351–360 of 434 posts
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yes, this is basically experimental tech, if used with open source harnesses. if used with proprietary harnesses, treat as actual malware.
Technically open source harness like opencode is more "malwarey" than claude code for example because its default permissions are very open.
So many of the replies are saying that they should've restricted access using .md files and whatnot. Is really any guarantee that they even follow those? It seems like even if you ask pretty please don't touch those files, there's a chance they will. So many people have just willingly installed spyware on their computers and big tech calls this the next big thing.
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Yeah sounds like semantic indexing that cursor (pending acquisition by spacex/xAI) does. https://cursor.com/docs/agent/tools/search
They upload your ssh keys too?
I made a tool to solve this problem (at least on Linux, though I believe there's a way to achieve something similar on MacOS): https://github.com/swelljoe/flar It uses bubblewrap to instantly construct a container around just the agent config, auth and history and the project path. The agent or any command it runs can't reach outside of it even if you tell it to (or, more dangerously, a random prompt injection from t…
what is rocks and what is gars?
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If the agent you are running really wanted to it could easily find a way to mount the windows folders and read them all. WSL isn't a security boundary, you are only barely more protected than people running grok in their home directory.
it is not about "security" but it is more about confinement. And how could it do that without sudo rights?
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If you decide that your entire home directory is the project, as the OP did by setting the repo_path to ~/, then, well… I mean, if you ask me, I don’t recommend it, but it’s your computer and your free will.
Then that should be considered a 'nuke button' and nuke buttons don't find themselves into well-designed software for the simple fact that an end user shouldn't have to worry about shooting themselves in the foot. Again, with good software.
So is X going to claim the user disabled something the second before everything went south? That's what the owner's other company does.
the user literally added their home directory as a trusted directory. there's nothing to "claim"
My assumption when asked "do you trust this directory?" is that I am being asked if I am certain I understand what is in the directory and that it won't include some sort of prompt injecting attack. I would never dream that I was consenting to the complete exfiltration of that directory.