Earlier quoted context omitted.
so openai hacked into huggingface?
To me it sounds like an open AI model with a narrow task of solving an issue found that the best way to solve it was to cheat and to get access to the answers that were hosted on hugging face and then did everything in its power to escalate permissions until it was able to get it to Hugging Face servers via the open internet.
OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
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Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#732Earlier quoted context omitted.
If anyone's looking to actually run a model that doesn't have guardrails, there's an uncensored model that you can run locally with llama.cpp: https://www.reddit.com/r/LocalLLaMA/comments/1rq7jtm/qwen353... Specifically, I serve the model with this shell script on my M2 Max: https://github.com/shawwn/scrap/blob/master/llama-serve It's pretty good. I used it to do some pesticide research. (Normal models all refuse due…
> It's pretty good. I used it to do some pesticide research. (Normal models all refuse due to guardrails about bioweapons.) As someone who has never once had any need whatsoever to research pesticides I… don’t think it’s bad at all? I don’t want anyone to have the capability to invent a human-targeted pesticide who isn’t verified not crazy?
Any physics teacher should know the theory for constructing a nuclear bomb. Should we be controlling that knowledge too?
What about flight simulators? Don't want a load of people knowing how to fly.
This isn't computer science, the hard bit is getting the materials and equipment, not the knowledge.
Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#733Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#734As grounded as this article comes across I can’t help but find this whole situation reckless and worrying. There is essentially nothing us private citizens can do while these companies develop super machine capabilities that if they were to slip into the wrong hands could cause massive real world problems. They’re moving fast and breaking things and the only defense we have is paying them money in the hopes that the…
It's computer Gain of Function research.
Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#735I don't know if OpenAI thinks this is a marketing / PR angle for them (our super smart AI cheated on a cyber capabilities test in the most _brilliant_ way) but my read is this: Why should OpenAI (or any frontier lab) be building these systems if they can't get a secure environment / containment right? It sounds like there was little defense in depth, appropriate monitoring, or any attempts to have their super smart m…
Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#736From https://huggingface.co/blog/security-incident-july-2026 , this is frickin' hilarious: > When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident respon…
> This had a second benefit: no attacker data, and none of the credentials it referenced, left our environment. Well, that may be correct for the second, local, analysis attempt... but seems funny to tout this as an advantage after already having tried the opposite...
Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#737Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#738From https://huggingface.co/blog/security-incident-july-2026 , this is frickin' hilarious: > When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident respon…
It is pretty funny, because there is something here for everyone. People who don't believe in guardrails have a clear indicator as to why operators should have access to models that don't try to question their Daves. On the other, people, who think that if only we could align the models just a tiny lil bit better, none of this would have happened to begin with. Pure madness.
I am unsure if this is terminology I am unfamiliar with, a typo of Devs, or a 2001 reference.
Re: OpenAI and Hugging Face address security incident during model evaluation
#739Can someone not super-AI-pilled explain to a reasonable lay person why this matters? It seems like the comments here are a mix of: * The test was irresponsibly designed and protected * The model was particularly persistent in finding a way to access the network and exploit vulnerabilities * The model 'shouldn't' have done this But as far as I can tell: * The model didn't destroy anything on the way - it just was 'pap…
In this case, the model infiltrated an external organization's infrastructure. What's the dollar cost it caused Hugging Face to clean up the mess? If a person did this, they'd be arrested. More generally, here's my worry - it points towards something like: The smarter they get, the more devious they become. Even though the guardrails might've been off, the chain-of-thought wasn't enough to prevent a deliberate, calcu…