Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data • Hacker News Board

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#51

Post by walrus01 » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:25 AM UTC

alephnerd wrote: post #20

tamimio wrote: post #14

But in reality this won’t happen, because China won’t be happy and will force Iran to a deal like last time or they will lose all the parts and intelligence tech they are providing to them.

> because China won’t be happy and will force Iran to a deal like last time... Iran's political leadership is amenable to negotiating but their incumbent military leadership which now calls the shots aren't [0][1]. The current incumbents in the IRGC and Artesh are now vets who were deployed on the frontlines in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq and are deeply anti-Western as a result. > or they (Iran) will lose all the…

> leadership doesn't trust China because they undermined Iran's position on Hormuz by backing the UAE [4]

Would you say that in the broadest possible sense, this is because China cares much more about keeping an unrestricted flow of (not $140-160 a barrel) oil coming from the Persian Gulf, oil/gas exports and outbound flow unrestricted for their own domestic consumption. They think that's much more important, given a choice and the impact of oil NOT flowing to their economies, than supporting the continuation of the IRGC and status-quo leadership in Iran.

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#52

Post by brokencipher » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:26 AM UTC

anigbrowl wrote: post #35

An interesting fact to consider is that the US stockpile (the Strategic Petroleum Reserve) is reported as the total of sour (high sulfur) and sweet (low sulfur) crude oil. The sweet stock makes up about 1/3 of the reserve and hardly varies at all. This is because US refineries are virtually all configured for sour crude: due to a mistaken belief in the 1990s that sweet crude was running out, the industry bet the farm…

Isn't this the reason why they specifically targeted Venezuela, to get their oil?

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#53

Post by eliotho » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:30 AM UTC

rtpg wrote: post #44

refulgentis wrote: post #6

I really do appreciate the effort but the data doesn’t reflect current conditions, and it’s falsified given it’s been virtually closed for months, certainly the same as 30% throughout that is the models default parameter, and we didn’t see ex. prices at $150/barrel 3 weeks in, or a host of other things it predicts. EDIT: I’m not saying it doesn’t matter the strait is closed - it does! - it’s just, what are we to do w…

The thing I've heard now in several places is that China is drawing down its massive secret stockpile (its _greatly_ reduced imports) which counterbalances a huge amount of this I do generally agree that the theoretical model being _this_ misaligned with the reality in front of us feels a bit hard to use

That's actually the intended behavior: while reserves are silently being spend is when the crisis is brewing. Although the main point is that nobody knows China's reserves, but this allows to calibrates scenarios based on what you believe is plausible

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#54

Post by eliotho » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:32 AM UTC

zer00eyz wrote: post #43

Simulacra wrote: post #40

This is very interesting, and it shows why the Strait is urgently in need of a back up. I don't know what that would be or what would be feasible, but I've seen a lot of people talk about an underground pipe.

The saudis built a pipeline across their nation, and are exporting over 5million barrels (a large increase). There is a great bit of coverage on this by "what's going on with shipping" here: https://youtu.be/r0EvQgLcjMw?t=172 It does not look like this data is part of the paper above.

Fair catch, the data predates the reroute. Although this pipeline is routed to Bab-el-Mandeb which is in the network

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#55

Post by alephnerd » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:32 AM UTC

walrus01 wrote: post #51

alephnerd wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> because China won’t be happy and will force Iran to a deal like last time... Iran's political leadership is amenable to negotiating but their incumbent military leadership which now calls the shots aren't [0][1]. The current incumbents in the IRGC and Artesh are now vets who were deployed on the frontlines in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq and are deeply anti-Western as a result. > or they (Iran) will lose all the…

> leadership doesn't trust China because they undermined Iran's position on Hormuz by backing the UAE [4] Would you say that in the broadest possible sense, this is because China cares much more about keeping an unrestricted flow of (not $140-160 a barrel) oil coming from the Persian Gulf, oil/gas exports and outbound flow unrestricted for their own domestic consumption. They think that's much more important, given a…

Yes.

But the issue is China doesn't have many options to push back against the IRGC's wish for shahadat.

The political and private sector economic leadership in Iran was neutered after Rouhani was not re-appointed by Khamenei, so opposition within the regime is weak and is largely purged.

Supporting opposition against the regime is also obviously a no-go as it would both be a diplomatic bruise for China's image as well as risk a Neutral or worst case Pro-American Iran, as well as send a message to Pakistan, North Korea, Laos, and Cambodia that Chinese commitments are only fair-weather.

Supporting any intervention by neighboring countries would be diplomatically bruising for China's image and risk a Neutral or worst case Pro-American Iran, as well as send a message to Pakistan, North Korea, Laos, and Cambodia that Chinese commitments are still dependent on American power projection.

And the clerical leadership and IRGC (two sides of the same coin - to join the Pasdaran you need to be ideologically vetted by clerical leadership, and a large portion of recruits are products of the religious education system) have complete control over all the organs of Iran's armed forces and it's economy, and hold resentment against both the West and East for being morally and religiously lax as well as capitalist.

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#56

Post by eliotho » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:34 AM UTC

anigbrowl wrote: post #35

An interesting fact to consider is that the US stockpile (the Strategic Petroleum Reserve) is reported as the total of sour (high sulfur) and sweet (low sulfur) crude oil. The sweet stock makes up about 1/3 of the reserve and hardly varies at all. This is because US refineries are virtually all configured for sour crude: due to a mistaken belief in the 1990s that sweet crude was running out, the industry bet the farm…

This is an interesting insight, as usable reserves < reported reserves the clocks in the model are optimistic

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#57

Post by petcat » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:42 AM UTC

brokencipher wrote: post #52

anigbrowl wrote: post #35

An interesting fact to consider is that the US stockpile (the Strategic Petroleum Reserve) is reported as the total of sour (high sulfur) and sweet (low sulfur) crude oil. The sweet stock makes up about 1/3 of the reserve and hardly varies at all. This is because US refineries are virtually all configured for sour crude: due to a mistaken belief in the 1990s that sweet crude was running out, the industry bet the farm…

Isn't this the reason why they specifically targeted Venezuela, to get their oil?

Venezuela and Iran are strategic targets to control China's supply of crude oil. That's pretty much it.

USA can produce all the oil/energy it needs for itself. Everything else is about controlling the energy supply to adversaries.

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#58

Post by walrus01 » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:49 AM UTC

alephnerd wrote: post #55

walrus01 wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> leadership doesn't trust China because they undermined Iran's position on Hormuz by backing the UAE [4] Would you say that in the broadest possible sense, this is because China cares much more about keeping an unrestricted flow of (not $140-160 a barrel) oil coming from the Persian Gulf, oil/gas exports and outbound flow unrestricted for their own domestic consumption. They think that's much more important, given a…

Yes. But the issue is China doesn't have many options to push back against the IRGC's wish for shahadat. The political and private sector economic leadership in Iran was neutered after Rouhani was not re-appointed by Khamenei, so opposition within the regime is weak and is largely purged. Supporting opposition against the regime is also obviously a no-go as it would both be a diplomatic bruise for China's image as we…

Within the neighboring region, China has also been sending extensive signals of "we support you and will engage in full trade with you, and retain full diplomatic relationships, etc, no matter what you're doing to your own people domestically" to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Stuff like offering full accreditation to the Taliban-run embassy in Beijing and issuing visas/support for a whole cadre of Taliban officials.

If China did an about-face on maintaining friendly relations with the IRGC, that would also be a big signal to the Taliban that maybe their "all weather" relationship with China was a bit more precarious than they previously thought it was.

With the recent minor border war between Afghan Taliban and Pakistani forces, closing the major land cargo trade routes of Torkham, Spin Boldak (and flows of cargo) along the AF/PK border, Afghanistan has very recently become much more reliant on import transit trade via Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Much of that for manufactured goods and technology that Afghanistan can't build domestically (just about everything of any technical sophistication) is ultimately manufactured in China and goes through UZ and TJ.

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#59

Post by alephnerd » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 2:57 AM UTC

walrus01 wrote: post #58

alephnerd wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. But the issue is China doesn't have many options to push back against the IRGC's wish for shahadat. The political and private sector economic leadership in Iran was neutered after Rouhani was not re-appointed by Khamenei, so opposition within the regime is weak and is largely purged. Supporting opposition against the regime is also obviously a no-go as it would both be a diplomatic bruise for China's image as we…

Within the neighboring region, China has also been sending extensive signals of "we support you and will engage in full trade with you, and retain full diplomatic relationships, etc, no matter what you're doing to your own people domestically" to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Stuff like offering full accreditation to the Taliban-run embassy in Beijing and issuing visas/support for a whole cadre of Taliban officials. If…

> China has also been sending extensive signals of "we support you and will engage in full trade with you, and retain full diplomatic relationships, etc, no matter what you're doing to your own people domestically" to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Stuff like offering

China has started disengaging with the Taliban now that Pakistan is fighting a war against them and after the Taliban are sending their leadership to India almost every month [0][1], backing the Taliban's position [2], and the Pakistani Taliban (which has the same leadership as the Afghan Taliban) has continued to attack CPEC [3] and targeting Chinese personnel [4].

> If China did an about-face on maintaining friendly relations with the IRGC, that would also be a big signal to the Taliban that maybe their "all weather" relationship with China was a bit more precarious than they previously thought it was

China snubbed the Taliban by not condemning Pakistan's strikes on Afghanistan [2] and not pressuing Pakistan to allow Afghanistan's ascension in the SCO [5].

And there's a reason the Taliban are sending their wounded for treatment in India and not China [6].

> With the recent minor border war...

The Taliban are treating the war as existential. And they are now diverting Afghan cargo to Indian operated Shahid Beheshti Terminal in Iran [7].

[0] - https://amu.tv/247309/

[1] - https://www.afintl.com/en/202607073529

[2] - https://amu.tv/245784/

[3] - https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/10/world/asia/pakistan-china...

[4] - https://afghandiaspora.org/2026/06/30/beyond-security-why-ch...

[5] - https://amu.tv/244941/

[6] - https://www.afintl.com/en/202606204287

[7] - https://www.reuters.com/world/india/afghanistan-urges-india-...

Re: Show HN: I simulated closing the Strait of Hormuz on real oil trade data

#60

Post by walrus01 » Sat, Jul 25, 2026, 3:05 AM UTC

alephnerd wrote: post #59

walrus01 wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Within the neighboring region, China has also been sending extensive signals of "we support you and will engage in full trade with you, and retain full diplomatic relationships, etc, no matter what you're doing to your own people domestically" to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Stuff like offering full accreditation to the Taliban-run embassy in Beijing and issuing visas/support for a whole cadre of Taliban officials. If…

> China has also been sending extensive signals of "we support you and will engage in full trade with you, and retain full diplomatic relationships, etc, no matter what you're doing to your own people domestically" to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Stuff like offering China has started disengaging with the Taliban now that Pakistan is fighting a war against them and after the Taliban are sending their leadership to Indi…

> and the Pakistani Taliban (which has the same leadership as the Afghan Taliban) has continued to attack CPEC [3] and targeting Chinese personnel [4].

Is it a fair assumption that a major factor in this in China's long term and continuing military cooperation with Pakistan? Joint fighter/attack jet development programs for air force, etc. It's my understanding that China has very friendly relations with the generals who actually run the Pakistani state, no matter who might be occupying the PM/president role at any given time.