If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; if you can find these projects and conveniently use them, state vendors can and will write scanners that find them. They're paid to do it; new detections are how they get to charge for maintenance and new versions. Then you're down to two issues: (1) Concealing an encrypted volume jacks suspicion w…
>If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; This would evade 99% of them. Most "state-level" adversaries are just high school dropouts working border jobs told to "investigate suspicious things". I once had a police officer literally raid my room for drugs during a massive party we were throwing in university, for example. They took everyth…
If you're intercepted with anything of value what you want is to rapidly destroy it.
This was the big problem I found when I was trying to figure out a secure way use Yubikeys: they're both long term unreliable, and short term impossible to wipe or destroy fast enough.
Literally a printout of 1 time passwords has better security properties in an adversarial situation.
For a storage device what you want isn't a secure store, what you want is a pin pull or switch which wipes it instantly.