As someone who is on the other side, the amount of familiar, LLM generated reports are overwhelming and usually falls under "not familiar with product design/security scope" category. But there are also really good ones - so I can't afford to not take actual look at each, but it gets tiring and we need a solution. Spamming the former category with LLM generated "rationale" isn't that solution (yes I can tell this art…
Opening a freshly cloned repo in Cursor shouldn’t automatically execute a binary within that repo.
Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
171–180 of 222 posts
Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#172Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#173Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Really unfortunate. I don't understand why there's such a lack of response on the Cursor side. It's hard to vibe code security.
Is it though? Cause you can have an agent analyze the reports to filter out the wheat from the chaff.
Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#174As someone who is on the other side, the amount of familiar, LLM generated reports are overwhelming and usually falls under "not familiar with product design/security scope" category. But there are also really good ones - so I can't afford to not take actual look at each, but it gets tiring and we need a solution. Spamming the former category with LLM generated "rationale" isn't that solution (yes I can tell this art…
There is not easy solution, the landscape has changed and if care about security, you just need to allocate more human resources. Another layer of LLM checks won't help.
Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#175Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#176I'm not sure I fully agree with this being a major vuln. There's a lot of up front scary text which was raising a lot of red flags until it actually discussed the "what". An actor has to place a malicious .exe in the user's code folder, named git.exe, for this to take place. I see this akin to something like saying "replacing their .bashrc with an alias that says `ls` instead executes `/tmp/mega-big-virus.sh` is a vu…
Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#177Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#178Uh, you're already beyond fucked if git.exe (or equivalent in *nix) is a hacked one and on your system. And similarly the same doomsday article does not exist for VSCode, Zed, GitKraken, and a billion other tools that run git without caring to ask..
Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#179Earlier quoted context omitted.
The entire point of Cursor is to run autonomous coding agents. You are giving it a random untrusted repo, saying "hey it might have a virus, go crazy" and then getting mad that it caused harm? Check (and double check and triple check) your sources. If a malicious executable made it to your computer it is already too late.
Different layers, different risks. You do not expect an agent-level app to run untrusted binaries. You expect prompt injection, etc. And I don't at all agree that a malicious executable landing in some directory is already game over. Plenty of zip files have malicious executables, it doesn't mean you say "oh, my zip extractor should just run every executable because if one's bad I'm already toast".
Re: Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protection Left
#180Earlier quoted context omitted.
I’ve never got my head around how it’s apparently the done thing these days to just copy a bash command from a website and run it (sometimes with sudo! O.o ) to install software. I somewhat naively hope that this is because everyone is pushing single purpose VMs for that kind of install, but really I know better.
How is it different from downloading and running the application itself from that website?