Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It seems like everyone wants to be _the_ password manager for all your passkeys. Which defeats part of the point of passkeys in the first place in that they are supposed to be device-bound, the private key held in the TPM or secure enclave or whatever other security chip, mathematically non-exportable. Storing all your private keys in a cloud vault still leaves you exposed to potential credential theft if your vaul…
> Every device is supposed to have its own unique private key, stored in TPM, released only when passing the user challenge (biometrics or pin, or a yubikey). This is a misconception. A particular service can choose to enforce those class of passkeys, but most don't need that and shouldn't. Passkeys are primarily meant to replace passwords and be hard (but not necessarily impossible) to exfiltrate. The key difference…
Unfortunately, the designers of passkeys decided they should replace passwords and usernames and second factors.
Also they decided they should be cloud-synchronised, so the something-you-have second factor doesn't impose the burdensome requirement for you to have something, which was apparently a big usability problem.