burner phones. As others have said, it is standard practice.
He doesn't access your data. He confiscates your phone, then still doesn't access your data, then denies you entry, then still doesn't access your data, then holds you in immigration detention for a week while he tries to access your data, which he can't. Is that a success? Maybe, if your data really is that valuable and a successful border crossing isn't.
Definitely.
> Maybe, if your data really is that valuable and a successful border crossing isn't.
Even if my data consisted entirely of cat pictures, it would be more valuable than successfuly crossing the border into a country that actively tries to invade my privacy.
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He’s a “surveillance expert” so the language is not at all surprising. These are the people who always bring up the appeal to emotion, associating a benign act with something unpalatable, criminal, terrorist, think of the children. When your job depends on not understanding and all that.
I'm fairly certain the person being quoted is saying the opposite of what you've implied - i.e. he thinks it is concerning THAT GrapheneOS is automatically associated with criminality.
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In regards to your first link, the quote "'It’s concerning – and sends the message that [GrapheneOS] is criminal by default,' said Christophe Boutry, a cybersecurity and surveillance expert." really is leading language. It's stating that protection is criminal and that vulnerability is law-abiding.
This is why it is important to continue iterating everywhere that device security is important for everyone. iPhone has nearly the same level of protection and we also do not see it as 'criminal by default'. Secondly, it is important to get as many people to use GrapheneOS as possible, including non-tech people. The more widespread it becomes, the harder it will become to paint this picture.
The recent Darksword exploit should give everyone pause in asserting that iOS is secure:
https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/mobile/2026/03/a-darksword...
I trust iOS with my banking and financial apps in a way that I would never trust Google, but I am under no illusion that any architecture can be completely secure.
On the Linux side, I have found SELinux maddening at times in forcing me to the syslog to enable and permit what I need the machine to do.
I have never seen anything this obstreperous in a BSD, but perhaps I have not looked with sufficient depth.
In any case, the Trust / SELinux / Enforcing status is a sizable advantage against iOS.
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He doesn't access your data. He confiscates your phone, then still doesn't access your data, then denies you entry, then still doesn't access your data, then holds you in immigration detention for a week while he tries to access your data, which he can't. Is that a success? Maybe, if your data really is that valuable and a successful border crossing isn't.
> Is that a success? Definitely. > Maybe, if your data really is that valuable and a successful border crossing isn't. Even if my data consisted entirely of cat pictures, it would be more valuable than successfuly crossing the border into a country that actively tries to invade my privacy.
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I dont understand why people like a journalist working on things they dont want seized would carry this kind of data on their device at a situation like this (border crossing), I see it as more useful to remove that kind of data from the device first.
Probably because everything seems to be an "app" these days. Even when it has no business being one.
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The problem is that most apps opt out of backup, so it's effectively useless.
Android 12 changed the meaning of allowBackup="false" to opting out of cloud backups. GrapheneOS encrypted backups use the device-to-device transfer mode which includes apps opted out of cloud backups. It's similar to the Google Play data transfer feature, not Google's backup system.