Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don’t think it counts as social engineering if it’s exploiting an llm, we might need a new word. Prompt injection doesn’t cover it, because it’s not about a malicious prompt. I’m thinking some play on highjacking. AIjacking? Agent-jacking? Claudejacking?
To me the exploit chain sounded like a social engineering script done via telephone. Triggers like "Please spell your name and employer letter by letter" and "Due to security reasons I need to validate your hometown" fit my understanding of social engineering quite well. We can make it sound more advanced by creating a new name for it, but the concept seems to be super basic and the lack of bounty by Anthropic is baf…
I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
41–50 of 317 posts
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#42Doesn’t surprise me. Yesterday I learned that people run AI agents on their system with full admin rights. No containerisation or anything. Wild. Like we forgot 50 years of computer security overnight.
Most programmers and power users install large dependency trees with npm/pip/bundler/... on the same user account as their main browser on a regular basis. Even on Linux where it's easy to create new user accounts. This isn't much different.
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don’t think it counts as social engineering if it’s exploiting an llm, we might need a new word. Prompt injection doesn’t cover it, because it’s not about a malicious prompt. I’m thinking some play on highjacking. AIjacking? Agent-jacking? Claudejacking?
To me the exploit chain sounded like a social engineering script done via telephone. Triggers like "Please spell your name and employer letter by letter" and "Due to security reasons I need to validate your hometown" fit my understanding of social engineering quite well. We can make it sound more advanced by creating a new name for it, but the concept seems to be super basic and the lack of bounty by Anthropic is baf…
Anyway, agree with what you see saying - this is well worth a payout, embarassing they haven’t
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
Most programmers and power users install large dependency trees with npm/pip/bundler/... on the same user account as their main browser on a regular basis. Even on Linux where it's easy to create new user accounts. This isn't much different.
Most programmers use docker or don't install extensions unapproved by their company.
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#45> despite holding more information than most password managers what?
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#46Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#47But turns out I was playing 4D cybersecurity chess
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#48Creative use of social engineering, well done. > "no bounty was awarded" Ridiculous. Anthropic engineers are not just stupid to allow such a vuln in the first place, but they also try to hide such vulns from their bosses because a bounty payout would need to be explained to the finance team.
More like agentic en... Oh. Was it actually what we were doing all along?
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#49Creative use of social engineering, well done. > "no bounty was awarded" Ridiculous. Anthropic engineers are not just stupid to allow such a vuln in the first place, but they also try to hide such vulns from their bosses because a bounty payout would need to be explained to the finance team.
I don’t think it counts as social engineering if it’s exploiting an llm, we might need a new word. Prompt injection doesn’t cover it, because it’s not about a malicious prompt. I’m thinking some play on highjacking. AIjacking? Agent-jacking? Claudejacking?
Re: I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
#50Doesn’t surprise me. Yesterday I learned that people run AI agents on their system with full admin rights. No containerisation or anything. Wild. Like we forgot 50 years of computer security overnight.
That's because sandboxing is quite hard. I use `cco`, but even then, the home folder is exposed. You are one prompt away from the agent sending the browser passwords with curl. To prevent this, you need a fake home and a networking whitelist for the agent to access the provider (llama cpp, OpenAI, etc.) There is no cross-platform solution that is easy to use for this. And no, a Linux box with Docker won't do. I devel…
colima makes it pretty easy, on macOS and linux at any rate.