31–40 of 175 posts
Might as well be rot13. If you rented 8 MI300X's or the nvidia equivalent, I don't even think an unreasonably long password would matter. It should finish quickly enough that you would be upset with all of the money you have now wasted by having to commit to a month of utilization
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Most "state-level" adversaries are just high school dropouts working border jobs told to "investigate suspicious things". The state-level threat isn't just about the direct employees' competence. They also have the funding to purchase tools made by people who really know what they are doing. Think of things like Pegasus spyware or Darksword iPhone hacking. I can believe that a keystone cop wouldn't know the differe…
Pegasus spyware operations cost something like $500k a pop, last I checked.
If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; if you can find these projects and conveniently use them, state vendors can and will write scanners that find them. They're paid to do it; new detections are how they get to charge for maintenance and new versions. Then you're down to two issues: (1) Concealing an encrypted volume jacks suspicion w…
> If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; if you can find these projects and conveniently use them, state vendors can and will write scanners that find them. They're paid to do it; new detections are how they get to charge for maintenance and new versions. How would those scanners work? If the device presents itself as a bog-standard usb…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Someone should write a disk formatting utility that randomizes the bits on your drive. Now you can claim that any encrypted drive (which just looks like pure noise if done correctly) is a drive that was just formatted.
Sounds a lot like stenography. https://github.com/dishather/steganodisk
If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; if you can find these projects and conveniently use them, state vendors can and will write scanners that find them. They're paid to do it; new detections are how they get to charge for maintenance and new versions. Then you're down to two issues: (1) Concealing an encrypted volume jacks suspicion w…
> If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; I kinda assumed this was a solved problem now, up to the information-theoretic limit. Just create a FAT32 fs (for example), put some boring decoy files on it, and then unmount it. Traverse the FAT to map which blocks are in-use vs not-in-use, and use the not-in-use ones to store your encrypted da…
Apple and Microsoft? I trust apple a bit more and MS none at all.
Linux is a bit different because the kernel is the OS, but only a small part of all its different packages. Also you'll have to watch it like a hawk because nation states will constantly try to compromise it.
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Be careful in countries like UK which have laws requiring the decryption of any data they find. There are people sitting in jail because they couldn't decrypt the "random noise" on their computers.
There literally are not. Anyone competent enough to be an expert witness will be able to plainly explain to everyone else how statistical analysis obviously delinates the difference between truly random noise and an encrypted volume.
Encrypted data should be statistically indistinct from random noise.
It's an information theory thing. Everything in the ciphertext should be sitting at maximum entropy.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Be careful in countries like UK which have laws requiring the decryption of any data they find. There are people sitting in jail because they couldn't decrypt the "random noise" on their computers.
There literally are not. Anyone competent enough to be an expert witness will be able to plainly explain to everyone else how statistical analysis obviously delinates the difference between truly random noise and an encrypted volume.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Most "state-level" adversaries are just high school dropouts working border jobs told to "investigate suspicious things". The state-level threat isn't just about the direct employees' competence. They also have the funding to purchase tools made by people who really know what they are doing. Think of things like Pegasus spyware or Darksword iPhone hacking. I can believe that a keystone cop wouldn't know the differe…
Pegasus spyware operations cost something like $500k a pop, last I checked.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Pegasus spyware operations cost something like $500k a pop, last I checked.
Can you check again and share where you're getting that number?
https://prodefence.io/news/pegasus-spyware-operating-costs-c...
If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; if you can find these projects and conveniently use them, state vendors can and will write scanners that find them. They're paid to do it; new detections are how they get to charge for maintenance and new versions. Then you're down to two issues: (1) Concealing an encrypted volume jacks suspicion w…
>If you're using off-the-shelf "hidden" encrypted volume schemes, you're not going to be evading state-level adversaries; This would evade 99% of them. Most "state-level" adversaries are just high school dropouts working border jobs told to "investigate suspicious things". I once had a police officer literally raid my room for drugs during a massive party we were throwing in university, for example. They took everyth…
Just to say, I know what you mean.